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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

EMER KENT WINWARD,

:

De f endant/Appe11ant.

Case No. 940530-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction by a jury
of forgery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990) (attached in Addendum A ) .
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did a fatal variance exist between the State's

evidence at trial and the bill of particulars concerning the
"victim" against whom defendant harbored the requisite "purpose
to defraud"?

Defendant's waiver of this claim below prevents

appellate review of the merits of this issue.

State v. Fulton.

742 P.2d 1208, 1216 (Utah 1987), cert, denied. 484 U.S. 1044
(1988).

Alternatively, if the merits are considered, the

question of whether a fatal variance exists is a legal question
reviewed on appeal without deference to the trial court.
generally State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).

See

2.

Was there sufficient evidence adduced at trial to

establish a "purpose to defraud anyone" as is required by Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-501?

In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, the

Court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's
verdict, and reverses the conviction only when the evidence and
the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are "so inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime." State v.
Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1215-16 (Utah App. 1991) (quotation
omitted); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990).
As a sub-issue of this point, must there be a nexus
between the "purpose to defraud" and the act of forgery?

This

presents a question of statutory interpretation which is reviewed
on appeal using a correction-of-error standard.

State v.

Stettina, 868 P.2d 108, 109 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Dickev,
841 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897
(Utah 1993).
3.

Did the trial court properly refuse to instruct the

jury that they must be unanimous as to the nature of the fraud
and the identity of the victim since neither constitutes an
element of the offense of forgery?

Because defendant failed to

raise a timely objection below to the absence of a unanimity
instruction, this Court must review this issue for manifest
injustice.

Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d

1201, 1203 (Utah App. 1991).

2

4.

Did the trial court properly admit expert testimony

concerning "purpose to defraud [?]"

A trial court's determination

on the admissibility of expert testimony is reviewed on appeal
for an abuse of discretion.
(Utah 1993).

State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361

Reversal is not warranted "unless the decision

exceeds the limits of reasonability."

Id,

As a sub-issue of this point, did the trial court
properly admit evidence regarding defendant's dealings with the
Bauers and ERA Realty?

Defendant's failure to provide any

meaningful argument prevents appellate review of the merits of
this issue.
5.

State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984).
Did the trial court properly refuse to instruct the

jury about joint venture or specific intent?

Defendant's

argument violates Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, thereby preventing appellate review of the merits of
this claim.

Alternatively, the issue of whether the trial court

erroneously failed to give defendant's proposed jury instruction
is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness.

State v.

Squire, 888 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Utah App. 1994) (citations omitted).
This Court will affirm where the instructions given, taken as a
whole, "fairly tender the case to the jury[.]"

State v. Diaz,

859 P.2d 19, 24 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting State v. Brooks, 638
P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981)).
6.

Did the trial court exercise appropriate discretion

in denying defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing on his
motion to disqualify the prosecutor?
3

Review of a trial court's

denial of an evidentiary hearing is had for an abuse of
discretion.

United States v. Gines, 964 F.2d 972, 977 (10th Cir.

1992), cert, denied, 113 S.Ct. 1023 (1993); United States v.
Peterman, 841 F.2d 1474, 1484 (10th Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 488
U.S. 1004 (1989); see State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1227 (Utah
App. 1993) (noting that a decision on a motion to disqualify an
attorney is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and
acknowledging that trial courts have broad discretion to control
the conduct of attorneys in matters before the court).
7.

Did the trial court properly impose a prohibition

against practicing law as a condition of probation where
defendant's practice was directly related to the criminal offense
of which he was convicted?

This question has become moot and

does not warrant appellate review.

See Burkett v. Schwendiman,

773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989); State v. Stromcruist, 639 P.2d 171,
172 (Utah 1981).

Alternatively, in reviewing a trial court's

probation decision, this Court applies an abuse of discretion
standard.

State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990); State

v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah App. 1994); see also Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8) (j) (1990) (granting sentencing court broad
discretion in imposing probation terms and conditions the court
considers appropriate).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on
appeal is contained in or appended to the body of this brief.
4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Emer Kent Winward and his wife Kimberlee
Winward were charged in the same information with unlawful
dealing with property by a fiduciary, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (1990) and -412 (1990),
and with forgery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990), based on their involvement in a real
estate transaction which culminated on August 9, 1993 (R. 1-5).x
Defendant moved for a bill of particulars, to which the State
responded (R. 16-18, 25-35).

The State thereafter amended the

information to additionally allege theft, a second degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990), as an
alternative to the unlawful dealing with property charge (R. 3638).

After a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over to

the district court on all counts (R. 55-57, 62). Defendant filed
a motion to quash the bindover order, a motion to recuse of the
judge, and a motion to disqualify the prosecutor, together with a
request for an evidentiary hearing on the latter motion (R. 6585, 86-87, 88-90, 131-32).

After hearing argument on the

motions, the district court granted the motion to quash as to all
but the forgery count, and denied in total the latter two motions
(R. 181-86, 187-90).

1

Although defendant and his wife were represented by the same
trial counsel and filed several joint pleadings, their cases were
handled separately below. Defendant was tried first by order of
the trial court (R. 270; Tr. Vol. II. 1191).

5

Following a two-day trial, a jury convicted defendant
of forgery, and the court ordered preparation of a presentence
report and released defendant pending sentencing (R. 257).
Defendant filed a post-trial motion to arrest judgment and an
application for certificate of probable cause (R. 290-313) . The
trial court denied both motions and sentenced defendant to an
indeterminate term of zero-to-fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison, stayed execution of the sentence and imposed probation
for 36 months under six conditions, including the provision that
defendant not practice law during the probationary period (R.
340-43, 346-47, 374-75) (a copy of the judgment and sentence is
attached in Addendum B ) .
In ruling on the application for a certificate of
probable cause, the trial court found that the issues raised by
defendant did not raise a substantial question of law or fact,
and that defendant posed no risk of flight or danger to the
community (R. 346-47).

Defendant appealed, and this Court

reversed the trial court's ruling (R. 368), and issued a
certificate of probable cause.

On remand for determination of

the conditions of release, the trial court stayed all
restitution, fines and community service requirements as well as
the requirement that defendant not practice law (R. 370-72, 38284) (attached in Addendum C). 2
2

A disciplinary hearing was subsequently held on March 7,
1995.
The district court granted the Office of Attorney
Discipline's motion for interim suspension of defendant, then
stayed the suspension for 180 days, apparently to permit
determination of this appeal (a copy of the district court's ruling
6

Defendant now appeals his conviction and sentence,
attacking the trial court's evidentiary rulings, the jury
instructions, the probation conditions, the court's refusal to
grant an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to disqualify
the prosecutor, and the sufficiency of the evidence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are recited in the light most favorable to
the jury's verdict.

State v. Morgan, 865 P.2d 1377 (Utah App.

1993); State v. Mickelson, 848 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1992); see
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993).

Because defendant

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the facts are stated
in detail.
In August 1992, George and Ann Marie Bauer listed their
home at 171 North 800 West in Cedar City for sale with Tom
Goodman, an agent of ERA Realty, for the purchase price of
$45,000 (Trial Transcript, Volume I [hereinafter "Tr. Vol.
855-58, 872-73, 884-85).

"]

Thereafter, when the home had not sold,

the Bauers lowered the asking price to $43,500 (R. 873, 885). On
July 12, 1993, another ERA agent, Kim Winward, defendant's wife,
received an offer from Nicole Packer, Kim's employee, to purchase
the Bauer home for $40,000 cash, $500 of which would be in the
form of earnest money (R. 251; Tr. Vol. I. 856, 859, 885-86,
889).

Two days later, the Bauers accepted the offer, relying on

the advice of their contracted real estate agent who indicated
that it was a fair deal, and without knowledge of other
is attached in Addendum D ) .
7

transactions concerning the property, including the fact that the
property would be re-sold on the same day Packer bought it for
$18,000 more than Packer was paying (Tr. Vol. I. 800-03, 874,
878, 880, 888).
Packer was living with the Winwards that summer, and
Kim had gotten her a job as her assistant at ERA Realty so she
could earn money to go to college (Tr. Vol. I. 921-22).
Defendant and his wife approached Packer about participating in a
plan in which she would be a "straw man" purchaser of real
property for and on behalf of defendant and his wife (Tr. Vol. I.
923-28; Vol. II. 1059, 1061-62).

Packer did not have the $40,000

purchase price for the Bauers' home but agreed to participate in
the Winwards' idea to buy property and immediately sell it at a
higher price to someone who would put up the money for the
initial purchase, then split the profits in thirds (Tr. Vol. I.
925-28, 960). After making this arrangement with the Winwards,
Packer made the offer on the Bauers' home, under the Winwards'
direction (Tr. Vol. I. 927).
Packer bought the property for $4 0,000 and closed the
sale on August 6, 1994 (Tr. Vol. I. 796, 799, 815). The same
day, Vicki R. Bassett purchased the property for $58,000 (Tr.
Vol. I. 800-803, 806) .
Bassett worked in a beauty salon, was a client of
defendant at the time, and was in the process of fighting a
custody battle over two of her children (Tr. Vol. I. 894; Vol.
II. 1101).

Defendant told her that she needed to secure a home
8

to appear stable and to help her position in the custody battle
(Tr. Vol. I. 915-16).

She explained that she did not have money

for a down payment, and defendant said he had located a home
which she could purchase without any money down (Tr. Vol. I. 89596; Vol. II. 1065, 1069).

Bassett agreed with defendant to

purchase the property for $58,000 by means of a $55,000 note at
11% interest (Tr. Vol. I. 896). Defendant said he would take
care of the remaining $3,000, which represented the down payment
being asked on the property, and that Bassett could repay the
$3,000 by providing hair and nail services to himself, his wife,
Packer, and another person (Tr. Vol. I. 900-01, 905). However,
defendant never contributed any money in this transaction (Tr.
Vol I. 906). Neither did he tell Bassett that Packer bought the
house for $40,000 the same day Bassett bought it for $58,000 (Tr.
Vol. I. 800-03, 806, 878, 888, 897, 909).
On July 15, 1993, one day after the Bauers accepted
Packer's $40,000 offer, a second ERA earnest money agreement on
the Bauer property was drafted reflecting the offer from Bassett
to Packer for $58,000 (R. 251; Tr. Vol. I. 802). The agreement
provided that Bassett would execute a thirty year note for
$55,000 at 13% interest (R. 251; Tr. Vol. I. 802).3
Through her work at ERA Realty, Kim Winward was privy
to the fact that Patricia Williams had money to invest in a real
3

Although Bassett agreed to 11% interest, the paperwork at
closing reflected 13% interest (Tr. Vol. I. 915-16). When the
witness asked defendant about it, he told her that she didn't have
to complete the deal then stressed to her how much more stable she
would appear in the custody matter if she had a home (id.).
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estate transaction (Tr. Vol. II. 1067).

The Winwards contacted

Williams, who agreed to purchase Bassett's $55,000 note for
$45,000 to finance the Bassett purchase (R. 251; Tr. Vol. I. 971;
Vol. II. 1067, 1097).

Defendant never told Williams that he, his

wife and Packer would receive profit from Williams' investment
(Tr. Vol. II. 1100, 1107).
Both transactions on the same property closed on August
6, 1993, at Cedar Land Title (Tr. Vol. I. 793, 815). All
participants came in separately to sign the documents (Tr. Vol.
II. 810). However, defendant appeared with both Packer and
Bassett as their legal representative (Tr. Vol. I. 847, 851-52,
930-31, 935, 966). During the course of the day, two warranty
deeds were signed:

the first from Bauer to Packer and the second

from Packer to Bassett (R. 251; Tr. Vol. I. 799, 810, 879). A
trust deed and a trust deed note were signed from Bassett to
Packer and, within hours, an assignment was prepared from Packer
to Williams (R. 251; Tr. Vol. I. 806-07, 814-15).
Williams supplied the financing to cover the costs of
both transactions through a wire received by Cedar Land Title (R.
251; Tr. Vol. I. 916, 971; Vol. II. 1078-79).

No money was

contributed by defendant, his wife, or Nicole Packer to the
assignment of the note to Williams (R. 251; Tr. Vol. II. 110708).

The $5,000 difference between the original purchase price

of $40,000 and the $45,000 wired by Williams was disbursed as
follows:

10

$4,697.50
+110.00
+692.50
-500 . 00

Check issued to Nicole Packer by title co.
Closing costs for Packer (Bauer/Packer deal)
Closing costs for Bassett (Packer/Bassett
deal)
Earnest money (Bauer/Packer)

$5,000.00
(R. 251; Tr. Vol. I. 836-38; Vol. II. 1022).
Once the transactions were completed, Cedar Land title
issued a check for $4,697.50 made payable to Nicole Packer and
gave it to defendant in the belief he was Packer's legal
representative (R. 251; Tr. Vol. I. 777, 817; Vol II. 1079).
Defendant stipulated that he knowingly and intentionally signed
Packer's name to the check and deposited it into his wife's
account at Mountain America Credit Union near his home (Tr. Vol.
I. 777; Vol II. 1079-80, 1086).

Thereafter, Packer received a

check from the defendant for $1,160.00, $1,000 of which defendant
represented was her share of the profits from the real estate
transaction and $160 of which was earned by her in a manner
unrelated to these transactions (Tr. Vol. I. 937; Vol II. 994,
1081).

Defendant did not tell Packer about the existence of the

check from the credit union or its amount, nor did he ever tell
her what the true profits of the transactions had been (Tr. Vol.
I. 940, 965-66).

It was not until three and a half months later,

while talking with Vicki Bassett, that Packer learned that she
had received less than one-third of the profits (Tr. Vol I. 937,
961-62; Vol II. 982). Upon checking the documents at the real
estate company, Packer discovered the existence of the check and
defendant's unauthorized endorsement (Tr. Vol. I. 938, 940-44) .
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I:

Defendant's failure to seek a continuance

upon discovery of an allegedly fatal variance between the State's
evidence at trial and the bill of particulars prevents appellate
review of his claim of error. Alternatively, no fatal variance
existed where the evidence conformed with the information, the
bill of particulars and the elements of the offense.
POINT II: The State adduced sufficient evidence at
trial from which the jury could have found that defendant
harbored a "purpose to defraud anyone" as is required under the
forgery statute.
POINT III; A jury must be unanimous on all elements of
a criminal charge for the conviction to stand.

Defendant was not

entitled to an instruction on unanimity regarding matters which
were not elements of the charged offense.
POINT IV:

The trial court properly admitted expert

testimony regarding the "purpose to defraud" element of forgery
under Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, especially where
defendant first introduced the evidence.

Further, any alleged

prejudice was adequately mitigated by the trial court's
admonition to the jury before admitting the expert opinion and by
defendant's own cross-examination of the witness.

No review is

warranted where defendant's argument regarding admission of
evidence relating to his interaction with the Bauers and ERA
Realty violates Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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POINT V:

Appellate review of defendant's claim of

error in refusing to give instructions relating to joint venture
is not warranted because defendant's argument violates the Rules
of Appellate Procedure.

Further, defendant's proposed

instructions were incomplete statements of the law, and there was
no reasonable basis in the evidence to justify them.

Finally,

the absence of an instruction on specific intent was not error
under the circumstances of this case; the instructions, taken
together, clearly and accurately tendered the case to the jury.
POINT VI: The trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing on his
motion to disqualify the prosecutor.

The court had sufficient

information before it upon which to render its decision, and
defendant has not established his entitlement to such a hearing
in this jurisdiction.
POINT VII:

The question of the propriety of a

probation condition which temporarily prohibits defendant from
practicing law has been rendered moot by defendant's subsequent
interim suspension.

Alternatively, such a probation condition is

appropriate as it relates to and punishes defendant's criminal
activity and does not amount to civil disciplinary redress for an
ethics violation.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS CLAIM OF VARIANCE BY FAILING TO
REQUEST A CONTINUANCE; ALTERNATIVELY, NO FATAL VARIANCE
EXISTS BETWEEN THE STATE'S EVIDENCE AND THE PLEADINGS
Defendant argues that there was a fatal variance
between the proof adduced at trial and the bill of particulars
where the State allegedly presented evidence beyond the scope of
the bill of particulars in violation of the Utah Constitution,
article I, section 12. Br. of App. at 11. Specifically, he
claims that even though the bill of particulars identifies Nicole
Packer as the person against whom the defendant harbored a
purpose to defraud, the trial court permitted the State to offer
alternative theories that defendant's fraudulent intent
encompassed a "field of alleged victims[,]" including not only
Packer, but the Bauers, the Bassetts, ERA Realty, and Mountain
America Credit Union.

Id. at 11-14.

He claims that he was

prejudiced because he was prepared only to defend against the
theory that Packer was defendant's intended victim; accordingly,
defendant centered his testimony around his relationship with
Packer, their discussions and their agreements.

Id. at 16-17.

A. Defendant's Claim is not Properly Before this Court and
Should Not be Reached
Under Rule 4(3), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a
defendant may move for a bill of particulars to supplement the
information

,f

[w]hen facts not set out in an information or

indictment are required to inform a defendant of the nature and
cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him to prepare his
14

.defense."

State v. Allen. 839 P.2d 291, 298 (Utah 1992); State

v. Strand, 720 P.2d 425, 427 (Utah 1986); State v. Mvers, 302
P.2d 276, 279 (Utah 1956).

The variance rule, grounded in

article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, prohibits the
State from proving at trial material matters beyond the scope of
the information and the bill of particulars.

State v. Bell, 770

P.2d 100, 103 n.4 (Utah 1988); Myers. 302 P.2d at 280.
When the trial evidence varies from the information and
the bill of particulars, defendant has a right to seek a
continuance.

State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1215 (Utah 1987),

cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1044 (1988) . Where defendant fails to
seek a continuance, he is no longer able to claim surprise and
waives his claim of variance.

Id., at 1215-16.

Because

defendant in this case failed to request a continuance, despite
the repeated discussions between the court and counsel concerning
the alleged variance from the bill of particulars (R. 209-90; Tr.
Vol. I. 752-56, 821-25; Vol. II. 1035-51, 1104, 1148-49), his
variance claim is not properly before this Court and should not
be reached.

Fulton, 742 P.2d at 1216.

B. Alternatively, No Fatal Variance Existed Between the State's
Evidence at Trial and the Pleadings
In the event this Court reaches defendant's variance
claim, it should reject the claim because defendant has failed to
establish any constitutionally fatal variance between the charges
identified in the information, the bill of particulars and the
State's evidence at trial.
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Where a bill of particulars is provided, that document
together with the information provides the detail of the charges
against which defendant must defend at trial.

See Bell, 770 P.2d

at 104; Fulton, 742 P.2d at 1214; Mvers, 302 P.2d at 279.
However, the State is not compelled to disclose all of the
evidence it intends to introduce at trial in a bill of
particulars.

Allen, 839 P.2d at 298; State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d

1351, 1353 (Utah 1977).

Nor must the State disclose the exact

theory on which it intends to proceed at trial.

Allen, 839 P.2d

at 298; State v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1977).
Defendant is only constitutionally entitled to receive notice of
the "particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct" so as to
adequately prepare a defense.

Allen, 839 P.2d at 298; Bell, 770

P.2d at 103-04.
Defendant's claim that he is entitled to a declaration
of the "field of alleged victims[,]" his claim is without merit
as the identity of the party defendant intended to defraud is not
an element of the crime.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990)

(requiring that the accused harbor a "purpose to defraud
anyone").

Moreover, the participants whom he claims should have

been identified were all intimately involved in the underlying
real estate transactions, and their involvement in the trial
could come as no surprise to defendant as they were necessary to
the factual development of the case.
Defendant's assertion of a right to the State's theory
behind the "purpose to defraud" element of the crime must also
16

fail.

First, defendant is not entitled to the State's exact

theory in response to a motion for a bill of particulars. Allen,
839 P.2d at 298.

Second, at the time he sought the bill of

particulars, defendant was well aware of the statute under which
the State had charged him and of the State's belief that
defendant's fraudulent intent extended to the other participants
involved in the real estate transactions (R. 1-5) (copies of the
information and the probable cause statement are attached in
Addendum E ) .
Additionally, there was no variance as defendant was
provided ample notice, by means of the original information, the
bill of particulars, and the preliminary hearing, of the evidence
the State later adduced at trial. Addendum E.

The forgery count

in the information echoes the language of section 76-6-501,
although it does not identify the specifics of the fraudulent
acts.

Addendum E.

The two-page, single-spaced probable cause

statement attached to the information, however, outlines in
detail the real estate transactions, the identities of the
participants involved, and defendant's part in the entire deal
(attached in Addendum E).

The statement makes clear that the

State believed that defendant had defrauded each of the
participants named in the probable cause statement in a
premeditated manner.

Id.

It is also clear from the probable

cause statement that the money represented by the final check
defendant forged was derived from a series of transactions, all
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of which were necessary to the "success" of defendant's plan and
proof of which would be required at trial.

Id.

Further, defendant's motion for a bill of particulars
specifically asked for the identity of the person believed by the
State to have been defrauded by defendant's endorsement of the
check identified in Count 3 of the information.

Defendant's

motion sought, in part:
3.

With respect to [the forgery count]:
a. The identity of the person and/or entity that
Defendant Emer Kent Winward sought to defraud; and
b. the nature and identity of the fraud which said
defendant was facilitating.

(R. 17) .4 Addendum E.

The motion did not ask for the identity

of all participants against whom the State believed defendant
harbored the "purpose to defraud" required under the statute.
Defendant cannot limit the State's case by submitting a narrowly
drawn request for a bill of particulars but must also take into
account the contents of the information and the probable cause
4

The State's response provided:

RESPONSE 3. With respect to [the forgery count]:
(a)
The identity of the person that Defendant EMER KENT
WINWARD sought to defraud is Nicole Packer.
(b) The nature and identity of the fraud that Defendant was
facilitating was taking a check made payable to Nicole Packer,
forging her name without her knowledge, and depositing the
monies in his wife's account so he and his wife, not Ms.
Packer, could use and spend the monies. Specifically, the
State alleges that the act occurred without her authority and
that the Defendant not only forged her signature but took
substantial steps in trying to obtain the actual monies after
the check was deposited.
(R. 26) . Addendum E. The response also listed all participants in
the transactions as witnesses to be called to explain their
involvement and knowledge of the transactions as well as what they
were not told by defendant (R. 34-31). Addendum E.
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statement attached thereto.

See generally Bell, 770 P.2d at 104;

Myers, 3 02 P.2d at 279 (the charges are delineated by both the
information and the bill of particulars).
Even if a variance existed, it was not constitutionally
fatal where defendant was neither surprised by the variance nor
prevented from presenting a proper defense to it. As previously
established, defendant knew before trial of the State's position
regarding defendant's treatment of all the participants involved
in the real estate transactions (R. 1-5, 25-35, 55-57).
Defendant provided detailed testimony concerning the entirety of
the transactions in support of his defense that he not only
believed he had authority for endorsing Packer's name on the
check and depositing it in his wife's bank account, but that at
every stage of the transactions which culminated in the check he
acted responsibly and according to accepted practice in dealing
with each of the other participants involved (Tr. Vol. II. 10591113) . As the record reflects that defendant was neither
reasonably surprised nor hindered in the preparation of his
defense, he is not entitled to reversal of his conviction.
POINT II
THE STATE ADDUCED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE JURY
COULD HAVE FOUND THAT DEFENDANT HARBORED A "PURPOSE TO
DEFRAUD ANYONE"
Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence
to establish the element of "purpose to defraud" against Packer
or any of the other participants identified by the State at
trial.

First, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to
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establish that defendant intended to defraud Packer.
at 17-21.

Br. of App.

He then challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as

it relates to the Bauers, Vicki Bassett, ERA Realty, and Mtn.
America Credit Union.

Id. at 21-30.

Included in the latter

point is the argument that the evidence relating to these four
participants could not support a forgery conviction because it
did not establish any legal nexus between defendant's endorsement
of the check and any purpose to defraud them.

Id. at 21-26.

The fault with defendant's arguments is the fact that
the victim(s) of defendant's "purpose to defraud" need not be
identified in order to obtain a forgery conviction; so long as
there was sufficient evidence to establish that he had such an
intent toward someone, the State's burden is met.
infra, on Jury Unanimity.

See Point III,

The State need only prove a purpose to

defraud anyone in order to establish this element of the offense.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501.

"Purpose to defraud" has been defined

by this Court as "'a purpose to use a false writing as if it were
genuine in order to gain some advantage[.]'"5

State v.

Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v.
May, 93 Idaho 343, 461 P.2d 126, 128 (1969) (citations omitted))
5

Defendant's reliance on statutory definitions of "intent to
defraud" from other jurisdictions is misplaced because those
jurisdictions add additional requirements to the "forgery offense"
in those jurisdictions. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3110(9)
(including in the statutory definition of "intent to defraud" that
the accused intend that another rely upon a deception and "assume,
create, transfer, alter or terminate a right, obligation or power
with reference to property"). Thus, defendant's reliance on State
v. Rios, 246 Kan. 517, 792 P.2d 1065 (1990), is not persuasive
because that case rests on Kansas' statutory definition. Br. of
App. at 24-26.
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(a copy is attached in Addendum F).

That the purpose to defraud

must coincide, at least in part, with the forgery is settled in
this jurisdiction.

State v. Collins, 597 P.2d 1317, 1318 (Utah

1979) .
The mere act of endorsing Packer's name to the check
without authority was sufficient to imply the purpose to defraud
and meet the State's burden of proof on this element of forgery.
Gonzalez, 822 P.2d at 1216. Defendant argues that he had implied
authority to sign Packer's name or, alternatively, that the end
justified the means--Packer got what she agreed to despite the
forged endorsement.

Br. of App. at 18-20.

While the question of

whether defendant acted with implied authority was a
consideration for the jury, the jury was well within its bounds
to reject this argument, as well as his contention that she
essentially ratified the act.

Id., at 21.

Instead, the jury

could reasonably infer a purpose to defraud from defendant's
secrecy about the check's existence, its full amount, the fact of
the endorsement, and the final amount of the profits.6
Further, the jury was justified in believing Packer's
testimony that, although she agreed to accept $1,000 for her part

6

Defendant's assertion that Packer's access to the account
somehow mitigates the evidence that defendant intended to defraud
her when he deposited her check into the account is no more
persuasive now than it was at trial. Br. of App. at 19 n.7. There
was no evidence below to suggest that Packer had any reason to know
that the Winwards' account balance had been increased beyond the
$5.00 at which it stood when defendant deposited Packer's check
(Tr. Vol. I. 779; Vol. II. 1113). Nor was there any evidence that
Packer ever accessed the account without direction from the
Winwards (Tr. Vol II. 1005-06, 1024-25).
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in the transactions, she did so only because defendant led her to
believe that $1,000 was one-third of the expected profits (Tr.
Vol. I. 937). She never received an accounting or was told the
amount of the profit (Tr. Vol. I. 965-66; Vol. II. 990-91, 1008,
1017, 1019).

Further, Packer's receipt of $1000 of the money

represented by the check does not mitigate the fact that, as sole
payee, she was legally entitled to the entire amount represented
by the check.

It was only after she learned that the profit had

been more than the $3,000 she had assumed that she discovered she
had received less than the share she had agreed to.7
In addition, the jury had defendant's admission that he
endorsed the check without Packer's express authority, together
with evidence that he never disclosed the check's existence, its
amount, or his endorsement of it Packer or to Mtn. America, the
two most easily identifiable targets of the endorsement itself.
The jury may well have found, based on this evidence, that
defendant gained the intended advantage of keeping more than the
two-thirds amount of the profit to which he and his wife were
entitled, and additionally was able to forestall any unwanted
inquiries into the underlying realty transactions.
7

Consequently,

Defendant argues that Packer knew the check was coming and
would be payable to her and that, by failing to challenge it or the
endorsement for several months, she waived any claim to any of the
rest of the money. Br. of App. at 21. However, Packer testified
that she did not know the check existed until more than three
months after it had been issued (Tr. Vol. I. 940; Vol. II. 1009).
It was only after she discovered from Vicki Bassett that the profit
had exceeded $3,000 that she looked into the transactions,
discovered at the title company that a check had been issued to
her, and decided that there would have been only one check and that
it would have been made payable to her (Tr. Vol. II. 1010-13).
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the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that defendant
forged the endorsement on the check with a purpose to defraud
Packer.
Moreover, by endorsing Packer's name to the check and
directing its deposit into a personal account to which Packer was
not a signatory, defendant led Mtn. America to believe it had
authority to give him $4,167,50, when in fact no such authority
existed.

Defendant argues that the endorsement merely created a

"potential for loss" to the credit union.

Br. of App. at 29-30.

However, the proper focus of the inquiry is on the advantage
defendant intends to garner, not the actuality of a loss to
another party.

Gonzalez, 822 P.2d at 1216 (defendant was

apprehended before any loss had been suffered, but the forgery
conviction was affirmed where the State established the advantage
defendant had intended to gain from the forgery).

By creating

and offering the forged endorsement to the credit union,
defendant led the credit union into honoring the endorsement,
thereby receiving the advantage of more money than he was
entitled to under his agreement with Packer and leaving the
credit union open to liability upon discovery of the forgery and
the bank's part in honoring the forged endorsement.
Based upon either of these scenarios, there was
sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably have
concluded that defendant had "a purpose to use a false writing as
if it were genuine in order to gain some advantage", thereby
possessing a "purpose to defraud anyone[.]"
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Gonzalez, 822 P.2d

at 1216 (quoting May* 461 P.2d at 128). Consequently,
defendant's allegation of error is without merit, and his
challenge to the evidence as it relates to the Bauers, Vicki
Bassett and ERA Realty would not affect his conviction and need
not be addressed by this Court.

State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208,

1213 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1044 (1988).
In any event, the claim against the remaining
participants would fail on its merits.

The forgery statute does

not require that the forged document be made "with the intention
of inducing another person to act in reliance thereon [,]" Br. of
App. at 23, although in this case defendant in fact intended that
Mtn. America act in reliance on the false endorsement.

Instead,

defendant must have intended to use the writing to gain an
advantage.

Gonzalez, 822 P.2d at 1216.

The evidence permitted

the jury to determine that defendant endorsed and deposited the
check without disclosing its existence to anyone in order to
complete the on-going fraud against the Bauers, Vicki Bassett and
ERA Realty and to keep the profits of the transactions.

The

fraud, born with defendant's idea to engage in the real estate
transactions, did not end until the proceeds of the check--the
advantage (profit) toward which defendant's efforts were aimed-were in defendant's account and Packer had been given $1,000.
Only at that point was the advantage envisioned by defendant
fully realized and the profits at his disposal.

In this type of

situation, the endorsement was not done to cover up a fraud which
had already occurred.

It was, instead, one of the final acts
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upon which the completion of the fraud depended.

Accordingly,

the jury was able to determine that defendant harbored a "purpose
to defraud" one or more of the participants to the realty
transactions at the time he forged Packer's name to the check.
POINT III
THE ABSENCE OF A JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING UNANIMITY
DOES NOT WARRANT REVERSAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE
DOES NOT RELATE TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE FORGERY CHARGE
Defendant argues that reversal is warranted because the
trial court did not require unanimity by the jurors concerning
the nature of the fraud (Br. of App. at 30-32, Point IIIA) and
the identity of the victim (id., at 32-33, Point IIIB).

First,

he claims that the State relied on alternative "wrongs" to prove
the offense of forgery or to prove the "purpose to defraud"
element of forgery, and that the absence of any assurance of
unanimity on the "wrongs" runs afoul of the Utah Supreme Court's
unanimity decision in State v. Tillman 750 P.2d 546 (Utah
1987).8

Br. of App. at 31-32.

Then he argues that the jury was

erroneously permitted to consider whether the Bauers or ERA
Realty were "victims" despite the lower court's determination
that neither party was a viable victim.9

Id. at 32-33.

However, both of these arguments necessarily fail for a single
8

Defendant's claim of "alternative wrongs" appears to mean
that whatever fraud defendant intended for one "victim" was
necessarily different from that intended for any other victim, and
the jury was permitted to convict him not only based on more than
one victim, but also on more than one method of fraud.
9

Defendant concedes that he does not challenge the specific
intent of the statute, i.e., the purpose to defraud. Br. of App.
at 31.
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reason:

the nature of the fraud and the identity of the victim

are not elements of the offense of forgery, rendering jury
unanimity unnecessary.

See State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162, 165-

67 (Utah 1987).
Moreover, defendant failed to raise a timely objection
below to the absence of the instruction.

Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)

(defendant must object before the jury is instructed and state
"distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his
objection."); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah App.
1991).

His assertion of the issue in support of his post-trial

motion to arrest judgment and application for certificate of
probable cause was not timely (R. 290-309).

At trial defendant

did not request such an instruction, and the objections he stated
to the court did not put the court on notice that he was putting
unanimity at issue (Tr. Vol. I. 1148-49).

Addendum G.

Consequently, appellate review may be had only to avoid manifest
injustice.

Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c); Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1203.

Defendant has not argued manifest injustice, and none occurred in
this case where unanimity is not required.
A jury must be unanimous on all elements of a criminal
charge for the conviction to stand.

State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d

1150, 1159 (Utah 1991); Tillman, 750 P.2d at 585-88 (Durham, J.,
concurring & dissenting); id. at 591 (Zimmerman, J., concurring &
dissenting); id. at 577-80 (Stewart, J., concurring in the
result).

Therefore, if the State's case is "premised on more

than one factual or legal theory of the elements of the crime and
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any one of those theories is flawed or lacks the requisite
evidentiary foundation [,]" the conviction must fall.

Johnson,

821 P.2d at 1159.
The State's forgery case was clearly based only on
defendant's endorsement of the Packer check without her authority
(Tr. Vol. I. 764-65; Vol. II. 1165-66).

Part of the State's

burden was to prove that defendant acted with a "purpose to
defraud anyone".

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1990).

The jury

was appropriately instructed that a "purpose to defraud" is
"simply a purpose to use a false writing as if it were genuine in
order to gain some advantage" (R. 24 0; Jury Instruction No. 14-C,
attached in Addendum G).
(Utah App. 1991).

State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216

The plain language of both the statute and the

instruction make clear that the jury need not identify either the
particular fraud or the specific victim in order to decide
whether defendant acted with a "purpose to defraud".

The

requisite purpose may be inferred from "the mere creation of an
instrument that is false [,]" Gonzalez, 822 P.2d at 1216, and a
defendant may be convicted of forgery even where no fraud has
been perpetrated.

See id. (conviction upheld even though

defendant was apprehended before anyone was victimized or any
fraud was completed).

Consequently, even if the jurors found

that defendant intended to defraud different people or to do so
in different ways, all of which culminated in the forged check,
they were justified in convicting defendant of forgery so long as
they found that he acted with a "purpose to defraud anyone".
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Defendant's reliance on Johnson and Tillman is misplaced, and his
claim must fail.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ESTABLISH ERROR IN THE DISTRICT
COURT'S ADMISSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY; FURTHER, HIS
CHALLENGE TO THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE SURROUNDING HIS
DEALINGS WITH THE BAUERS AND ERA REALTY VIOLATES RULE
24(A) (9), UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, AND DOES
NOT WARRANT REVIEW
A. The District Court Properly Admitted Expert Testimony
Concerning "Purpose to Defraud"
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing
the State's rebuttal witness, Hans Q. Chamberlain, an attorney
with extensive credentials and experience in public and private
practice, to offer expert opinion testimony concerning whether
certain hypotheticals presented evidence of a "purpose to
defraud".

Br. of App. at 33-39.

This issue requires a review of

how the testimony came out at trial.
Mr. Chamberlain's testimony was originally admitted as
rebuttal testimony for the purpose of aiding the jury in
determining whether defendant's professional position justified
his endorsement of Packer's check.

The trial court held:

Counsel, I see Mr. Chamberlain's role as that of
an expert witness and, as an expert witness, opining as
to what in his experience attorneys do or do not do. I
can see that his testimony under Rule 401 may have a
tendency to make the existence of any fact[,] that is
the role of an attorney in a real estate transaction[,]
either more or less probable than it would be without
the testimony of an expert witness. (Tr. Vol. II.
1118-19) .
(A copy of the trial court's ruling and the entirety of the
witness' testimony is attached in Addendum H.)
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The court went on

to find that under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, the
testimony was appropriate because it helped the jury to
understand the role of an attorney in the transactions, an issue
arising from defendant's testimony (Tr. Vol. II. 1052-1113).

The

court reiterated its decision that under Rule 401, Utah Rules of
Evidence, the evidence "has a tendency to make the existence of a
fact more or less probable" (Tr. Vol. II. 1121), and added that
there was no problem under Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence
(prejudice v. probative value) (Sealed Hearing, July 14, 1994,
[hereinafter "Hng."] at 1122).
On direct examination of the rebuttal witness, the
prosecutor appropriately established the witness' legal
background and experience (Tr. Vol. II. 1123-27), then, pursuant
to the trial court's order, obtained the witness' opinion as to
whether a lawyer could endorse a check made payable to someone
else without that person's knowledge or consent (Tr. Vol. II.
1128-29).

Addendum H.

Defendant does not challenge this opinion

on appeal.
On cross-examination, defendant expressly established
that the witness was on the stand to give his opinion (Tr. Vol.
II. 1130-31).

Addendum H.

Defense counsel then expanded

questioning to include the definition of a partnership or joint
venture (Tr. Vol. II. 1131-32), the standard practice at the
witness' office for depositing checks (Tr. Vol. II. 1132-35),
and, through use of a series of hypotheticals, whether the
witness could determine whether an intent to defraud exists given
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certain actions done within the guise of a partnership (Tr. Vol.
II. 1135-36).

Addendum H.

None of the opinions obtained during

cross-examination are challenged on appeal.
Despite having initiated the questioning about intent,
defendant now complains of the remaining opinions given by Mr.
Chamberlain on the issue.

On re-direct examination, the

prosecutor posed a hypothetical closely in line with the State's
view of the facts of this case and obtained the witness' opinion
that the actions outlined by the prosecutor showed evidence of
intent to defraud (Tr. Vol. II. 1138).

Addendum H.

Over

defendant's objection that the question takes the matter "far
beyond [the witness'] field of expertise[,]" the court admitted
the response with the following cautionary instruction to the
jury:
Members of the jury, I'm going to allow Mr.
Chamberlain to answer the question, but I'm going to
instruct you that the testimony of an expert witness
should be viewed by you as the testimony of any other
witness when it comes time to make your determination
in the jury room as to the innocence or guilt of the
defendant. This testimony should be viewed by you in
the same fashion as you do all the other witnesses
under the instructions given by the Court. (Tr. Vol.
II. 1138). Addendum H.
On re-cross examination, defense counsel expanded in
detail on the hypothetical from his view of the evidence (Tr.
Vol. II. 1138-41)#10 then was allowed to ask, over the State's
objection, whether the hypothetical "present[s] a jury question
as to whether or not that person who made the endorsement on
10

Because of the length of the hypothetical, it is reproduced
in Appendix H instead of in the body of the brief.
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behalf of the partner intended to defraud that partner" (Tr. Vol.
II. 1141-42).

Addendum H.

The witness answered that the jury

was to decide whether the partner acted with that intent as well
as whether the relationship gave rise to some kind of authority
(Tr. Vol. II. 1142).

Addendum H.

Counsel expressly established

that "by telling this jury, that in your opinion . . . that under
[the prosecutor's] hypothetical that that may be evidence of
fraud, you were not telling this jury that you have made any
judgment about this case" (Tr. Vol. II. 1142-43).

Addendum H.

The prosecutor then asked the following question:
Taking all of those assumptions that you can
recall [from the defendant's hypothetical] and add to
that, now, Mr. Chamberlain, that the partner whose name
was signed did not give authority[,] and add the
assumption that the partner whose name was signed
didn't even know about the check[,] and add that to the
assumption that these partners agreed to to [sic] a
one-third split and the partner whose name was signed
had no idea of the amount of that check, do you have an
opinion as to whether or not that that would show
purpose to defraud?" (Tr. Vol. II. 1143). Addendum H.
Defendant objected because "we are going so far afield here" and
because the opinion was " [i]rrelevant, immaterial and in
violation of rule 403" (Tr. Vol. II. 1143-44).

Addendum H.

The

trial court permitted the opinion:
. . . And I appreciate your specificity, Counsel.
Weighing this matter, coupled with the Court's
cautionary instruction, overruled." (Tr. Vol. II.
1144). Addendum H.
The witness responded by saying that the hypothetical showed
"strong evidence of intent to defraud" (Tr. Vol. II. 1144).
Addendum H.

Defendant now objects to the opinions given during
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the prosecutor's re-direct examinations of the witness based on
Rules 403, 702, and 704(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.
1.

Rule 403
Rule 4 03 deals with the exclusion of otherwise relevant

evidence due to prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. By
asserting a rule 4 03 violation, defendant appears to concede the
relevance of Chamberlain's testimony.

However, he provides no

argument as to how the probative value of the evidence "is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury".

Neither does

he directly challenge the trial court's determination that there
was no problem with the testimony under Rule 403 (Tr. Vol. II.
1122, 1144).

Addendum H.

Accordingly, there is no meaningful

argument to which the State can respond, and defendant's claim of
error under Rule 403 should fail.

State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d

1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) ("Since the defendant fails to support
[his] argument by any legal analysis or authority, we decline to
rule on it."); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249-50 (Utah App.
1992); State v. Steraer. 808 P.2d 122, 125 n.2 (Utah App. 1991)
(refusing to reach a claim containing no supporting citation or
meaningful analysis).
2.

Rule 702
Defendant appears to argue that the opinions violate

Rule 702 because they were not helpful to the jury.
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Br. of App.

at 35-36.X1

To the contrary, the opinions, initiated by

defendant during his initial cross-examination, aided the jury in
understanding the evidence and determining a fact in issue.
Rule 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise.
The trial court found that the witness possessed
specialized knowledge that would assist the jury to better
understand the possible source of the authority defendant claimed
he possessed to sign the Packer check (Tr. Vol. II 1120-21).
Defendant went on to establish the witness' experience and
background relative to partnership arrangements and endorsements
of partnership checks (Tr. Vol. II. 1131-36).

Both parties then

went on to use the witness' expertise to aid the jury in
understanding that more than the mere existence of a
relationship, partnership or otherwise, factors into the
determination of the propriety of a person's actions, and that an
endorsement and deposit by one partner may or may not be
appropriate within the relationship, depending on the remaining
facts to be considered, including the knowledge of the

11

Defendant fails to provide a supporting argument as to why
the "admission of [Chamberlain's] opinion clearly violated U.R.E.
702[.]fl Br. of App. at 36. Consequently, this Court should not
reach this claim of error. State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah
App. 1991) (refusing to reach an issue unsupported by record
citation or legal authority).
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individuals involved (Tr. Vol. II. 1132-33).

Clearly, the

challenged opinions did not purport to tell the jury what result
to reach.

Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah App.),

cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).

Because Chamberlain's

testimony assisted the jury on an issue first introduced by
defendant, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
permitting the expert opinions generated in the re-direct
examination of the witness.

See State v. Gordon, 886 P.2d 112,

117 (Utah App. 1994) (defendant is not entitled to appellate
relief for error he invited); State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287,
1292-93 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah
1995) .12
3.

Rule 704(b)
Despite the fact that the majority of defendant's

argument on appeal centers on rule 704(b), defendant waived this
challenge by failing to object to the witness' opinions regarding
intent to defraud on the basis that the opinions went to an
ultimate issue to be decided by the jury.

State v. Ranael, 866

P.2d 607, 611 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 360
(Utah App. 1993) (failure to make a specific objection waives

12

Moreover, any error which may have arisen from Chamberlain's
testimony was adequately mitigated by the court's cautionary
instruction to the jury regarding the appropriate consideration to
be given Chamberlain's testimony as well as by defendant's crossexamination, which made it abundantly clear that the witness'
testimony consisted of his own opinion, that the existence of an
intent to defraud in this case was a jury question, and that the
witness did not mean to tell the jury what outcome to reach or to
take from the jury its ultimate decision as to intent or guilt (Tr.
Vol. II. 1130-31, 1138, 1142-43).
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appellate review).

Moreover, Rule 704 was not used by the trial

court as a basis for admitting Chamberlain's testimony.

Absent

an objection or a claim of plain error or exceptional
circumstances on appeal, this challenge is not properly before
this Court.

State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 606 (Utah App.

1994) .
Should this Court reach the Rule 704 argument, it will
find the argument to be without merit.

Expert testimony does not

violate Rule 704 merely because it embraces an ultimate issue to
be decided by the jury.

Utah R. Evid. 704; State v. Larsen, 865

P.2d 1355, 1362 (Utah 1993).

The question is whether the opinion

embraces a factual issue or constitutes an unadorned legal
conclusion.

Id.

In this case, the witness' opinions that the
hypotheticals did or did not suggest an intent to defraud were
fact-oriented.

The term "intent to defraud" was used in the

factual sense of whether the hypothetical actions conformed with
ordinary practice.

The witness' opinions properly went to the

factual question before the jury of whether any of the challenged
acts occurred in conjunction with a purpose to defraud anyone.
See Jury Instruction No. 14-A (attached in Addendum G ) .
Accordingly, the opinions were properly admitted as they were not
simply legal conclusions.

See United States v. Logan, 641 F.2d

860, 863 (10th Cir. 1981) (citing Rule 704, court upheld the
admission of expert testimony that funds were improperly taken
from a private corporation); Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361-62 (citing
35

Rules 702 and 704, court upheld the admission of expert testimony
concerning the materiality of information where "materiality" was
used in the factual, not legal, sense).
4.

Other Arguments
Defendant also challenges Chamberlain's "expertise in

weighing evidence[.]"

Br. of App. at 38. However, Chamberlain

was not asked to weigh the evidence.

The prosecutor asked his

opinion as to whether the hypothetical situation "would show
purpose to defraud" (Tr. Vol. II. 1143).

Addendum H.

Chamberlain responded that it showed "strong evidence of intent
to defraud" (Tr. Vol. II. 1144).

Addendum H.

His use of the

qualifier "strong" was not sought by the prosecutor's question,
nor was it objected to by defendant.

See State v.

Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 948 (Utah App. 1990) (where
prosecutor's question produced unexpected testimony, defendant's
failure to mitigate its impact precluded his claim of error on
appeal).

Further, any prejudice which may have arisen from its

use was minimal and was adequately mitigated by the trial court's
admonition to the jury about how to consider the expert testimony
and by defendant's own questioning of the witness, which
reiterated that the witness' testimony was only his opinion, was
not meant to tell the jury what to decide, and was not meant to
take from the jury the ultimate decision as to intent or guilty
(Tr. Vol. II. 1130-31, 1138, 1142-43).
Defendant also challenges the prosecutor's final
hypothetical question as being inadequate.
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However, the question

consisted of the entirety of defense counsel's own hypothetical
with the addition of three additional hypothetical facts from the
State's view of the evidence.

Defendant had the opportunity to

add any other "exculpatory facts and circumstances" he deemed to
be important, as he previously had done in his cross examinations
of the witness, but failed to do so.

Further, not only did

defendant fail to challenge the "adequacy" of the hypothetical
below, but he fails to provide any legal argument or authority on
appeal to establish what "facts" were missing from the
prosecutor's hypothetical and how the absence of those "facts"
rendered the question inadequate.
not warrant review.

Accordingly, the claim does

Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); see Amicone, 689

P.2d at 1344 ("Since the defendant fails to support [his]
argument by any legal analysis or authority, we decline to rule
on it."); Sterger, 808 P.2d at 125 n.2 (declining to reach a
claim which contained no supporting citation or meaningful
analysis).
B. Defendant's Failure to Provide a Meaningful Argument
Regarding the Admission of Evidence of Defendant's Dealings with
the Bauers and ERA Realty Prevents Appellate Review
Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously
admitted evidence that the Bauers and ERA Realty were victimized
by the forgery.13

He claims that the evidence was irrelevant

because the trial court ultimately concluded that neither party

13

Defendant also includes the Bassetts in the first sentence
of his argument, but omits them from the remainder of his claim.
Accordingly, they are not included in the State's argument.
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was victimized by the forgery.14

Br. of App. at 40.

Alternatively, defendant argues that the evidence was
inadmissible under Rule 4 03, Utah Rules of Evidence, because it
was prejudicial, confusing and misleading, all of which "clearly
outweighed its relevance."

Id.

Review of a trial court's rulings on the admissibility
of evidence is had under an abuse of discretion standard.

State

v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); Stevenson, 884 P.2d at
1290; but see State v. Gonzales, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App.
1991) (standard of review for relevancy issues is correction of
error standard).

In determining whether there was an abuse of

discretion, the appellate court "will presume that the discretion
of the trial court was properly exercised unless the record
clearly shows the contrary."

Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530,

534-35 (Utah 1984) (quoting State ex rel. Road Commission v.
General Oil Co., 448 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1968)).

Even where an

abuse of discretion is found, reversal is not warranted absent a
finding of prejudice, that is, a "reasonable likelihood that the
error affected the outcome of the proceedings."

State v. O'Neil,

848 P.2d 694, 699 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah
1993); see also State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992).

14

Defendant does not make an argument that the evidence was
conditionally admitted under Rule 104(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.
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Defendant's argument suffers from a significant
deficiency:

he fails to identify either the evidence he claims

should not have been admitted or the rulings which he claims were
error.

He directs attention to one ruling by the lower court

sustaining his Rule 4 03 objection to a question concerning ERA
Realty, but he does not challenge that ruling.
40.

Br. of App. at

He essentially claims that in pre-trial and during the

trial, the trial court was asked to rule on the admissibility of
evidence relating to the Bauers and ERA realty and, over
defendant's objection, improperly admitted the evidence on an
unspecified but erroneous basis.

Explanation of the involvement

of the Bauers and ERA Realty in the real estate transactions was
essential to both parties in order to present the facts giving
rise to the Packer check.15

Defendant's lack of specificity

requires that the State and this Court review the entire record
and all references to the Bauers and ERA, determine which
testimony defendant would characterize as establishing his
"wrongful conduct" toward these parties, and create an
appropriate response.

However, defendant has the burden of

providing a meaningful argument with support, both legal and
factual, for his allegations of error.

15

Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9);

The evidence was also admissible under Rule 404(b), Utah
Rules of Evidence, to establish "motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identify, or absence of mistake or
accident[.]" Such evidence, including what defendant disclosed or
failed to disclose to the participants and how he orchestrated both
closings, shed light on defendant's intent, motive and plan,
helping to illustrate his goal of generating as much profit for
himself as possible, even at the expense of one of his own clients.
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see Amicone, 689 P.2d at 1344; Sterqer. 808 P.2d at 125 n.2. His
failure to identify the allegedly irrelevant evidence renders his
argument so ambiguous as to prevent any meaningful response by
the State.16 Accordingly, this Court should decline to reach
the issue. Sterqer, 808 P.2d at 125 n.2.
Defendant closes his argument by challenging the lower
court's failure to strike the unspecified evidence or to instruct
the jury that it did not provide an appropriate basis upon which
to base their verdict.

Br. of App. at 40. However, in addition

to the ambiguity surrounding the evidence to which defendant
refers, he also fails to provide any legal authority to support
his position that the lower court was required to act without
objection, and he fails to acknowledge that he did not ask the
trial court for either course of action.

Accordingly, this

argument does not merit this Court's review.

See State v. Yates,

834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Caver, 814 P.2d 604,
613 (Utah App. 1991).

16

For example, Sally Melling, the employee at Cedar Land Title
who handled the closings, testified that despite the fact that the
closing documents listed ERA as receiving $100 earnest money,
defendant told her that ERA did not get the money (Tr. Vol. I.
852) .
This testimony may be part of the evidence defendant
intended to challenge as it suggests that defendant "committed
wrongs" against ERA. Br. of App. at 40. However, the evidence was
necessary to an understanding of the overall transaction and why
the witness acted as she did. Moreover, defendant did not object
to this testimony below.
Similarly, Mr. Bauer testified that he was never told that the
property would be resold to anyone immediately following Packer's
closing (Tr. Vol. I. 879-80), suggesting nondisclosure on
defendant's part. Defendant made no objection to this statement.
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POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
ON JOINT VENTURE OR SPECIFIC INTENT WHERE DEFENDANT
FAILED TO ESTABLISH HIS ENTITLEMENT TO THE PROPOSED
INSTRUCTIONS, AND THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN, TAKEN
TOGETHER, PROPERLY TENDERED THE CASE TO THE JURY
A. Defendant's Claim of Error in Failing to Instruct the Jury on
Joint Venture Should Not be Reached by this Court; Alternatively,
the Claim is Without Merit
Defendant claims that the trial court committed
prejudicial error by refusing to give two of his proposed jury
instructions.

He contends that the court's failure to include

instructions defining "joint venture" and explaining that each
member of a joint venture is an agent of the others was error
because the evidence supported such instructions and they were
central to defendant's theory (a copy of the instructions is
attached in Addendum I).

Br. of App. at 43.

1. Defendant's Argument Does Not Warrant Review Because it
Violates the Rules of Appellate Procedure
This Court should not address defendant's claim because
his argument violates Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

While defendant summarily claims that the evidence

supported his proposed instructions, he fails to identify the
evidence or provide any record citations to support his bald
statement.

Absent any meaningful attempt to establish his claim,

the claim does not warrant this Court's review.

State v. Yates,

834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992).
Additionally, defendant's claim that the trial court
failed to instruct the jury on "implied authority" should not be
addressed because the proposed instructions did not include such
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a reference.

While the proposed instructions defined joint

venture and mentioned the agency relationship between the
members, neither instruction uses the term "implied authority."
Not only was the issue not addressed below, but defendant asserts
no plain error or exceptional circumstances argument on appeal.
Consequently, this issue is not properly before this Court on
appeal.

See State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1291-92 & n.8

(Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995); State v.
Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App. 1992).
2. The Trial Court Properly Refused to Give the Proposed
Instructions Where There was no Reasonable Basis in the
Evidence to Justify the Instructions, and Thev were
Incomplete Statements of the Law
In ruling on defendant's objection to the exclusion of
instructions numbers 4 and 5, the trial court said:
. . . I find that while you [defense counsel] may
argue joint venture and have presented sufficient
evidence to argue joint venture, that it is
inappropriate for the Court to instruct on that matter
because I'm not sure that the facts and the evidence
before the Court at this juncture support instructions
on joint venture. (Tr. Vol. II. 1155). Addendum I.
Defendant recognizes that he is entitled to have the
jury instructed on the law applicable to his theory of the case
where "there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to justify
it".

State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980); State v.

Aly, 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989).

However, he fails to

make any effort to establish the evidence which formed the
claimed "reasonable basis" here.

Defense counsel questioned

Packer about the nature of the partnership or enterprise in which
she and defendant were engaged, but Packer clearly did not
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understand the term "joint venture" or the repercussions of such
an arrangement (Tr. Vol. II. 996-97).

She agreed that she and

the Winwards had a business arrangement in which they divided the
duties and shared the profits (Tr. Vol. I. 996-97), but she
denied believing that she had given defendant any form of
authority to endorse the check (Tr. Vol. I. 942-43).

On the

other hand, defendant testified that they had a partnership or a
business venture and that it would not be unusual for a partner
to deposit partnership proceeds into a partnership account (Tr.
Vol. II. 1110).

He also said that he signed Packer's name to the

earnest money agreement because he believed their arrangement
gave him authority, but that he signed the check later in part
because he had already done so on the earnest money agreement
(Tr. Vol. II. 1088-90).

Finally, despite defendant's assertion

that "joint venture" was "never defined in the context of the
evidence [,]" Br. of App. at 42-43, defendant had Hans Chamberlain
define joint venture in essentially the same terms as were
involved in the proposed instructions (Tr. Vol. II. 1131-32).
Chamberlain further testified that the mere existence of a joint
venture or partnership does not determine the propriety of
endorsements by individual partners (Tr. Vol. II. 1139-42), and
that the parties' understanding of the agreement and
responsibilities played a part in whether their actions were
justified on the basis of joint venture (Tr. Vol. II. 1132-36,
1139-42).

See Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-15 & 16 (1994) (outlining

the rights and duties of partners).
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This testimony does not

present a sufficient basis upon which to justify the proposed
instructions, especially where defendant failed to argue to the
jury any theory regarding joint venture or implied authority,
despite the trial court's express allowance of such an argument
(Tr. Vol. II. 1155).

This suggests that the joint venture theory

was one on which defendant had chosen not to rely.17

Instead,

he argued in closing that defendant's actions throughout the real
estate transactions were rationally explained and reasonable
given the nature of the dealings and his responsibilities to
those involved, that there was no evidence that defendant
attempted to conceal information from anyone, and that there was
no evidence that defendant lied to anyone (Tr. Vol. II. 1172-75).
Accordingly, defendant was not entitled to his proposed
instructions, and the trial court did not err in refusing to give
them.
Moreover, merely defining "joint venture" and
explaining that it is accompanied by an agency relationship among
the partners does not inform the jury how to relate the
information to the existence or nonexistence of authority for the
endorsement in question.

Under both Utah law and Chamberlain's

testimony, the mere existence of a joint venture or partnership
does not necessarily give rise to implied authority to sign an
individual's name, as opposed to the partnership's name, to a

17

Defendant concedes on appeal that "the sum and substance of
the defense in this case" was the theory that defendant never
possessed a purpose to defraud, as is required for conviction. Br.
of App. at 45.
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negotiable instrument without disclosing the instrument's
existence, amount, or location.

Utah's law on partnerships and

joint ventures permits execution of instruments in the
partnership name for the purpose of carrying on the business but
does not provide for signing the individual name of one partner
to a negotiable document.

See Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-6 (1994).

Hans Chamberlain established the basic information contained in
defendant's proposed instructions using the same language (Tr.
Vol. II. 1131-32), then opined that forgery is still possible in
a joint venture situation if one party possesses the requisite
intent to defraud or if the other party lacks knowledge of the
document or the details of the endorsement or does not know of
the legal repercussions of the arrangement (Tr. Vol. II. 1132-36,
1139-42).

Addendum H.

Clearly, the proposed instructions fell

short of providing the jury with sufficient information with
which to make a reasoned determination of the relationship
between joint venture and the propriety of defendant's
endorsement of Packer's check.

Because the instructions were

incomplete statements of the law, the court did not err in
refusing to use them.

First Interstate Bank v. Kesler, 702 P.2d

86, 96 (Utah 1985) (proposed instruction which was incomplete
statement of law was properly refused).
Regardless of whether the instructions should have been
given, defendant suffered no prejudice from the court's refusal
to do so.

The jury had the same information before it through

defendant's cross-examination of Chamberlain and, because
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defendant chose not to argue the theory in his closing argument,
the jurors were fully able to utilize the information in their
deliberations regardless of whether they received it from the
court or from an expert witness.
B. No Specific Intent Instruction was Warranted Where the
Instructions Given, Taken Together and in Context, Clearly and
Accurately Tendered the Case to the Jury
Defendant argues that forgery is a specific intent
crime that requires instruction as to specific intent before the
jury is able to convict.

Br. of App. at 44-45.

He claims that

the specific intent required is "the purpose to defraud" (Tr.
Vol. I. 1152), and that it is not enough for the jury to find the
existence of a "purpose to defraud", but that the jurors must be
aware that this element is, in fact, a specific, not a general,
intent before they may convict defendant of the offense.

Br. of

App. at 44-45.
In support of his claim, defendant cites the concurring
opinion in State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 81 (Utah 1981) .
However, Potter is distinguishable because of the fact that "the
jury [was] faced with several criminal charges requiring both
general and specific intent instructions."

Id., at 79 n.3.

This

required special care on the part of the court to keep the
instructions distinct and clear.

Id., at 78. However, the trial

court's confusing instructions on both general and specific
intent may well have misled the jury into believing that they
should automatically infer the specific intent required for some
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of the charged offenses once they found defendant had committed
the necessary act for each offense.

Id.

This case does not present the difficult situation
faced by the trial court in Potter.

Defendant was charged with a

single crime which required that he act "knowingly and
intentionally" and with a purpose to defraud.

The jury

instructions clearly set forth these requirements (Jury
Instruction No. 14-A), separately defined each (Jury Instructions
Nos. 14-B, 14-C), and fully appraised the jury that it must find
each of these elements, together with the remaining elements of
the offense, beyond a reasonable doubt (Jury Instruction No. 14A).

Addendum G.

In order to reach a guilty verdict, the jury

was not required to differentiate between specific and general
intent; it need only follow the instructions and definitions
given by the court.

Moreover, to require the court to contrast

such terms of art in this case would have injected a possibility
for confusion in a case where the elements, the intent, and the
definitions are otherwise clear, concise and understandable.
Furthermore, defendant's proposed instruction would
have added nothing to the instructions given the jury.

Defendant

proposed the following instruction:
The crime charged in this case is a serious crime which
requires proof of specific intent before the defendant
can be convicted. Specific intent as the term
[implies] means more than the general intent to commit
the act. To establish specific intent, the prosecution
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
knowingly did an act which the law forbids, purposely
intending to violate the law. Such intent may be
determined from all the facts and circumstances
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surrounding the case (R. 229; Tr. Vol. II. 1152).
Addendum J.
This instruction is meaningless as the jury had already been
clearly informed that it must find, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the defendant "acted knowingly and intentionally" and with a
purpose to defraud (R. 243; Jury Instruction No. 14-A).

The

definition given for "purpose to defraud" echoed the language
used by this Court in State v. Gonzales, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216
(Utah App. 1991).

Far from "eliminat[ing] this element of the

offense", Br. of App. at 45, the court's instructions (Jury
Instruction Nos. 14-C & 14-A), reinforced the jury's
responsibility to find a "purpose to defraud" before it could
convict.

Because the instructions, taken together in the context

of this case, clearly and accurately presented the jury with the
elements of the offense and their responsibility, the trial court
properly refused to give defendant's proposed "specific intent"
instruction.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED APPROPRIATE DISCRETION IN
DENYING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
ON HIS MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE PROSECUTOR
Defendant contends that the lower court erred when it
denied his motion for an evidentiary hearing aimed at
disqualifying the prosecutor.

He summarily asserts that the

district court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing "to
test the truthfulness of the allegations" he made against the
prosecutor.

Br. of App. at 48.
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In support, defendant sets out what he claims are
examples of the prosecutor's "vindictiveness" at trial.
46-48.

Id. at

He then closes his argument by asserting that "the

alleged conduct in fact disqualifies the prosecutor[.]" Id. at
48.

To the extent he means that the "vindictive" conduct argued

in his brief disqualifies the prosecutor, he has not met his
burden of proving his allegations.

He does not demonstrate that

these examples constitute misconduct which "affected a
substantial right of the defendant."

State v. Gray, 851 P.2d

1217, 1228 (Utah App.) (quotation omitted), cert, denied, 8860
P.2d 943 (Utah 1993).

Further, none of the examples was before

the lower court at the time it ruled on defendant's pre-trial
request for a hearing.

Consequently, these examples have no

bearing on whether the trial court's denial of defendant's motion
was erroneous.
To the extent he claims that the pre-trial conduct
alleged below in support of his motion for an evidentiary hearing
automatically disqualifies the prosecutor, he did not establish
the claim below and fails to make any attempt to establish it in
his appellate brief; he makes no argument concerning why an
evidentiary hearing was required given the allegations and
arguments before the lower court at the time of its ruling.
Accordingly, this Court should reject his claim of error.

Utah

R. App. P. 24(a)(9); see State v. Sterqer, 808 P.2d 122, 125 n.2
(Utah App. 1991) .
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Defendant moved to disqualify the prosecutor shortly
after the preliminary hearing, alleging that the prosecutor had
committed perjury in the statement of probable cause, "accosted"
defense counsel in the courthouse during a preliminary hearing
recess to solicit a "physical altercation", made false
accusations and called defense counsel names, made unethical and
inappropriate comments to the press, and harbored "an irrational
and unjustifiable animus" toward defendant (R. 88-90).

After the

State filed its response to the disqualification motion,
defendant sought an evidentiary hearing because "the State's
response to Defendant's motion raises several factual issues
relating to [the prosecutor's] good faith or lack thereof" which
defendant felt could only be resolved in an evidentiary hearing
(R. 132) .
At a hearing on defendant's motion, the district court
listened to both sides, asked defense counsel for Utah authority
for removing the prosecutor (Hng. at 37),18 then denied the
motion for an evidentiary hearing, providing the following
"reasoning":
I do not appreciate attorneys dealing with one another
in less than professional settings. It is unseemly for
attorneys to shout at one another, for attorneys to be
in close contact such as they are quoted to be in each
other's face. I don't like to see it. I don't like to
see it operating in my courtroom. I don't like to see
it operating in litigation over which I am presiding.
It is the specific order of the Court to both
counsel, and entered in the minutes of this case, that
18

To which defense counsel replied, "Only the Canon of Ethics,
Your Honor" (Hng. at 37).
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both counsel will deal with one another without voices
raised, that they shall not approach each other any
closer than one yard, 36 inches. That their voices
shall not be audible more than 3 0 feet away from any
conversation that they have. As I have indicated, I'm
not going to put up with sandbox squabbles. We've got
a lawsuit here that has serious implications for the
State of Utah and for these defendants, and we're going
to treat it as the kind of serious lawsuit that it is.
(Hng. at 44-45) .19
Defendant relies on a single case to support his right
to have an evidentiary hearing.

In State v. Marcotte, 229 La.

539, 86 So.2d 186, 188 (1956), the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that the trial court should have heard evidence on defendant's
motion to recuse the district attorney.

However, the decision

was based on a local rule of criminal procedure "providing the
causes for recusation of a district attorney" and upon a single
prior Louisiana case with which the author of the opinion and the
dissenting justice disagreed.
171 So. 108 (1936).

See State v. Tate, 185 La. 1006,

A third justice was absent and did not take

part in the decision.
Utah has no equivalent rule or precedent.

There is no

basis upon which defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing
on his allegations.

The prosecutor provided to the trial court

all the information on which he based the challenged assertions
in the probable cause statement (R. 93-122) (attached in Addendum
K).

A review of that information establishes that the prosecutor

presented it in good faith and to the best of his ability based
on the information available to him at the time.
19

Defendant's

Because the trial court sealed the record of the hearing,
the State has not appended copies of the transcript to this brief.
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allegations reflect only ethical questions more appropriately
addressed through the state bar--a method recognized by defendant
but ultimately rejected by him (Hng. at 41-42).
The trial court had before it sufficient information
from both sides to determine that an evidentiary hearing was not
appropriate and that the case could proceed without a change of
prosecutors.

Defendant's bald assertion on appeal that the

conduct he alleged against the prosecutor "in fact disqualifies
the prosecutor" does nothing to establish his right either to an
evidentiary hearing or to disqualification of the prosecutor.
Accordingly, defendant's allegation of error is without merit.
POINT VII
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ADDRESS DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO
HIS PROBATION CONDITION AS THE ISSUE HAS BEEN RENDERED
MOOT BY THE INTERIM SUSPENSION ORDERED SUBSEQUENT TO
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION AND SENTENCE; ALTERNATIVELY,
PROHIBITION FROM PRACTICING LAW IS AN APPROPRIATE
PROBATION CONDITION AS IT RELATES TO AND PUNISHES
DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
A.

Introduction:
The trial court sentenced defendant to the statutory

indeterminate term of imprisonment, then stayed the sentence and
imposed probation under several conditions, one of which was the
temporary prohibition against practicing law (R. 362-66).
Addendum B.

Defendant contends that the district court erred by

suspending him from practicing law as a condition of probation.
Br. of App. at 48-49.

He argues that the Rules of Lawyer

Discipline and Disability provide the only means by which he can
be suspended from practicing law, and that suspension in the
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context of sentencing following a conviction is beyond the
authority of the district court.

Id.

B. This Court Should Not Address This Claim as it has Become
Moot
The question of whether the temporary prohibition
constitutes a valid or invalid probation condition has been
rendered moot by the ruling in a disciplinary action brought by
the Utah State Bar against defendant subsequent to his conviction
and sentence.

On March 24, 1995, the district court granted the

interim suspension sought by the Office of Attorney Discipline
and stayed the suspension for 180 days pending this appeal.
Addendum D.

Should this Court affirm defendant's conviction, the

suspension will take effect regardless of the conditions to which
defendant's probation may be subject. Accordingly, a decision on
this issue will be without practical effect, and, under Rule 37,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, it should not be addressed.
Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989); State v.
Stromquist, 639 P.2d 171, 172 (Utah 1981) (an appellate court
will not reach a moot issue or render advisory opinions).
C. Alternatively, Temporary Suspension from the Practice of Law
as a Probation Condition is an Appropriate Punishment for
Violation of State Criminal Laws Where the Professional License
Relates Directly to the Criminal Conduct
The Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability provide
the method by which civil disciplinary proceedings are conducted
"so as to achieve substantial justice and fairness in
disciplinary matters[.]"

Rules of Lawyer Discipline and

Disability 1(c) (attached in Addendum L).
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However, the temporary

suspension in this case was not civil in nature or designed as
disciplinary redress for an ethical violation, as are the
proceedings under the rules.
L.

See id., Rules 1, 9, 19. Addendum

Even under Rule 19, by which an attorney's conviction may

become grounds for formal disciplinary proceedings, the rule
specifies that the conviction must be for "a crime which reflects
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as
a lawyer in other respects [.]"

Id., Rule 19(a).

Addendum L.

In

other words, as defendant notes, disciplinary action under the
rules deals with investigating and disposing of ethical problems
within the profession, not necessarily the punishment or
rehabilitation of criminal activity by those in the profession.
By contrast, the district court did not undertake to
discipline defendant for any ethical violations he may have made
vis-a-vis his professional position by imposing the temporary
prohibition as a condition of probation.

Instead, the trial

court imposed sentence upon defendant as a penalty or punishment
for his violation of the criminal laws of this state, and the
probation condition was part of the agreement by which defendant
had an opportunity to avoid imprisonment while still being
penalized for his criminal conduct.

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-

1(2) (1990) (upon conviction of any crime, the trial court has
authority to "suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and
place the defendant on probation"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-181(8) (j) (1990) (when placing a defendant on probation, the court
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has broad discretion to impose the terms and conditions it deems
appropriate to the defendant and the case).
Moreover, the probation condition is inherently
reasonable based on its relationship to the offense of which
defendant was convicted.

The evidence indicated that defendant's

profession played a large part in his ability to generate a
profit from the real estate transactions and to obtain physical
possession of a check made out to someone else.

The temporary

prohibition against practicing law directly relates to the
circumstances and conditions surrounding the criminal offense
and, therefore, is a valid factor for the sentencing judge to
address in developing appropriate probation conditions. See,
e.g., Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F.Supp. 1221, 1237-38 & cases cited in
n.60 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (affirming imposition of a probation
condition that defendant temporarily refrain from participating
in the management of union activities where defendant's
conviction was directly related to his participation in union
activities); Whaley v. United States, 324 F.2d 356, 359 (9th Cir.
1963), cert, denied, 376 U.S. 911 (1964) (upholding probation
condition that defendant not engage in repossession business
following his conviction for impersonating an FBI agent in
connection with his repossession activities); Yarbrouah v. State,
166 S.E.2d 35, 36-37 (Ga. App. 1969) (upholding as probation
condition one year prohibition of practicing law against lawyer
convicted of forging deed).
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Even if the temporary prohibition was not appropriately
imposed as a probation condition, it would affect neither the
conviction nor the sentence in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully
requests that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and
sentence.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION
Should this Court reach the merits of defendant's
arguments, the detailed facts and the numerous issues prompt the
State to request that oral argument be scheduled in this case and
,

that a published opinion be issued.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <^y

day of May, 1995.

JAN GRAHAM
Attori^ey Gen^^^l

n

\1S C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed by first class mail,
postage prepaid, to Gary W. Pendleton, attorney for appellant,
150 North 200 East, St. George, Utah
May, 1995.

56

84770, this Q 7

day of

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1990)

76-6-501

OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY

CRIMINAL CODE

not. State v. Pacheco, 636 P.2d 489 (Utah
1981).
Evidence held sufficient to establish at least
$250 embezzled by theater manager. State v,
Patterson, 700 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1985).
To prove market value in a different city, the
cities must be sufficiently close geographically
and similar in population to be considered comparable for purposes of valuing the property.
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985).
—Testimony of o w n e r .
Owner is competent to testify to the value of
stolen property where the owner's opinion of
the value is based on comparable prices for
similar property. State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142
(Utah 1978).

Owner of the stolen property was allowed to
give his opinion as to the value of such property. State v. Ballenberger, 652 P.2d 927 (Utah
1982).
Because an owner is presumed to be familiar
w , t h t h e v a i u e o f h i s possessions, an owner is
competent to testify on the present market
^ r t y > S t a t e v. P u r c e l l > 7 1 1 R 2 d
y a , u e of h i s
9 4 « /iw 0 u IQOE*
lULan iy
*
°°''
C i t e d in State v
- Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah
1985); State v. Parkin, 742 P.2d 715 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987); State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616
(Utah 1987); State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1987); State v. Barber, 747 P.2d 436
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am. J u r . 2d Larceny
I 44.

C.J.S. — 52A C.J.S. Larceny % 60(1).
Key Numbers. — Larceny *» 23.

PART 5
FRAUD
76-6-501- Forgery — "Writing" defined,
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) Alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any
such altered writing; or
(b) Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent
or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in
a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing or any other method
of recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or purports to
be:
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a government, or any agency thereof; or
(b) A check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stocks,
bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or
claim against property. or(a pecuniary interest in or claim against any
person or enterprise. )
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be
a check with a face amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class A
misdemeanor.
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History: C. 1953, 76-6-601, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-601; 1974, ch. 32, ft 19;
1975, ch. 52, 5 1.

76-6-501

Cross-References. — Checks, burden of
proof as to sending by telegraph, § 69-1-3.
Expert testimony, Rule 15, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
convicted of forgery. State v. Musselman, 667
P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983).

ANALYSIS

Attempted forgery.
Attempt to utter.
Attorney signing client's name.
Authority to use forged signature.
Defenses.
—Insanity.
—Postdated check.
Elements of offense.
—Making and passing.
—Passing.
—Signature.
Evidence.
—Handwriting.
—Other crimes.
—Sufficient.
False pretenses distinguished*
Fictitious name.
Indictment or information.
Intent.
"Make* or "utter."
Prescription.
Signature.
—In general.
—Authority to sign another*! name.
Standard of proof.
Uttering.
Variance.
Verdict.

Authority to use forged signature.
Where defendant forged his accomplice's
name on checks which accomplice owned but
had reported stolen, then cashed the checks
and split the proceeds with the accomplice, defendant committed forgery as defined under
Subsection (1Kb), notwithstanding that the accomplice authorized defendant to sign his
name. State v. Collins, 597 P.2d 1317 (Utah
1979).
Defenses.
—Insanity.
Insanity, if sufficiently established, would
constitute defense to a charge of forgery State
v. Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 P. 641, 24 L It.A.
(N.S.) 545 (1909).
—Postdated check.
In prosecution for forgery, fact that forged
check was postdated did not help defendant,
who had attempted to pass it. State v. Green,
89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750 (1936).
Elements of offense.

Attempted forgery.
The crime of attempted forgery involves the
same culpability and dishonesty as does the
crime of forgery itself. State v. Ross, 782 P.2d
529 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Attempt to utter.
Where information charging offense of forgery contained one count for forgery and another for uttering, attempt to utter could be
shown, for it was immaterial that attempt to
utter was unsuccessful; it was fact of uttering
or attempting to utter that was of evidentiary
value. State v. Green, 89 Utah 437,67 P.2d 750
(1936).
Attorney signing client's name.
Section 78-51-32, which authorizes an attorney to execute documents in the name of a client, does not authorize an attorney to forge a
client's name to a negotiable instrument such
as a settlement check and does not preclude
the attorney's conviction for forgery as a matter of law when he does so; however, when an
attorney acts pursuant to the general authority granted by § 78-51-32 he may not later be

—Making and passing.
Crime of forgery could consist of making of
forged instrument or of passing of instrument
known to be false, or of both making and passing such instrument. State v. Gorham, 93 Utah
274, 72 P.2d 656 (1937); State v. Jensen, 103
Utah 478, 136 P.2d 949 (1943).
—Passing.
Even though proof failed to show that defendant had personally forged instrument, showing that defendant passed instrument knowing
it to be false or forged would prove crime of
forgery. State v. Gorham, 93 Utah 274,72 P.2d
656 (1937); State v. Jensen, 103 Utah 478,136
P.2d 949 (1943).
—Signature.
To convict one of uttering and passing forged
draft, it was not essential that he should have
personally affixed forged name to draft. State
v. Gorham, 93 Utah 274, 72 P.2d 656 (1937);
State v. Jensen, 103 Utah 478, 136 P.2d 949
(1943).
Evidence.
—Handwriting.
In prosecution for issuing two fictitious
checks, defendant's demand that prosecution
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ADDENDUM B
Judgement, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence,
Order of Probation, and Commitment
Trial Transcript, pp. 1258-62

SCOTT M. BURNS (#4283)
Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

)

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, STAY
OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE,
ORDER OF PROBATION, AND
COMMITMENT

vs.
EMER KENT WINWARD,
Defendant.

)

Criminal No. 941500056

)

Judge James L. Shumate

The Defendant, EMER KENT WINWARD, having been convicted of the offense of
FORGERY, a Second-Degree Felony, pursuant to a jury trial and jury verdict on July 28, 1994,
and the Court having entered said verdict and thereafter having ordered the preparation of a
presentence investigation report, and after said report was prepared and presented to the Court,
the Court having called the above-entitled matter on for sentencing on September 12, 1994, in
Parowan, Utah, and the above-named Defendant, EMER KENT WINWARD, having appeared
before the Court in person together with his attorney of record, Gary W. Pendleton, and the State
of Utah having appeared by and through Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns, and the Court
having reviewed the presentence investigation report and having further reviewed the file in detail
and thereafter having heard statements from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Iron County

^Lto

Attorney, and the Court being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following
Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation, and Commitment, to wit:
JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, EMER
KENT WINWARD, has been convicted after a jury trial and jury verdict of the offense of
FORGERY, a Second Degree Felony, and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had
anything to say in regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to
the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty
as charged and convicted.
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, EMER KENT WINWARD, and pursuant
to his conviction of FORGERY, a Second-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to a term of
imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for a period of one (1) year and not to exceed fifteen (15)
years, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the Utah State Department of
Corrections.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no fine be imposed.
STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the execution of the term of imprisonment imposed and
the fine imposed in this case are hereby stayed, pending the Defendant's strict adherence to and
compliance with the following terms and conditions of probation.
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ORDER OF PROBATION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, EMER
KENT WINWARD, is hereby placed on probation for a period of thirty-six (36) months under
the supervision of the Utah Department of Adult Probation and Parole, strictly within the
following terms, provisions, and conditions:
1.

The Defendant shall forthwith make and execute a formal agreement provided by

the Utah Department of Adult Probation and Parole, and during the period of probation set forth
herein, shall strictly conform with all the terms, provisions, and conditions, and the same are
hereby made a part of this Order by means of incorporation.
2.

That the Defendant shall report as ordered and required by this Court and the

Department of Adult Probation and Parole during the period of this probation.
3.

That the Defendant shall commit no law violations during the period of this

probation.
4.

That the Defendant shall serve a term of incarceration in the Iron County Jail for

a period of ninety (90) days, commencing at 6:00 p.m. on Friday, September 16, 1994, and
continuing for ninety (90) days thereafter at which time the Defendant shall be released (at
6:00 p.m. following the 90-day commitment).
5.

That the Defendant shall undergo a psychological evaluation by Dr. Richard

Moody, said evaluation to take place within the next thirty (30) days, with the Court to review
the case upon completion of said psychological evaluation on October 11, 1994, at 3:00 p.m. in
Cedar City, Utah.
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6.

That the Defendant shall pay restitution, to be determined at a later date and after

an evidentiary hearing, to Mountain America Credit Union of Cedar City, Utah.
7.

That the Defendant shall pay a fine in the amount of one thousand dollars

($1,000), together with an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge, for a total fine and surcharge in
the amount of one thousand eight hundred fifty dollars ($1,850).
8.

That the Defendant shall complete two hundred (200) hours of community service

in a Mnon law,f area of service.
9.

That the Defendant, as a specific term and condition of probation, shall not engage

in the practice of law during the period of this probation.
COMMITMENT
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, EMER KENT WINWARD,
and deliver him to the Iron CountyAJtah State Correctional Facility, there to be held under the
provisions of the foregoing Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of
Probation, and Commitment.
DATED this

day of September, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

JMfl^pgHUMATE
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF IRON )
I, LINDA WILLIAMSON, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron
County, State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and exact copy of the
original Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation, and
Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. Emer Kent Win ward. Criminal No. 941500056,
now on file and of record in my office.
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of
1^&
October
Utah, this O
day of September, 1994.

1R3DA WSLltAteeON
LINDA WILLIAMSON
District Court Clerk

:^JUu^

&M\J^

By
Deputy District Court Clerk
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of a person is to be able to deal with the stress and the

2

J realities, not to forget about it, not to try to put it

3

» away,

4
5

6
7
8

9

When you were licensed to practice law, you swore
I an oath.

When I assumed the responsibilities of this bench,

I swore a similar oath.

And let me tell you, it's with a

heavy heart that I adhere to the responsibilities of that
I oath at this time.
It is the sentence of this Court that you be

10

committed to the Utah State Prison for a period of time not

11

less than one year or more than 15 years.

12

the execution of that sentence and place you on probation

13

for a period of 36 months.

14

that you will serve 90 days in the Iron County Jail.

15

the period of this jail sentence, you will be as soon as

16

possible evaluated by Dr. Richard Moody, who, I believe,

17

still has a contract with Adult Probation and Parole, for a

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

psychological evaluation.

I'm going to stay

First term of your probation is
During

That evaluation will be completed

and submitted to the Court within the next 30 days and the
Court will schedule a review of this portion of the sentence
within that period of time.
The agency recommendation recommends that
restitution in the amount of $3,097.00 be paid to Nicole
Packer, whom the report characterizes as the victim.

This

Court has heard the evidence and specifically finds that
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
CCRTIFIKD SHOHTHAND REPORTS*

\^L
(801)

673-5100

3

O
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1 I Nicole Packer is not a victim. In all likelihood, Nicole
2

i Packer, who strikes this Court as being an extremely bright

3

young woman, was a co-participant in these activities and to

4

characterize her as a victim and a recipient of restitution

5

is unreasonable. Restitution will be ordered at a time,

6

later to be determined, but the Court specifically fixes the

7

I victim as Mountain America Credit Union. Mountain America

B

Credit Union is the holder of this instrument which has been

9

dishonored. Mountain America Credit Union, as I recall from

10

the testimony at trial, recovered from the accounts a

11

certain portion of the $4,600.00, but there is a balance due

12

that needs to be fixed.

13
14
15
16
17
1B
19
20
21
22
23
24

With respect to fines and surcharges, I'll impose
a $1,000.00 fine, plus an 85% surcharge, for a total fine
and surcharge of $1,850.00. Now, as a term of your
probation, you are ordered to complete 200 hours of
community service in a non-law-related field. This may be
unusual. This Court is not made aware of any proceedings
from the State Bar, but seeing a concern that the Court has,
it is the further order of the Court that during the term of
this probation, you do not, as a condition of probation,
practice law from this day forward. And the Court is well
concerned that such a provision may beyond the jurisdiction
of this Court. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah

25
determines who is licensed, but I think the Court has the
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN, JR.
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1
2

power to suspend the practice of law as a condition of
I probation.

3

You are to sign the form of an agreement as

4

prepared by Adult Probation and Parole and abide by all of

5

its terms and conditions, including those terms and

6

conditions set forth by the Court. I intend to review this

7

case with the psychological report on October 11, 1994, 3:00

B

p.m.

9

Pendleton,

10

schedule?

I don't want it to go any later than that. Mr.
do you know if that's a problem with your

11

MR. PENDLETON: I can clear my calendar.

12

THE COURT: All right. If you don't have any

13
14
15
16
17
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19
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pressing engagements elsewhere, we might kick it back to
October the 10th. Mr. Burns, you or your office can cover
that review, is that reasonable?
MR. BURNS: Yes, sir. We'll be here.
THE COURT: Anything else as a term of probation
recommended by the State, Mr. Burns?
MR. BURNS: No, sir.
THE COURT: Mr. Pendleton, anything else that you
would recommend?
MR. PENDLETON: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Winward, I'm going to
do one other thing. I'm going to order that you report to

25
the Iron County Jail Friday evening at 6:00 p.m. Your
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
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family is here and you need them, at least between now and
then.
Mr. Pendleton, we have a pending motion before the
Court*

I111 give you the opportunity to argue it.
MR. PENDLETON:

Your Honor, I, for the record,

would file a notice of appeal with the clerk, if I may
approach.
THE COURT:

I certainly believe that the rules

allow you to do so even though the final judgment has not
been executed, Counsel.
MR. PENDLETON:
THE COURT:
you, Counsel.

You can in criminal cases.

I think you can and should.

Thank

The notice of appeal is ordered filed.

It will be file stamped once we get back to Cedar City,
Counsel, but the record will reflect that it is filed on the
12th of September, 1994, at 11:38 a.m.
MR. PENDLETON:
before the Court to —
probable cause.

Your Honor, we have a motion

for issuance of the certificate of

The State has responded by two memoranda

that they have filed.

This Court, when it released Mr.

Winward following the verdict, specifically made a finding
that the Court did not believe that he is a threat to the
community or to any individual member of this community and
I think that notwithstanding what I considered to be an
unfavorable pre-sentence report, I believe that that's
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORT**
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basically the conclusion that Mr. Carroll reached also. He
referred to this incident as situational and didn't think
there was any likelihood of the defendant re-offending in
this manner.
THE COURT:

I still make that finding, Counsel.

The Court is not concerned about Mr. Winward as a threat to
the community whatsoever.

I am more convinced of that than

I was prior to reading the pre-sentence report and the
supporting letters.
MR. PENDLETON:

Your Honor, the only issue, then,

as to whether or not the orders of this Court should be
stayed, particularly the sentence, pending the appeal and an
opportunity for this defendant to have that reviewed by the
appellate court, is whether or not and this is as I understand 77-20-10, and rule —

the new Rule 27. Basically, as

I understand it, the question now before the Court is
whether or not we have presented or have identified issues
that we intend to present on appeal which present
substantial questions of either law or fact and which would
indicate a reasonable likelihood, I think thatfs the
language

of the rule, reasonable likelihood that a new

trial would
reversed.

be ordered or the case or the conviction
The Court in hearing our motion to arrest the

judgment was asked to address a motion made on a much higher
level.

That is whether or not the Court concluded that the
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN, JR.
C E R T I F I E D S H O R T H A N D REPORTER

ADDENDUM C
Minute Entry, Motion Hearing, October 11, 1994
(on remand from the Court of Appeals)

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MINUTE ENTRY
October 11# 1994
State of Utah
vs
Emer Kent Winvard
Criminal #941500056
Type of Hearing: Motion Hearing
Present:

Defendant
Atd Gary W. Pendleton
Atp Scott M. Burns
Don Carroll (AP&P)

Tape #Parowan 150001

Judge James L. Shumate
Clerk Lori Jones

Beginning ct. 920 to ct. 3334

ct 920) The Court welcomes those present, stating there are
two matters to be addressed today. The first being the Order
issued by the Court of Appeals, the second matter, a Motion made
by the defense concerning restitution and funds.
Atp Burns opens discussion, addressing the 'Motion to
Establish Restitution and Direct Distribution of Funds Presently
Held by Iron County Attorney's Office', stating the County
Attorneys Office is not holding any funds as indicated in the
motion.
Atd Pendleton further argues that he feels the funds are
either in the Co. Atty's possession or possibly with State Bank.
ct 993) The Court informs counsel that to his recollection
the funds were frozen at Mountain America.
ct 1050) Secondly, as to restitution, the Court relies on
AP&P to identify the victims. It has been determined that Nicole
Packer is not a victim. In any case he feels the motion is
premature and not timely to rule upon, that the case is still on
appeal.
ct 1115) The Court addresses the Remand Order from the Court
of Appeals, and cites rule 77-20-10.
ct 1206) Atd Pendleton provides argument as to why the
defendant should be allowed to practice law while case is on
appeal.
ct 2466) Atp Burns provides argument, stating rule 77-20-10
is at issue here and that the Court should enfore this rule.
Counsel argue the matter.
ct 2721) The Court rules upon the conditions of release as
ordered by the Court of Appeals, terms:

3^7!

1. The defendant shall enter into a formal agreement with
AP&P and sign that agreement today.
2. The defendant shall committ no further law violations.
3. The defendant shall complete a psychological evaluation
with Dr. Moody, the results shall be provided to the Court in
earnera.
4. The issues of restitution are ordered stayed.
5. The issues of fines are ordered stayed.
6. The issues of community service are ordered stayed.
7. The issues of practicing law are ordered stayed.
ct 3030) Atp Burns informs the Court that the bar counsel
will be informed of todays hearing and asked to take action.
ct 3074) Atd Pendleton asks for an order to transcribe the
hearing which took place on 7/14/94. The Court allows request,
stating the reporter will make the transcript and deliver it to
the Court of Appeals in camera, copies will be provided to
counsel with orders the copies are not to be seen by anyone other
than counsel.
Counsel discuss the in camera packed submitted to the Court
earlier. The Court determines that Atd Pendleton may view the
packet under orders not to share information with his client
pending further order of the Court. If Atd Pendleton feels his
client needs to see the records he may bring his request before
the Court.
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ADDENDUM D
Ruling on Motion for Interim Suspension

FILED
Fourth Judical D:smct Cou<t
of Utah County, Siatfe ;>* uryn

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF
THE DISCIPLINE OF:

Ruling on Motion for Interim
Suspension
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 940400526

JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS
EMER KENT WINWARD,
Defendant

This matter came before the court for hearing on March 7, 1995. The Office of
Attorney Discipline was represented by P. Gary Ferrero, Esq. Mr. Winward was represented
by Gary W. Pendleton, Esq. The issue before the court was the interim suspension of Mr.
Winward, an attorney who was convicted of a felony in the Fifth Judicial District Court. Iron
County.
The court, after carefully considering the facts, memoranda, and oral arguments of
counsel, now enters the following:
Ruling
1
Facts

1. Emer Kent Winward Esq. is charged with unprofessional conduct by the Office
of Attorney Discipline of the Utah State Bar.
2. Mr. Winward was found guilty by a jury of forgery, a second degree felony on
July 28, 1994.
3. Winward was sentenced on September 12, 1994,
4. An act of forgery is a criminal act that reflects adversely on his honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer.

5. The conviction is on appeal before the Utah Court of Appeals and a certificate of
probable cause has issued.

n
Discussion and Procedure
The Office of Attorney Discipline is authorized to seek and interim suspension of
lawyers who have committed a crime. (Rule 19 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and
Disability).
Rule 19(c) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and disability provides:
Imposition. The district court shall place a respondent on interim suspension upon
proof that the respondent has been convicted of c crime which reflects adversely on the
respondent's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness a s a lawyer in other respects, regardless of the
pendency of appeal.
Paragraph HP references a reinstatement upon reversal of conviction. But there is
no reference or guidance where a certificate of probable cause has issued The committee
either overlooked this probability, or did not intend that a certificate of probable cause would
deter the OAD!s ability to seek an interim sanction.The imposition of sanctions should not be
considered without some discussion of the current law surrounding the granting or denial of a
certificate of probable cause,
A judge has already considered whether defendant was entitled to a certificate of
probable cause pursuant to Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure which states in
relevant part,
(f) No certificate of probable cause shall issue and the defendant shall be detained
unless the appropriate court finds that the appeal:
(1) is not being taken for the purpose of delay; and
(2) raises substantial issue of law or fact reasonably likely to
result in reversal, an order for a new trial or a sentence that does
not include a term of incarceration in jail or prison.
U.R.Cr.P.27 was amended effective May 1,1993. The amendment substantially changed the

wording of Rule 27. There is no Utah case of which this court is aware that addresses the
rule in its present state. However, there are a number of cases which generally discuss factors
to be considered in determining whether to issue a certificate of probable cause.
The case of Stste v. Neelev. 707 P.2d 647 (Utah 1985) established a two part test
for courts to follow in determining whether an issue to be appealed it substantial and supports
a request for a certificate of probable cause. "There are two prongs to the test for
determining whether issues raised are 'substantial1. First, the question raised must be either
(1) novel, i.e., there is no Utah Precedent that governs, e n (2) fairly debatable." Neelev 707
P.2d at 649 (emphasis added). The Neelev test has been cited on a number of occasions by
Utah courts. Most recently, the Utah Court of Appeals cited Neelev in its opinion on State
v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 362 (Utah App. 1993). The Bnum decision was written after the
amendment to UJLCr.P. 27 went into effect, but apparently relied on the previous version of
the rule. The Neelev test is also cited in the "NOTES TO DECISIONS" appearing directly
after UJtCrP. 27.
The plain language of the relevant part of U.R.CrJP. 27 and the Neelev test for
determining tffubgtantialityw are not harmonious. U.HCr.Pt 27(f), as presently drafted,
essentially requires the trial judge to admit clear error and invite reversal in order to justify
issuing a certificate of probable cause. If a trial judge must admit error and determine that
his/her decision is reasonably likely to result in a reversal, the proper remedy should be
granting a new trial; this would avoid unnecessary, prolonged delay attendant with allowing
the probable cause certificate case to go the to the Court of Appeals or Utah Supreme Court
with the trial judge's recommendation and •'blessing- that it be remanded for a new trial. The
Neelev test, which includes a consideration of the "novelty" of the issue to be appealed and
whether there is precedent esse law on point, malces more sense to this court The practicality
of the rule, as it is now drafted, escapes this court.
The amended Rule 27 was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court after the Neelev
decision. A clear reading suggests that a trial court judge has determined that the appeal

"raises substantial issues of law or fact reasonably likely to result in a reversal, etc.

Decision
The movant is entitled to have this court grant its motion for interim suspension
under Rule 19. Accordingly, the motion is hereby granted. But because of the above
discussion on Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, it seems obvious that the
appeal in the criminal conviction is "reasonably likely to result in a reversal.11 I do not
believe the committee or the court considered this unique circumstance.
The law dictates an interim suspension, but justice would suggest that the interim
suspension be stayed fbr some reasonable period of time until the appellate issues can be
addressed.
The motion is granted, but the interim suspension is stayed for a period of ISO
days.
Counsel for Office of Attorney Discipline is instructed to prepare an Order
consistent with this ruling.
Dated this ^ / d a y of March, 1995,

BY me COURT
'XYNN W. DAVIS, JUDGE
cc: Gaiy Ferrero, Esq.
Gary W. Pendleton, Esq.

ADDENDUM E
Original Information
Probable Cause Statement
Motion for Bill of Particulars
State's Response to Defendants' Request for Discovery
and Motion for Bill of Particulars

IF F F^ ^ F*
SCOTT M. BURNS (#4283)
Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694
Telecopier: (801) 586-2737
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

INFORMATION
Plaintiff,

vs.
EMER KENT WINWARD,
d.o.b. 03/13/63,
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD,
d.o.b 08/01/63,

r.

.

IN

#RlS0005k and

Cnmmal No.

j^q^^QQ^

Judge James L. Shumate

Defendants.
The undersigned complainant, Scott M. Burns, Iron County Attorney, states on
information and belief that the above-named Defendants, EMER KENT WINWARD and
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD, committed the following crimes, to wit:
COUNT I: UNLAWFUL DEALING WITH PROPERTY BY A
FIDUCIARY, a Second-Degree Felony, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 6, Section 513, and Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 412, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said EMER KENT
WINWARD on or about August 9, 1993, in Iron County, State of
Utah, did knowingly and intentionally deal with property that had
been entrusted to him as a fiduciary in a manner which he knew
was a violation of his duty and which involved substantial risk of
loss to the owner or to a person for whose benefit the property was
entrusted, said property having a value in excess of $1,000.

COUNT II: UNLAWFUL DEALING WITH PROPERTY BY A
FIDUCIARY, a Second-Degree Felony, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 6, Section 513, and Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 412, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said KIMBERLEE H.
WINWARD on or about August 9, 1993, in Iron County, State of
Utah, did knowingly and intentionally deal with property that had
been entrusted to her as a fiduciary in a manner which he knew
was a violation of her duty and which involved substantial risk of
loss to the owner or to a person for whose benefit the property was
entrusted, said property having a value in excess of $1,000.
COUNT III: FORGERY, a Second-Degree Felony, in violation of
Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, in that said EMER KENT WINWARD, on or about
August 9, 1993, in Iron County, State of Utah, did knowingly and
intentionally, with a purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge
that he was facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, did
alter any writing of another without her authority or utter any such
altered writing; or did make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue,
transfer, publish, or utter any writing so that the writing or the
making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance,
transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of
another, whether the person is existent or non-existent or purports
to have been executed at a time or place or any numbered sequence
other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when
no such original existed, said writing being a check with a base
amount of $100 or more.
COUNT IV: FORGERY, a Second-Degree Felony, in violation of
Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, in that said KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD, on or about
August 9, 1993, in Iron County, State of Utah, did knowingly and
intentionally, with a purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge
that he was facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, did
alter any writing of another without her authority or utter any such
altered writing; or did make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue,
transfer, publish, or utter any writing so that the writing or the
making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance,
transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of
another, whether the person is existent or non-existent or purports
to have been executed at a time or place or any numbered sequence
other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when
no such original existed, said writing being a check with a base
amount of $100 or more.
~2-

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT
On or about December 10, 1993, Cedar City Police Detective Kelvin Orton received a
complaint from one Nicole Packer relating to an alleged forgery of a check made out to her.
After interviewing Ms. Packer, Detective Orton also conducted interviews with George and Ann
Bauer, Garry Goodsell, Mitchell Schoppmann, Defendant Emer Kent Winward, and other persons
at Cedar Land and Title in Cedar City, Utah, and Detective Orton asserts that his investigation
reveals the following, to wit:
1. That during the year 1993, George and Ann Bauer listed their property for sale (a
residence located in Cedar City, Utah) with ERA Realty and the listing agents were Tom and
Melba Goodman; however, Defendant Kimberlee H. Winward became the selling agent and
originally advised the Bauers to list the property for sale in the amount of $45,000. Thereafter,
Kimberlee H. Winward advised Mr. and Mrs. Bauer to accept a cash offer in the amount of
$40,000 from one Nicole Packer. When Mr. and Mrs. Bauer inquired as to where the buyer was
obtaining her money, Kimberlee H. Winward informed them that "Nicole Packer's parents are
wiring her the money." In fact, Cedar Land and Tile officials and specifically Mitchell
Schoppmann, advised Detective Kelvin Orton that on August 9,1993, $45,000 cash was received
from Southern Utah Title for the purchase of the Bauer property.
2. Nicole Packer was requested by Kimberlee H. Winward and Emer Kent Winward to
(a) act as a purchaser, (b) sign various documents (which she states she really didn't understand
what they meant) at a closing and (c) they would give her 1/3 of any profits they received from
the sale. Nicole Packer agreed to act in that capacity and was involved in the closing of the
Bauer property. After a real estate fee and other expenses were deducted from the $40,000
purchase price, Mr. and Mrs. George Bauer received approximately $36,000. It should be noted
that the actual purchase price ($45,000) was never revealed to George or Ann Bauer and they
were "shocked" when they learned that Co-defendants Emer Kent Winward and Kimberlee H.
Winward had received more than the $40,000 purchase price.
3. Pursuant to the closing, purported purchaser Nicole Packer was issued a check in the
amount of $4,697.50 by Cedar Land and Title Company. However, Nicole Packer was never
informed of the amount of the check, and never saw the check, as it was taken by Defendants
Emer Kent Winward and Kimberlee H. Winward, at which time Defendant Emer Kent Winward
"forged the name of Nicole Packer to the check" and deposited it in the account of Kimberlee
H. Winward. It should be noted that during an interview with Detective Kelvin Orton on January
5,1994, Defendant Emer Kent Winward acknowledged that he forged the name of Nicole Packer
without her knowledge and deposited it into his wife's account and that his wife had full
knowledge of said action and consented, agreed and assisted in that taking place. Nicole Packer,
thereafter, received a check in the amount of $1000 (her purported 1/3 share of any profits that
were made) and did not complain until she learned at a later date that her name had been forged
to a check in the amount of $4,697.50 as she believed that she was perhaps entitled to the greater
amount of monies.
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4. It should be noted that immediately after the closing, Nicole Packer assigned any
interest she had in the property to a Pat B. Williams of Las Vegas, Nevada. The money from
Southern Utah Title Company came from Mrs. Williams and the agreement between her, Emer
Kent Winward, and Kimberlee H. Winward, was that they would find a buyer who would sign
a promissory note for the purchase of said property in the amount of $58,.000. One Vickie
Carter Bassett of Cedar City, Utah, closed on the George Bauer property immediately after the
Bauer/Packer/Winward transaction of August 9, 1993, and purchased the residence for $58,000
at 13% interest, with no down payment.
5. Based upon the foregoing, your affiant asserts there is probable cause to believe that
Defendants Emer Kent Winward and Kimberlee H. Winward have committed the offense of
unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary, a second-degree felony as they were the real estate
agent and attorney representing the interests of George and Ann Bauer and (a) induced them to
sell their property for $40,000 cash, (b) did not inform them that the actual purchase price was
approximately $45,000, (c) provided them with false information with respect to who the buyer
was and where the purchase monies were coming from, and (d) actually received $45,000 for the
residence and did not transfer those monies to Mr. and Mrs. Bauer, nor informed them of the
inflated purchase price. By engaging in such acts, your affiant asserts there is probable cause to
believe that the theft of said monies was committed knowingly and intentionally.
6. Moreover, your affiant asserts that based upon the interviews conducted by Detective
Kelvin Orton, as well as an affidavit of forgery submitted by Nicole Packer, and the confession
of Defendant Emer Kent Winward, there is probable case to believe that on August 9, 1993,
Defendant Emer Kent Winward forged the name of Nicole Packer to a check made payable to
her, by Cedar Land and Tile Company, in the amount of $4,697.50, and without her knowledge
or consent, did negotiate said check and deposit it into the account of his wife, Co-defendant
Kimberlee H. Winward. Moreover, your affiant asserts that Co-defendant Kimberlee H. Winward
aided, abetted, assisted, encouraged and participated with full knowledge in the forgery of the
name of Nicole Packer and the deposit of said sum in her account. Based upon the foregoing,
your affiant asserts there is probable cause to believe that both Defendants committed the offense
of forgery, a second-degree felony.
7. Based upon the foregoing, your affiant asserts that there is probable cause to believe
that the Defendants have committed the offenses set forth in the information herein, and a warrant
for each Defendant's arrest is respectfully requested.
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This Information is based on evidence provided by Cedar City Police Detective Kelvin
Orton, Nicole Packer, Mitchell Schoppmann, Garry Goodsell, Patricia Williams, George Bauer,
Ann Bauer, Thomas Goodman, and officials at Mountain America Credit Union and State Bank
of Southern Utah.
DATED this

day of January, 1994.

>ltl/2

SCOTT-ttkBURNS
Iron County Attorney
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GARY W. PENDLETON (2564)
Attorney for Defendants
150 North 200 East, Suite 202
St. George, Utah 84770
Ph: (801) 628-4411

PILED
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT
,.., _, o m u i «
'94 JHN 21 PH H 18
1R0N COUNTY

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR*
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION FOR BILL OF
PARTICULARS

Plaintiff,
vs.

EMER KENT WINWARD and
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD,

Case No. 941500056/57

Defendant
Defendants, by and through their attorney, Gary W. Pendleton, and hereby
move the Court for an order requiring the prosecutor to provide a bill of particulars. To
inform Defendants and their attorney of the nature and cause of the offenses charged and
to enable Defendants to prepare for preliminary hearing, request is made for the production
of the following information within ten (10) days:
1. With respect to Count I:
a. The identity of the person and/or entity to whom Defendant Emer
Kent Winward owed a fiduciary duty;
b. The facts underlying the creation of that duty;
c. The property entrusted to said defendant; and

1

d. The nature and identity of the risk of loss.
2. With respect to Count II:
a. The identity of the person and/or entity to whom Defendant
Kimberlee H. Winward owed afiduciaryduty,
b. The facts underlying the creation of the duty,
c. The property entrusted to said defendant; and
d. The nature and identity of the risk of loss.
3. With respect to Count HE:
a. The identity of the person and/or entity that Defendant Emer Kent
Winward sought to defraud; and
b. The nature and identity of the fraud which said defendant was
facilitating.
4. With respect to Count IV:
a. The identity of the person and/or entity Defendant Kimberlee H.
Winward sought to defraud; and
b. The nature and identity of the fraud which said defendant was
facilitating.

?o
DATED this

day of January. 1994. s~~^
Gaiy W. Pendleton
Attorney for Defendants
MAILING CERTIFICATE

I do hereby certify that on this 2/rTiav of Januaiy, 1994,1 did personally mail

a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document to Scott M. Burns, Iron
County Attorney's office at P. O. Box 428, Cedar City, Utah 84720.
Secretary
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SCOTT M. BURNS (#4283)
Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

)
Plaintiff,

)

vs.

)

EMER KENT WINWARD,
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD,

)

STATES RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS'
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY AND
MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS

Criminal Nos. 941500056
941500057

)

Defendants.

Judge Robert T. Braithwaite

COMES NOW the State of Utah, by and through Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns,
and respectfully responds to Defendant's Request for Discovery and Motion for Bill of Particulars
as follows, to wit:
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
1. All written, recorded, or oral statements of Defendant given to investigating officers
or witnesses during the investigation of the alleged criminal violation in the above-entitled case.
RESPONSE 1: Copies of documents presently in the possession of the Iron County
Attorney's Office (and to the County Attorney's knowledge, in possession of law enforcement)
that relate to written, recorded, or oral statements of the Defendants have been copied and
delivered to the Defendants' attorney.

>s-

2. The criminal record of the Defendant, if any.
RESPONSE 2: The State of Utah is not aware of any criminal record, as relating to either
Defendant, and does not intend to use the Defendants' criminal records for purposes of
impeachment. However, and in the event the State learns that either Defendant has a criminal
record, the State will provide a copy of the same to the Defendants' attorney.
3. A list of all physical evidence seized by investigating officers involving the alleged
criminal violation and arrest of the Defendant.
RESPONSE 3: The only evidence seized by investigating officers, or obtained for that
matter, consists of documents provided by Defendant EMER KENT WINWARD or received
from various title companies and real estate offices in Cedar City, Utah. The State has not
"seized" any physical evidence directly from either of the Defendants.
4. A list of the names and addresses of all witnesses and a synopsis of their proposed
testimony.
RESPONSE 4: At the time of the preliminary hearing, the State of Utah intends to call
the following witnesses, to wit:
(a)

Nicole Packer of Cedar City, Utah, who can be reached through her

attorney of record, Andrea Nuffer of Salt Lake City, Utah;
(b)

George and Marie Bauer, 223 West Atlantic Avenue, Henderson, Nevada

(c)

Tom Goodman, ERA Realty, Cedar City, Utah;

(d)

Vickie R. Bassett, 171 North 800 West, Cedar City, Utah;

(e)

Jayma Dennett, Cedar Land & Title, Cedar City, Utah;

89015;
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(f)

Mitch Schoppmann, Cedar Land & Title, Cedar City, Utah;

(g)

Sally Melling, Cedar Land & Title, Cedar City, Utah;

(h)

Detective Kelvin Orton, Cedar City Police Department, Cedar City, Utah;

(i)

Patricia B. Williams, 4340 Rippling Brook Drive, North Las Vegas, Nevada

(j)

Thomas M. Higbee, Attorney at Law, Cedar City, Utah; and

(k)

perhaps a real estate agent or broker in Cedar City, Utah, said person's

89030;

identity not yet known.
Nicole Packer will testify, in sum and substance, that Defendant EMER KENT
WINWARD forged her name on a check and deposited the same in the account of Defendant
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD. She will further testify that her signature was a forgery and said
actions took place without her knowledge or consent. Finally, Ms. Packer will testify with
respect to everything she knows relating to the Bauer-to-Packer real estate sale and subsequent
transfer from Packer to Williams so the property could be sold to the Bassetts.
George and Marie Bauer will testify that Defendant KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD was
their real estate agent, that she owed a fiduciary duty to them, that they trusted her knowledge
and expertise in the real estate field, and that based upon her representations, they agreed to sell
their house for $40,000. The Bauers will also testify that they had no idea that the actual sales
price $45,000, or even $58,000, and that had they known that, they would not have sold their
home. They will also testify that neither Defendant KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD or EMER
KENT WINWARD ever disclosed to them that the property would be resold or that the property
had any value in excess of $40,000.
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Tom Goodman of ERA Realty in Cedar City, Utah, will testify with respect to all
knowledge he has relating to the listing of the Bauer property and the transactions that occurred.
Mr. Goodman will also testify with respect to common practices in the real estate industry in
Cedar City, Utah, as well as the establishment of afiduciaryduty, relationship of trust, and what
must be disclosed to clients in the real estate industry.
Vickie R. Bassett will testify with respect to all of her knowledge relating to the real
estate transactions, including the fact that she had no idea that the home originally sold for
$40,000, or thereafter $45,000, and that Defendant KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD and/or
Defendant EMER KENT WINWARD represented to her that the home was worth $58,000 and
that she should purchase the home at that price.
Jayma Dennett is the records manager at Cedar Land & Title. Ms. Dennett will verify
that various documents introduced into evidence are true and accurate copies of records of
documents on file at Cedar Land & Title.
Patricia B. Williams will testify with respect to her knowledge relating to all of the
transactions, including her purchase of the George and Marie Bauer property for approximately
$45,000 and her subsequent sale of the property to Vickie R. Bassett for $58,000, pursuant to a
trust deed and note with interest at the rate of 13%.
Mitch Schoppmann and/or Sally Melling of Cedar Land & Title Company will testify with
respect to their knowledge of the Bauer-to-Packer sale, Packer-to-Williams transfer, and
Williams-to-Bassett sale. Moreover, Mr. Schoppmann and/or Mrs. Melling will testify with
respect to various documents that had been obtained from Cedar Land & Title Company.
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Detective Kelvin Orton of the Cedar City Police Department will testify with respect to
his investigation as well as certain statements and documents received from Defendant EMER
KENT WINWARD.
Thomas M. Higbee will testify, as a lawyer licensed to practice law in the state of Utah,
that he has done substantial work as an attorney in the real estate field and that a fiduciary duty
is owed to certain clients and/or persons when real estate is purchased and sold; he will testify
with respect to what he believes that duty is and, based upon hypothetical, what he believes
would be a breach of that fiduciary duty. Moreover, he will testify with respect to whether or
not it is a custom or practice to "sign or forge" certain persons' names in real estate actions, as
an attorney, without said persons' knowledge or consent.
Realtor/broker, yet to be identified, will testify with respect to common practices, fiduciary
duties, obligations, and respond to a possible hypothetical in the event the Defendants object to
Mr. Tom Goodman providing that information as Mr. Goodman is associated with ERA Realty
and Defendants KIMBERLEE H WINWARD and EMER KENT WINWARD.
Please be advised that the State specifically asserts that it may identify additional
witnesses prior to the preliminary hearing. In the event said witnesses are to testify, the State
would not object to any delay or continuance in order for the Defendants to prepare for said
testimony. Stated another way, if additional witnesses are identified, the Iron County Attorney's
Office will advise the Defendant's attorney as quickly as possible and provide relevant
information with respect to said persons' testimony.
5. Any written, recorded, or oral statements made by witnesses or Defendant that the
Prosecutor intends to use at trial in this case.
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RESPONSE 5: Copies of all documents that the Iron County Attorney's Office possesses
at this time, including communications from Defendant EMER KENT WINWARD and references
to Mr. Winward's statements to law enforcement officers, are attached hereto and incorporated
herein by this reference. The State has not received any information regarding statements made
by Defendant KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD to law enforcement officers.
6.

A list of all physical evidence obtained by the State during the course of the

investigation relating to the Defendant, whether or not said evidence is to be used at trial.
RESPONSE 6: See Response 3 above.
7. The results of any tests, analysis, or examinations of physical evidence made by
private or law enforcement agencies that the prosecution intends to use at trial in the aboveentitled matter.
RESPONSE 7: The State of Utah is not in possession, at this time, of any tests, analyses,
or examinations of physical evidence made by private or law enforcement agencies that the
prosecution intends to use at trial at this time. In the event either of the Defendants deny making
certain writings, and in the event the State deems that proof of said writings' origin is necessary,
the State will employ certain questioned documents experts to examine said writings prior to trial.
8.

Copies of any and all warrants of arrest or warrants to search and any and all

documents, affidavits, tape recordings or other evidence supporting the issuance of said warrants
obtained by law enforcement agencies in the above-entitled case.
RESPONSE 8: Copies of all warrants of arrest, original Information/Probable Cause
Statement, Amended Information, and all other documents presently in the Iron County Attorney's
possession are attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference.
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9.

Copies of all tape recordings, including, but not limited to, taped statements of

informants and any other evidence supporting probable cause to arrest and search persons,
vehicles, or premises.
RESPONSE 9: The State of Utah is not in possession of any tape recordings or taped
statements received from informants or other persons that related to the arrest of the Defendants.
10. Please produce material or information in possession of the State with respect to any
evidence known to the Prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the Defendant, mitigate the
guilt of the Defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment.
RESPONSE 10: The State is not in possession of any evidence that tends to negate the
guilt of the Defendants, mitigate the guilt of the Defendants, or mitigate the degree of the offense
for reduced punishment.
11. Please list the names of any other peace officers involved in this matter who are not
already listed as witnesses.
RESPONSE 11: The State is not aware of any peace officers who were involved in this
investigation at this time, other than Detective Kelvin Orton of the Cedar City Police Department.
12. Please attach copies of all police reports, diagrams, statements and photographs, and
any other information provided by investigating officers, which have not previously been
provided.
RESPONSE 12: Copies of all police reports, statements, and all other documentation
presently possessed by the Iron County Attorney's Office are attached hereto and incorporated
herein by this reference.

-7-

D

RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS
1. With respect to Count I:
(a)

The identity of the person and/or entity to whom Defendant EMER KENT

WINWARD owed a fiduciary duty;
(b)

The facts underlying the creation of that duty;

(c)

The property entrusted to said Defendant; and

(d)

The nature and identity of the risk of loss.

RESPONSE 1: With respect to Count I:
(a)

The identity of the person to whom Defendant EMER KENT WINWARD

owed a fiduciary duty was George and Marie Bauer.
(b)

The facts underlying the creation of that duty were that (1) Defendant

EMER KENT WINWARD is an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Utah, and
(2) Defendant EMER KENT WINWARD aided, abetted, and encouraged his wife, a realtor
licensed to practice in the state of Utah, to knowingly and intentionally misrepresent the sales
price to George and Marie Bauer and, thus, criminally appropriate the monies belonging to Mr.
and Mrs. Bauer.
(c)

The property entrusted to said Defendants was their home located in Cedar

(d)

The risk of loss relates to the monies for Mr. and Mrs. Bauer's home.

City, Utah.

Specifically, the home was worth at least $45,000 (the actual sales price that was not disclosed
to Mr. and Mrs. Bauer) and possibly worth as much as $58,000, as that was the ultimate purchase
price agreed upon by Vickie Bassett.

-8-

2. With respect to Count II:
(a)

The identity of the person and/or entity to whom Defendant KIMBERLEE

H. WINWARD owed a fiduciary duty;
(b)

The facts underlying the creation of that duty;

(c)

The property entrusted to said Defendant; and

(d)

The nature and identity of the risk of loss.

RESPONSE 2: With respect to Count II:
(a)

See Response 1(a) above.

(b)

See Response 1(b) above.

(c)

See Response 1(c) above.

(d)

See Response 1(d) above.

The State has also alleged, and in the alternative to Counts I and II, that Defendant EMER
KENT WINWARD and Defendant KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD committed the offense of Theft.
Specifically, the State asserts that the Defendants acted knowingly and intentionally on August 9,
1993, in failing to disclose to Mr. and Mrs. Bauer the actual value of their home and, after failing
to disclose that, unlawfully sold the home for $5,000 more than the Bauers were told, using a
"straw man" by the name of Nicole Packer in order to effectuate the theft and, thereafter, assisted
in selling the property again from the "straw man", Nicole Packer, to a Patricia B. Williams who
thereafter sold the property to Vickie R. Bassett. The State alleges that the Defendants exercised
or obtained unauthorized control over the property (monies) of George and Marie Bauer.

9

3. With respect to Count III:
(a)

The identity of the person and/or entity that Defendant EMER KENT

WINWARD sought to defraud; and
(b)

The nature and identity of the fraud which said Defendant was facilitating.

RESPONSE 3: With respect to Count III:
(a)

The identity of the person that Defendant EMER KENT WINWARD sought

to defraud is Nicole Packer.
(b)

The nature and identity of the fraud that Defendant was facilitating was

taking a check made payable to Nicole Packer, forging her name without her knowledge, and
depositing the monies in his wife's account so he and his wife, not Ms. Packer, could use and
spend the monies. Specifically, the State alleges that the act occurred without her authority and
that the Defendant not only forged her signature but took substantial steps in trying to obtain the
actual monies after the check was deposited.
4. With respect to Count IV:
(a)

The identity of the person and/or entity that Defendant KIMBERLEE H.

WINWARD sought to defraud; and
(b)

The nature and identity of the fraud which said Defendant was facilitating.

RESPONSE 4: With respect to Count IV:
(a)

See Response 3(a) above.

(b)

See Response 3(b) above. Specifically, the State alleges that Defendant

KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD aided, abetted, encouraged, and assisted in the forgery by assisting
in the real estate transactions and thereafter having the check, forged by her husband, deposited
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in her account. Moreover, the State alleges that Defendant KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD had
"knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, did alter any writing,
etc."
DATED this

day of February, 1994.

SCOTT M. BURNS
Iron County Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true, and correct copy of the within and
foregoing STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY AND
MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS to Mr. Gary W. Pendleton, Attorney for Defendants,
150 North 200 East, Suite 202, St. George, Utah 84770, by first-class mail, postage fully prepaid,
on this

day of February, 1994.

flhnh

Secretary
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ADDENDUM F
State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1991)
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STATE v. GONZALEZ
OtmrnttM FJd 1214 (VfkApp. 1991)

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Ana Lllla GONZALEZ, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 900552-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec 4, 1991.
Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, J. Dennis
Frederick, J., of forgery. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Russon, J.,
held that: (1) sufficient evidence supported
conviction; (2) court properly admitted entire checkbook from which defendant wrote
check in question; and (3) reasonable doubt
instruction was proper..
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law *»U44.13(2, 5), 1159.2(7)
On sufficiency of evidence challenge,
Court of Appeals reviews evidence in light
most favorable to jury's verdict; it reverses conviction only when evidence and
its inferences are so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained reasonable doubt
that defendant committed crime of which
she was convicted.
2. Forgery * M 4

Sufficient evidence supported forgery
conviction; by filling in check, signing victim's name and presenting victim's VISA
check guarantee and check-cashing cards,
defendant completed writing of check while
purporting to be victim, and defendant did
this without any authority from victim.
U.C.A.1963, 76-6-501.
3. Forgery *»20
In forgery prosecution, it did not matter that defendant thought she had authority from third-person, as defendant did not
have authority from person whose name
was signed. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-501.

4. Forgery «=»35
For purposes of forgery prosecution,
defendant's act of completing check implied
purpose to defraud; defendant proffered
check as if it were genuine, would have
gained extra cash beyond purchase price if
she had not been apprehended, and others
shopping with defendant would have gain
advantage of purchase as result of defendant's act U.C.A.1953, 76-6-501.
& Criminal Law *»U34(3>
Whether certain evidence is relevant,
and therefore admissible, is question of
law, which Court of Appeals reviews under
correction-of-error standard.
6. Forgery *»43
In forgery prosecution, testimony that
witness heard third person, from whom
defendant obtained checks, boast that her
sister allowed third person to use sister's
checkbook on loan-type basis, was irrelevant; third person could not confer valid
authority to defendant to sign name of true
owner of check, and thus, excluded testimony had no probative value as to defendant's
authority to use true owner's checkbook.
7. Forgery *»37, 38
In forgery prosecution arising from defendant's writing of single check, rest of
checkbook was relevant as indirect evidence explaining circumstances surrounding crime, and was probative of defendant's intent to defraud. U.C.A.1953, 766-501.
8. Criminal Law *-1134(3)
Appeal challenging refusal of jury instruction presents question of law only;
thus, Court of Appeals shows no particular
deference to trial court's ruling.
9. Criminal Law *»789(4)
Reasonable doubt instruction which
had presumption of innocence clause, mandated acquittal if State failed to meet its
burden of proof, required doubt to be reasonable, and did not require proof to absolute certainty, was proper.

Lisa J. Remal and Ronald S. Fujino (argued), Salt Lake City, for defendant and
appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, State Atty. Gen., and
Kenneth A. Bronston, Asst Atty. Gen. (argued), Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.

uuui

i^io

loaned O'Neill "a couple of bucks' With the
intention of returning the next day for the
money. The next day O'Neill, who did not
have enough cash to repay Gonzalez, asked
Gonzalez to buy her some groceries and
write the check to cover the cost of the
groceries, plus the amount owed. Gonzalez thought nothing of using another's
Before BILLINGS, ORME and RUSSON, checkbook because she had, with permission, used her mother's in the past In
JJ.
addition to Cotner's checkbook, O'Neill
AMENDED OPINION «
gave Cotner's VISA check guarantee card
RUSSON, Judge:
and Smith's check-cashing card to GonzaAna Lilia Gonzalez appeals her convic- lez. Gonzalez then went with four of
tion of forgery, a second degree felony, in O'Neill's friends to Smith's.
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501
Additionally at trial, the court received,
(1990). We affirm.
over Gonzalez's objection, the entire checkbook offered by the State as evidence of
FACTS
Gonzalez's culpable state of mind. The
On January 21,1991, Gonzalez went to a trial court also sustained the State's objecSmith's Food and Drug Center in Salt Lake tion to testimony offered to corroborate
City with four other people. Although Gonzalez's testimony as to O'Neill's stateGonzalez did not select anything for her- ment about purporting to have her sister's
self, the group filled a shopping cart with authority to use the checkbook. Gonzalez
make-up, body building vitamins, and other was subsequently tried and convicted of
expensive items totaling $268.28. Gonzalez forgery.
wrote and presented a check for $300, writing in the amount, "Smith's" as the payee,
ISSUES
and the signature of Christie Cotner, the
Gonzalez
appeals
that conviction, raising
name on the check. Gonzalez also presented a Smith's check-cashing card and a the following issues: (1) Was the evidence
VISA check guarantee card, both bearing at trial sufficient to show that she acted
Cotner's name. Because of the large with purpose to defraud? (2) Did the trial
amount of the check and the nature of the court abuse its discretion in prohibiting tesitems, the assistant manager was called to timony corroborative of her testimony of
verify the check. He called the phone num- her lack of intent to defraud? (3) Did the
ber listed on the check, and reaching Coi- trial court abuse its discretion in admitting
ner's residence, was told that the check- the entire checkbook from which she wrote
book had been stolen the day before when the check? (4) Did the trial court err in
Cotner was shopping in West Valley City. refusing her proposed jury instruction on
The assistant manager called the police, reasonable doubt?
and upon arrival, an officer interviewed
and arrested Gonzalez, charging her with I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
forgery, a second degree felony.
f 1] Gonzalez first asserts that the State
At trial, Gonzalez testified as follows: At did not present sufficient evidence to cona party on January 20, she heard Shannon vict her of forgery because it failed to
(or Sherry) O'Neill boast that her sister prove her purpose to defraud. We review
allowed O'Neill to use her checkbook on a the evidence in a light most favorable to
loan-type basis. At that party, Gonzalez the jury's verdict State v. Johnson, 784
1. This opinion replaces the opinion of the same
name issued October 18, 1991 (172 Utah Adv.

Rep. 22).
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P.2d 1135,1138 (Utah 1989). We reverse a
conviction only when "the evidence and its
inferences are so inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of
which [she] was convicted." State v.
Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App.1989)
(quotation omitted).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990) reads,
in pertinent part
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if,
with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud
be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(b) Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the
writing or the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of another
In accordance with the said statute, the
Utah Supreme Court has stated that in
order to prove forgery, "the state must
show that the defendant not only used the
name of another, but must also show that
[she] did so without any authority to do
so." State v. Collins, 697 P.2d 1317, 1317
(Utah 1979).
Utah courts have yet to define the term
"purpose to defraud," but the Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "'intent to
defraud' . . . is simply a purpose to use a
false writing as if it were genuine in order
to gain some advantage^]" State v. May,
93 Idaho 343, 461 P.2d 126, 128 (1969)
(citations omitted). That court went on to
state that "a false writing has such an
obvious tendency to accomplish fraud that
the jury is warranted in inferring such an
intent from the mere creation of an instrument that is false." Id (citation omitted).
[2,3] Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence was
not so inconclusive that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt
as to Gonzalez's guilt Indeed, Gonzalez's
actions meet all of the requirements of
forgery. By filling in the check, signing

Coiner's name, and presenting Cotner's
VISA check guarantee and Smith's checkcashing cards, Gonzalez completed the
writing of the check while purporting to be
Cotner. Gonzalez did this without any authority from Cotner. It does not matter
that Gonzalez thought that she had authority from O'Neill. It is well established that
one needs the authority of the person
whose name is signed. See State v. Jones,
81 Utah 503, 20 P.2d 614, 617 (1933). It
follows, therefore, that O'Neill could not
confer valid authority to Gonzalez to sign
Cotner's name.
[4] Moreover, we hold that the act of
completing the check implies a purpose to
defraud. See May, 461 P.2d at 128. Gonzalez proffered the check to Smith's as if it
were genuine and would have gained the
extra cash beyond the purchase price if she
had not been apprehended. Furthermore,
the others shopping with Gonzalez would
have gained the advantage of the purchase
as a result of Gonzalez's act Accordingly,
we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to find Gonzalez guilty of forgery.
II. EXCLUSION OF TESTIMONY
[5] Gonzalez next contends that the trial court erred by prohibiting testimony corroborative of her own testimony of her lack
of intent to defraud. Specifically, Gonzalez
sought to present testimony that another
person heard O'Neill boast that her sister
allowed O'Neill to use her checkbook on a
loan-type basis. Whether certain evidence
is relevant, and therefore admissible, is a
question of law, which we review under a
correction-of-error standard. See State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n. 8 (Utah
1991).
[6] In support of her argument that
such testimony should have been admitted,
Gonzalez relies on a case from the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit which approved the admission of hearsay evidence
to establish a defendant's reliance on the
advice of counsel. United State* v. Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir.1984). In
Eisenstein, the trial court excluded the testimony of the defendants' attorney, offered

STATE V. UUN4ALUCU4
w ™ 1*1«
auMttt rid 12H (UtahAp* mi)
to prove that the defendants had given full single check, the rest of the checkbook has
disclosure to the attorney and relied on the no probative value and only served to consubsequent advice. The court of appeals fuse and mislead the jury. We disagree.
reversed, narrowly holding that such excluThe Utah Supreme Court has stated that
sion was improper because "it was neces- "if the evidence has relevancy to explain
sarily relevant for the lawyer to tell the the circumstances surrounding the instant
jury the nature of the enterprise presented crime, it is admissible for that purpose."
to him by [defendants] and upon which he State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah
gave his advice." Id, at 1546 (emphasis in 1978). The court has also held that intent
original).
"may be inferred from the actions of the
Here, the evidence which Gonzalez defendant or from surrounding circumsought to present is wholly irrelevant to stances." State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220,
the disposition of the case. Thus, Eisen- 1223 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted).
stein is inapplicable to the case at bar.
In the case at bar, Gonzalez's claim that
The sole purpose of the excluded testimony admission of the checkbook only served to
was that another person who attended the mislead or confuse the jury is insupportaparty had heard O'Neill's statement about ble because the prosecution made it clear in
her own use of the checkbook. Since closing argument that Gonzalez was only
O'Neill could not confer valid authority to being charged with the one act of forgery.
Gonzalez to sign Cotner's name, the exclud- Secondly, the checkbook is relevant to the
ed testimony had no probative value as to single count of forgery as indirect evidence
Gonzalez's authority to use Cotner's check- explaining the circumstances surrounding
book. Accordingly, we conclude that the the crime. Thirdly, it is probative of Gontrial court did not err in prohibiting the zalez's intent to defraud. Therefore, we
said testimony.
hold that the trial court did not err in
admitting the entire checkbook.
III. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
[7] Over Gonzalez's objection, the trial
IV. REASONABLE DOUBT
court admitted the entire checkbook from
INSTRUCTION
which Gonzalez wrote the check in ques[8] Lastly, Gonzalez claims that the trition. Gonzalez argues that the checkbook
is irrelevant, and thus, this admission was al court erred by refusing her proposed
reversible error, under Utah Rule of Evi- jury instruction on reasonable doubt "An
dence 402, which states that "evidence appeal challenging the refusal to give a
which is not relevant is not admissible at jury instruction presents a question of law
trial." Again, we review the trial court's only. Therefore, . . . [we show] no particuruling as to admissibility of evidence under lar deference to the trial court's ruling."
a correctness standard. State v. Ramirez, State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328, 1331
(Utah App.1990), cert denied, 815 P.2d 241
817 P.2d 774, 781 n. 3 (Utah 1991).
This court has previously held that (1991).
" 'where evidence [is] shown to have supported only conjectural inferences which
had little probative value' . . . reversal may
be appropriate on 'grounds that the improperly admitted evidence could only have
served to confuse and mislead the jury or
prejudice the outcome of the case.'" State
v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah App.
1987) (quoting Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d
489, 491-92 (Utah 1985)). Gonzalez contends that because she was not charged
with any offense other than forgery of the

This court has recently considered the
very instruction given by the trial court,
and determined that it was an appropriate
definition of reasonable doubt See Pedersen, 802 P.2d at 1331-32. Gonzalez, however, argues that the recent United States
Supreme Court decision in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S.
, 111 S.Ct 328, 112
L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) (per curiam) invalidates
our prior ruling because of the similarities
in the two instructions in question. We
disagree.
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In Cage, the Court acknowledged that
the "reasonable doubt standard 'plays a
vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure/ Among other things, 'it is
a prime instrument for reducing the risk of
convictions resting on factual error.'" Id.,
498 U i . at
, 111 S.Ct at 329 (quoting
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S.Ct
1068,1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)). Accordingly, the Supreme Court reasoned that in
"construing the [reasonable doubt] instruction, we consider how reasonable jurors
could have understood the charge as a
whole." Id., 498 U.S. at
, 111 S.Ct at
329 (citing Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S.
307, 316, 105 S.Ct 1965, 1972, 85 L.Eo\2d
344 (1985)).
[9] Comparing Cage to the present
case, we determine that the instruction in
question is sufficiently different from the
one rejected in Cage, and therefore it remains an adequate definition of reasonable
doubt In Cage, the Supreme Court questioned the phrases "substantial doubt,"
"grave uncertainty," and "moral certainty"
contained in the reasonable doubt instruction. The Court ruled that these phrases
could allow "a reasonable juror [to interpret] the instruction to allow a finding of
guilt based on a degree of proof below that
required by the Due Process Clause." Id.,
498 U.S. at
, 111 S.Ct at 330. The
instruction in the case at bar has no such
language. Any similarities* between the
two instructions were not questioned by
the Supreme Court Thus, Cage has no
applicability to the instruction in Pedersen,
nor to the instruction given here. Therefore, we "need not consider whether [Gonzalez's] proposed instruction might also
have been proper or even preferable."
Pedersen, 802 P.2d at 1331-32.

tion in prohibiting testimony corroborative
of Gonzalez's testimony of her lack of intent to defraud, nor in admitting the entire
checkbook from which Gonzalez wrote the
check; and (3) the trial court properly refused Gonzalez's jury instruction on reasonable doubt Accordingly, we affirm.
BILLINGS and ORME, JJ., concur.
(o f tmumSTsYSTiM^

STATE of Utah, In the Interest
of J.W.F., * person under
18 years of age.

Petition of Winfleld D. SCHOOLCRAFT.
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foster parents, rather than legal stepfather
was not abuse of discretion, even though
legal stepfather had been determined to be
fit prospective parent
Infants «»222
Parent and Child *=»14
Awarding custody of child to foster
parents, rather than to presumed father
who was legally married to mother at time
of child's birth on grounds that it was in
best interest of child was not abuse of
discretion, even though juvenile court
found that legal stepfather was fit prospective parent; child had been with foster
parents since shortly after birth when he
was determined to have been abandoned by
his natural mother, and status as legal
stepfather gave rise to no presumption of
custody.

No. 910163-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 27, 1091.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we hold that (1) the evidence at trial was sufficient to show that
Gonzalez acted with purpose to defraud;
(2) the trial court did not abuse its discre-

Man who was legally married to child's
mother at time of child's birth petitioned
for custody of child after child had been
determined to have been abandoned by his
natural mother. The Second District Juvenile Court, Weber County, determined that
legal stepfather was not biological father
and did not have standing to seek custody.
Legal stepfather appealed. The Court of
Appeals, 763 P.2d 1217, affirmed. Stepfather appealed. The Supreme Court, 799
P.2d 710, reversed and remanded for determination of what would be in child's best
interest On remand, the Juvenile Court,
Stephen A. VanDyke, J., determined that it
would be in child's best interest to be in
custody of foster parents in whose care he
had been since shortly after birth. Stepfather appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Bench, PJ., held that determination that it
was in best interest of child to live with

2. Gonzalez argues that the Cage instruction and
the Pedersen instruction are similar because
both have a presumption of innocence clause,
both mandate acquittal if the State fails to meet
its burden of proof, both require doubt to be

reasonable, and neither requires proof to an
absolute certainty. However, these similarities
are not questioned by the Supreme Court, and
are wholly appropriate for a reasonable doubt
instruction. See Pedersen, 802 P.2d at 1331-32.

Winfield D. Schoolcraft, pro se.
Robert K. Hunt (argued), Findley P.
Gridley, Gridley, Echard & Ward, Ogden,
for J.W.F.'s Foster Parents.
Jan Arrington (argued), Ogden, guardian
ad litem, for J.W.F.
Carol L.C. Verdoia (argued), Human Services Div., Salt Lake City, for State of
Utah.
Before BENCH, PJ., and GARFF and
JACKSON, JJ.
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
This case is before us following a remand
by the Utah Supreme Court to the juvenile
court for a determination of whether it
would be in the child's best interests for
appellant Schoolcraft to have custody of
J.W.F. See In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710
(Utah 1990). Schoolcraft appeals the juvenile court's decision that it would not be in
1. Schoolcraft argues that the juvenile court, this
court, and the supreme court, have all erred
because the biological father has never been
produced or legally proven to exist. This argument misses the point upon which this case now
rests. In the initial trial proceeding, the juvenile court found that appellant was not the
Utah Rap. 620-628 P.2d-6
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the child's best interests for him to have
custody. We affirm.
Inasmuch as the facts of this case have
been adequately and fully discussed in the
previous opinions of this court and the supreme court, we give but a brief factual
background. J.W.F. was born to Schoolcraft's wife, Linda Schoolcraft, while they
were separated. They had been separated
for a year prior to the birth. Schoolcraft
became aware of J. W.F.'s existence approximately one year after the birth when he
learned that the State had filed a neglect
and abandonment petition against Linda
Schoolcraft and Michael Ford, the putative
father of J.W.F.1 Schoolcraft then filed a
petition in juvenile court seeking custody of
J.W.F., alleging that he was the presumed
father because he was still legally married
to J.W.F. *8 mother at the time of the birth.
The juvenile court found that Schoolcraft
was not the biological father of J.W.F.
based upon a blood test and the fact that
J.W.F. is partly of African ancestry while
both appellant and Linda Schoolcraft are of
Anglo-Saxon ancestry. The juvenile court
ruled that because Schoolcraft was not the
biological father of J.W.F., he did not have
standing to seek custody and therefore dismissed his petition.
This court affirmed the juvenile court's
denial of standing but the Utah Supreme
Court reversed, holding that Schoolcraft
had standing to seek custody as J.W.F.'s
stepfather. The supreme court remanded
the matter to the juvenile court to "determine what custody arrangement would
serve the best interests of J.W.F. and act
accordingly." Id. at 716. On remand, the
juvenile court held that it would be in the
best interests of J.W.F. to be placed in the
permanent custody of J.W.F.'s foster parents in whose care he had been since the
juvenile court ruled shortly after his birtli
that he had been abandoned. Schoolcraft
now appeals that ruling.
biological father. This finding was affirmed bj
this court and by the supreme court. The iden
tity of J.W.F.'s biological father is therefore n<
longer relevant to the discussion of whethe
Schoolcraft, as J.W.F.'s legal stepfather at birth
should now have custody.

ADDENDUM G
Trial Transcript, pp. 1148-49
Jury Instructions Nos. 14-A, 14-B, 14-C

1
2

3
4

the ruling there.
I

Thank you, Mr. Burns.

Mr. Pendleton, your exceptions to the instructions
as proposed.
MR. PENDLETON:

Instruction 14A I except to on

5

the following grounds. The instruction instructs the jury

6

that they can find the defendant guilty if he acted with a

7

purpose to defraud anyone.

B

requested a bill of particulars which the State provided

9

identifying as the victim of this offense one Nicole Packer.

ID
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
IB
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

The defendant in this case

Specifically, the request for the bill asked the State to
identify the purpose —

the person whom the State contends

the defendant sought to defraud.

The State responded by

identifying Nicole Packer as that person.
instruction, the State —

Now, with this

the Court is allowing the govern-

ment to argue purpose to defraud as it may relate to Bauers,
Bassetts, the credit union, ERA Realty, and anybody else in
this world and Ifm not sure who that may or may not be, but
I'm sure I'll find out during closing argument.
I also object to the language of second numbered
paragraph of that instruction on the grounds that the language Mor with the knowledge that he was facilitating a
fraud to be perpetrated by anyone.11

That would allow the

government to argue, although there is no evidence to this
effect, that if he facilitated a fraud being committed by
Nicole Packer against the credit union, he could be liable.
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
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6

7

1

In conformity with the authority which the State has pro-

2

vided to the Court and upon which it relies and apparently

3

intends to argue, that being State

4

1377, a 1979 Utah Supreme Court case.

5

v. Collins,

at 597 P.2d

I also object on the

I grounds and for the reasons that the instruction does not
identify the specific instrument that was identified by —

7

in the trial and in the evidence.

B

element that the defendant knew that he had no such author-

9

I ity, which I think is implied as an element in the statute.

ID

It does not identify the

Those are my exceptions to that instruction.

11

I except —

I take an exception to Instruction

12

No. 14B as it relates to a definition of the term "defraud."

13

We already have a proposed instruction which will define

14

purpose to defraud.

15

application to the facts of this case, only gives the

16
17
ie
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

The definition of defraud has no

government ammunition to argue an omission of a duty which
—

or a failure —

omission of a duty to disclose, which

the government now will be able to come in and argue that
failure to disclose facts to Bassetts or Bauers or whoever
will satisfy the element of defraud.
I also except —
defining "utter."

take exception to the paragraph

The defendant is nowhere in this Informa-

tion charged with having uttered this instrument.
I also take exception to Instruction No. 14C on
the basis that it is an editorial comment to include the
B Y R O N RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
Before you may find Defendant Emer Kent Winward guilty of the
offense of Forgery, as charged in the Information, the State must
prove and you must find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt,
each and every one of the following elements:
1.

That the Defendant acted knowingly and intentionally;

2. That the Defendant acted with a purpose to defraud anyone,
or with knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud to be
perpetrated by anyone;
3.

That the Defendant did, without her authority, make,

complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish, or utter
any writing so that the writing or the making, completion,
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication, or
utterance purported to be the act of Nicole Packer;
4.

That the writing is a check with a face amount of $100

or more; and
5.

That the events occurred on or about August 9, 1993, in

Iron County, State of Utah.
If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of
the previously described elements, you must fine the Defendant not
guilty of the offense of Forgery as charged in the Information.
If the State has proved, however, each and every one of the
foregoing elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable
doubt, then it is your duty to find the Defendant guilty of
Forgery as charged in the Information.

<^13

INSTRUCTION NO. I ^ ~ Q

In these instructions certain words and phrases are used which require definitions in order
that you may properly understand the nature of the crimes charged and in order that you may
properly apply the law as contained in these instructions to the facts as you may find them from
the evidence. These definitions are as follows:
You are instructed that a person engages in conduct "intentionally", or with "intent", with
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
You are instructed that a person engages in conduct "knowingly", or with "knowledge",
with respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the
nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances.

A person acts "knowingly", or with

"knowledge", with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is
reasonably certain to cause the result.
You are instructed that "defraud" is defined as the making of a false representation
concerning a presently existing material fact which the representor either knew to be false or
made recklessly without sufficient knowledge, or the omission of a material fact when there is
a duty to disclose, for the purpose of inducing action on the part of the other party, with actual
justifiable reliance, resulting in damage to the party.
You are instructed that "utter" is to put or send (as a forged check) into circulation. To
"utter," as used in a statute against forgery, means to offer, whether accepted or not, a forged
instrument, with the representation, by words or actions, that the same is genuine.
You are instructed that "make" is defined as to cause to exist, or to execute in legal form.
You are instructed that "complete" is defined as to finish, or accomplish that which one
starts out to do.
You are instructed that "execute" is defined as to complete, or to make, sign, perform, do,
or to carry out according to its terms.
You are instructed that "authenticate" is defined as to represent as genuine, or true, or
reliable, or having the character and authority of an original.

iHX

You are instructed that "issue" means to send forth, or to deliver or go forth as
authoritative or binding.
You are instructed that "transfer" means to convey or remove from one place, or person,
to another; or to pass or hand over from one to another.
You are instructed that "publish" means to be declare or assert, directly or indirectly, by
words or actions, that a forged instrument is genuine.
You are instructed that "forge" is defined as to fabricate by false imitation, or to
fraudulently alter a genuine instrument to another's prejudice; or to sign another person's name
to a document, with a deceitful and fraudulent intent.
You are instructed that "forgery" is defined as the false making or the material altering
of a document with the intent to defraud. "Forgery" is also defined as a signature of a person
that is made without the person's consent and without the person otherwise authorizing it.

3M|

INSTRUCTION NO.

N~C

You are instructed that "purpose to defraud" is simply a purpose to use a false writing as
if it were genuine in order to gain some advantage.

^MO

ADDENDUM H
Testimony of Hans Q. Chamberlain
(Trial Transcript, pp. 1118-44)

1

then, that because Nicole Packer had been authorized by

2

your wife to sign on her account, that you had authority

3

to therefore sign her name on a check ?'

*

that's not the only reason.

5

A fid

\\H

said,

* F MQ,

The reason is, basically, the

[ whole relationship between us."

And then talked about the

partnership relationship, the joint venture relationship.
7

J He never said that attorneys licensed in Utah had the right

B

' to sign other j:: ^eople's thi ngs.

9

I not rebuttal,

ID

He never said that so it's

• Number two, Mr. Chamberlain, to the extent he f s

11

going to I\NP called to testify as io what: Hans Q„ Chamberlain

12

has done or hasn't done in the last 25 years or what he

13

would or would not do in the future, is not relevant.

14

immaterial.

15

to advise the jury as to what the law is, it's irrelevant

16
17
IB
19

22
23
24
25

To the extent that, tie is qoing to be offered

and immaterial.

That's the Court's obligation.

see that anything that outlined —

I fai ] to

that 1 s been outlined hy

Mr. Burns is rebuttal or that it's relevant or material.
I would object to him even being placed before this jury.

20
21

It's

THE COURT:

Counsel, 1 see Mr. Chamberlain's role

as that of an expert witness and, as an expert witness,
opini ng as to what ::i n, h :i s experience attorneys do or do not
do.

I can see that his testimony under Rule 401 may have a

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is the role
of an attorney in a real estate transaction either more or
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN, JR.
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'
2

less probable than it would be without the testimony of an
J expert witness.

3

MR. PENDLETON:

4

THE COURT:

5
6

Your Honor

~

Let me pick your mind a little bit.

Where do we stand there?
MR. BURNS:

First of all, Mr. Winward testified

7

that his implied authority came by virtue of his relation-

B

ship, not as attorney-client, but by virtue of his relation-

9

ship as a partner.

Basically, what we're going to establish

ID

here if we pursue this line is, we1re going to establish a

11

different standard of conduct with respect to attorneys and

12

regular people and there is no difference nor has the de-

13

fense ever asserted that there is a difference.

14

never claimed that just because of the fact that he is an

15

attorney that he had the right to sign somebodyfs name.

16
17
IB
19
2D
21
22
23
24
25

We have

What we have claimed is that he was in a joint venture
relationship with this girl.

They were in a close family

relationship that was almost like a family.

And that given

those circumstances, that he believed he had authority, had
nothing to do — we never offered evidence to say that
because he was an attorney he could do that.

Now, we want

to call somebody who has long standing in the community as
an attorney sit before the jury and say, "I wouldnft have
done that."

And thatfs irrelevant and immaterial and it's

prejudicial.
B Y R O N RAY CHRISTIANSEN, JR.
CEHT.FIED SHORTHAND RlPOHTER
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1

THE COURT: Mr. Pendleton, I'm afraid that I

2

jumpe

3

additional objections to Mr. Chamberlain's testimony?

4

— my question may have cut you off somewhat.

apyt.nin<:i e.lse

5

MR. PENDLETON,

T

Well, other than I hi..' tact, that, jt

6

is -

7

and uiidu —

B

we were talking about a defense or —

9

were talking about an offense that could only be committed

ID
11

'"is not rebuttal, it is not relevant or material,

iduciary

16
17
IS
19
20
21
22
23

we were talking about what duties of

then maybe his testimony, as

13

15

lor instance, if we

a fiduciary, i.e., an attorney licensed to practice t

12

14

he could only validly be called as an expert if

expert witness, would be
're

jriaJ. However,
here

- a forgery case.

talking about

That can be -••• a forgery case — a

forgery can be committed by somebody at the grocery store
lit- iinwn dr 1 ht niitomoM le i

;.

is noi.hanq

with the fact that he's licensed to practice law or that he
has special duties. And we have never suggested that by
virtue of his license to practice law that he had this
authority.

We have only suggested to the jury that because

he was in a relationship with this young lady as a coventurer or partner that he. had that t Lght, that implied
authority.

And I believe that it would be error to call

24
him.
25
THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you, Counsel.

B Y R O N RAY CHRISTIANSEN.
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1

Court's analysis is as follows. I refer, first of all to

2

Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence regarding specialized

3

knowledge because, as much as we would like to claim,

4

attorneys, I don't think, come in with scientific or tech-

5

nical knowledge, but certainly specialized knowledge. If

6

specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to

7

I understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-

9

J ence, training or education, may testify thereto in the form

ID

of an opinion or otherwise. Now, I see — to understand the

11

evidence and the role of an attorney in this transaction, it

12

is before the jury that an attorney is here. The role of an

13

attorney in a transaction, I think, must be explored simply

14

because of the fact that Mr. Winward is an attorney, that

15 may arise there. Certainly, it would arise, I think, in the
16 mind of a reasonable juror a question as to whether or not
17 attorneys can do some things that other people cannot.
18 Attorneys may or may not have authority. Mr. Winward, in
19

discussing his authority to sign the check, indicated an

20

implied rather than an express authority. And the question

21

is then begged, is it implied because of his role as an

22

attorney?

23

the parties in this enterprise?

24

under Rule 401, I think that it has a tendency to make the

25

existence of a fact more or less probable. Thatfs something

Is it implied because of the arrangement between
Evaluating the evidence
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I don't se .e a pi: oblem v - J • -

the jury needs to look at.

:'

Your objection to Mr. Chamberlain f s testimony is overruled
Mr. Bailiff, will you ask the members of the jury
to come

, ,

Thank you, Ladies and Gentlemen.

We are now back

In session with the jury present, as well as the defendant,
and the State being represented by Mr. Burns.

Mr. Burns,

you may call your next witness.
MR. BURNS:

Thank you, Your Honor.

The State

would call Hans Q. Chamberlain.
THE COURT:

Mr. Chamberlain, would you come for**.

Thank you, sir.

Please have a seat right here.

Go ahead, Counsel.

HANS QUINN CHAMBERLAIN,
having been called as a witness, being first duly sworn,
testified as follows:
EXAMINATION,
BY MR. BURNS:
o-

w'ou'Jfl you state your full ii-irne, please, spelling

your last name?
A<

My full n a m e is H a n s

Q U i n n chamberlain, C-H-A-M-B-

E-R-L-A-I-N.
Q.

And where do you reside, sir?
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN, JR.
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A.

In Cedar City, Utah.

Q.

And the nature of your employment or vocation?

A.

I'm a lawyer.

Q.

And how long have you been a lawyer?

A.

I passed the bar in 1969.

Served — well, actu-

ally four months duty in the CHAD Reserve and then came to
Cedar City and practiced in Cedar since 1970.
Q.

Would you tell the jury, please, your educational

background?
A.

Yes. I attended Southern Utah State College back

then, now Southern Utah University, for two years and two
quarters.

I then transferred to the University of Utah

where I was admitted into law school after three —

I went

to a quarter at the University of Utah, admitted into law
school after three years, and then graduated three years
later from the University of Utah Law School.

At the same

time, I also was able to use some of my law school hours in
the political science department at the University of Utah
and took summer school and also received a bachelorfs degree
from the University of Utah in 1969.

So I received both my

bachelorfs and my juris doctorate degree in 1969.
Q.

Would you tell the jury your professional affilia-

tions with the Utah Bar?
A.

Yes. I've been fairly active in Bar matters in

addition to practicing law.

I first began my involvement

BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN, JR.
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1

when I was asked to be a Bar Examiner for the Utah State

2

process whereby attorneys are selected and

3

then they write questions and model answers for Bar —

4

people who are going to the Bar exam.

5

I model answer -

for

We then submit that

another panel of attorneys who review it

6

and then when the applicants take the Bar exam, we read

7

their answers and grade the exams. And it consists of three

B

member a MI each team for each specialized aic.u

9

that I was assigned back then was secured transactions.

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

After that, l sought and was elected to the Bar
Commission for tl le State ',»!; Utah,, which is the. qoverninq
body for the Utah State Bar.
1982.

21

That occurred in, I believe,

1 was elected a second term and then in 1989 I was

elected to serve as president of the Utah State Bar and
served as president for one year*

Stayed on thereafter as

an ex officio member and then 1 —

my term was up, actually

resigned early so that someone else could be appointed from
this area to have the experience that I had.

19
2D

The area

And then since that time I have served as a member
~* the Board

Trustees for the Law and Justice Center,

which is the building that houses the Utah State Bar and

22
serves as a nc J: I- profi t cor poratj on i n an effort tic: • provide
23
pretty much legal services to the community, arbitration,
24
mediation, pro bono work, those kind of things.
25
Q.

Okay.

Mr. Chamberlain, may I ask you why you1re
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN, JR.
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1

I here today?
'

3

A.

Yes, Ifin here because you subpoenaed me to be

I here.

4

Q.

Thank you.

Could you tell the jury your back-

ground with respect to practicing law for the last 25 years,
the topics and types of issues youfve dealt with as a prac7

I ticing lawyer?

B
9
ID
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
IB
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A.

Yes. When I came down here in 1970, I just began

private practice.

After I was here six months, Robert L.

Gardner, who was then county attorney, was appointed as the
assistant attorney general for this area, which meant that
he had to resign as county attorney.

He resigned.

A county

commissioner at that time appointed me as county attorney.
I then ran that fall —

I was out of law school six months,

which needless to say was a little scary, having just got
out of law school and have a major commitment thrust upon
me.

It was extremely helpful in developing my practice and

what I feel is my expertise.

I served as county attorney

until 1978. After serving two fulls terms, I opted not to
run and serve a third term.

I then went into private prac-

tice and have been in private practice since that time.
While I was county attorney, I was also elected as president
of the Statewide Association of Prosecutors, which is the
association of all the prosecutors in the State of Utah.
Since that time, since 1978, I — well, I should back up.
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN.
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While I served as county attorney, I also maintained a
private practice in addition to being the county attorney.
:k tfien, you didn't have to be fill 1 time, so 1 maintained
somewhat of a private practice.
Then in 1978, I began practice with

couple of

• iei" lawyers mi Cedar City and then i in I yd

formed a

firm back then called Chamberlain, Corry, & Higbee consisting of myself, Kent Corry, and Tom Higbee.

That firm

tence since 1980.
The areas that I practice - - 1 do a lot of real
estate work.

"1 do -- we i epresei

institutions in Cedar City.
panies in Cedar City.
District.

tanks

and financial

We represent the title com-

1 represent the Iron County School

I do quite a bit of trial won

much

what I describe as a general practice, except :
bankrupts
those out
Q.

oly complicated tax matters.
?

do any
We refer

our office.

^hank you.

experience

In some 25 approximate years of your

ttorney, how many —

to the best of your

estimation, sir, how many real estate transactions have you
been involved in, either representing someone or conducting
the c 1 os i ini

o r he i nq \\ pa r t y t n i ha» ?* ea 1 estate transac-

tion?
A.

My best guess would be well over a hundred.
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORT.*

\ [
J Q ^ J ^ ^ Q O

Have
o^v^p
4 4 5

in mind when you represent someone in a divorce, you1re
acting somewhat as a counselor in determining how that
transaction is handled with regard to whether or not the
husband or the wife is given the home and in a sense that
becomes a real estate transactions and I would guess

I've

done, I don't know, a hundred to two hundred divorces at
least over that period of time.
Q.

Would that be in addition to the approximately

one hundred real estate transactions?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

And in those transactions, again to the

best that you can recall for the jury, on approximately how
many occasions have funds, which are the proceeds or the
result of a real estate transaction, made payable to a third
party, to someone else, come into your possession or have
been available for your access?
A.

Probably —

we had —

where it wasn*t paid

directly at closing at the time, the title company or something that was handled by Chamberlain and Higbee and particularly by me, I would guess about fifty.
Q.

Approximately fifty times?

A.

Yes, uh-huh (affirmative).

Q.

And on how many of those occasions, sir, did you

sign the name of the person to whom the check was written?
MR. PENDLETON:

Objection.

That's irrelevant and
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1
2

immaterial how many times Mr. Chamberlain has signed a name
I or —

3 !

I thought he was being qualified as an expert witness

and now hefs not even being asked for an opinion,

4

THE COURT:

Sustained.

MR. BURNS:

Thank you.

Rephrase your question,

Mr. Burns.

7

I

Q.

(By Mr. Burns)

Mr. Chamberlain, if proceeds

B

through a check in these some fifty occasions that you've

9

talked about in your experience —

ID
11
12
13

check from a real estate transaction came into your possession made payable to a third party, do you have an opinion
as to whether or not you or a lawyer could sign that
person's name without their knowledge or consent?

14

MR. PENDLETON:

IS

THE WITNESS:

16
17

20
21
22
23
24

Objection.

I have an opinion.

MR. PENDLETON:

That doesn't provide a sufficient

hypothetical to fit the facts of this case.

IB
19

if the proceeds of a

THE COURT:

Counsel, the objection is not to the

answer of the question that was given.

Mr. Chamberlain just

answered that, yes, he has an opinion.

Overruled.

Your

next question, Mr. Burns.
Q.

(By Mr. Burns)

What is that opinion?

MR. PENDLETON:

I'll object on the basis of an

inadequate hypothetical.

25
THE COURT:

Overruled again, Counsel. Mr.
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1

I Chamberlain, your answer.

2

THE WITNESS: Assuming a hypothetical that you

3

gave me, it would be my opinion it would be improper for an

4

attorney to sign a client's name to a check and deposit it

5

into any account, including the lawyer's own account.

6

Q.

(By Mr. Burns) Okay. Do you have an opinion as

7

to whether or not proceeds from a real estate transaction

B

made payable to someone else but come into your possession,

9

under what circumstances could that check be deposited into

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
IB
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

your personal account or into your wife's account?
A.

The only circumstances that I would consider

appropriate would be if I held a special or general power
of attorney from the client that authorized me to do that.
Q.

Okay. And would that presume, Mr. Chamberlain,

that the client knew about the check?
A.

Yes, yes.

Q.

Okay. Do you have an opinion as to under what

circumstances you would receive a check made payable to a
third party and never tell that person about the check?
MR. PENDLETON: Objection. I think this is beyond
the scope of his qualifications as an expert. I don't see
the relevance, either.
THE COURT: Overruled, Counsel. You may answer,
Mr. Chamberlain.
THE WITNESS: Well, I — I had that question —
BYRON

RAY
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I mean, in trying to answer your question, I looked at the
Rules of Professional Conduct because I thought they would
be appropriate in aiding me in trying to answer your questions and

I think you have an immediate obligation to

transfer the funds to the person they belong to and I believe thatfs consistent with Rule 1.13 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
MR. BURNS:

Thank you.

I have no further ques-

tions, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Cross-examination, if any, Mr.

Pendleton?
MR. PENDLETON:
THE COURT:

Just a moment,

Your Honor.

Certainly.
CROSS-EXAMINATION,

BY MR. PENDLETON:
Q.

Mr. Chamberlain, you are here strictly for a

limited purpose, as I understand it, to provide this jury
with knowledge of the fact that a person by reason of the
fact that they are licensed to practice law in the State
of Utah does not automatically have authority to endorse
someone else's name to a check, is that correct?
A.

I'm not sure that's the reason I'm here.

subpoenaed and asked to give an opinion.

I was

If you could

clarify your question, perhaps I could try to answer it.
Q.

The opinions that you have been provided —
B Y R O N RAY CHRISTIANSEN,
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1
2

been providing to the jury relate to whether or not a perJ son, strictly because of — by reason of the fact that they
are an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of
Utah, whether or not that person by virtue of only that fact
is authorized to sign someone else's name on a check?
A,

7

Yes, and that's because I believe they1re held to

J a higher duty than the average person.

B

Q.

9

who is in —

ID

A.

Okay.

11

Q.

Let's talk about partners.

12

A.

Partners?

13

Q.

Okay.

Now, let's talk about someone who is an attorney
let's don't talk about attorneys.

Okay.

Would you agree, first of all that a part-

14

nership or a joint venture can be created without any par-

15

ticular formality?

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A.

Well, any written formality, yes.

I think two

people can get together and the law imposes a partnership
arrangement.
Q.

And if two people get together and combine their

talents, their resources, and their efforts to the accomplishment of a commercial goal which would produce a profit,
generally speaking the law will imply upon those persons
and with respect to one another they are partners or joint
venturers, is that correct?
A.

Yes, I think that's correct.
B Y R O N RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
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2

Q.

And is it true that joint venturers or partners

| stand in relationship to each other as agent and principal

3

with respect to those matters that are within the scope of

4

the partnership venture?

5
6
7

A.

Probably, if the scope of the venture is defined

and known to all of the parties.
Q.

Okay.

So, by reason of the fact that somebody

e

happens to be an attorney doesn't mean that they can't be

9

a partner in a transaction, is that correct?

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
1B
19
20
21
22
23

A.

That's correct.

Q.

And by reason of the fact that a person is an

attorney doesn't mean that they cannot acquire implied
authority by reason of that partnership status, does it?
A.
plied.

Well, I guess it depends on how you define imI think you have to —

I think both partners have

to know of the relationship to being with and I think they
have to have discussed the authority for any implied authority to have occurred.
Q.

Somebody sends a check to Chamberlain and Higbee

payable for —

in payment of attorney's fees.

Typically,

you probably don't even see that check, do you?
A.

Well, we look at the checks as they come in.

Q.

You do?

A.

We have to make payroll like anybody else.

Q.

Okay.

24
25
But your secretary generally deposits those
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN.
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1 I checks, doesn't she?
2

3
4

'

A.

We call her our billing secretary, correct.

Q.

And she has a stamp that has language on it that

indicates which account it's supposed to be deposited in?

5

A.

Correct.

6

Q.

And that stamp is affixed by her with authority?

7

A.

Correct.

Q.

And that stamp, basically, acts as an endorsement,

e
9
ID
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

isn't that correct?
A.

Yes, I think that's correct.

Q.

And even if Tom Higbee got a check that came in

that was payable to Tom Higbee but it was for partnership
business or was for services rendered by Chamberlain and
Higbee, that check payable to Tom Higbee would be stamped
and endorsed by the partnership in the due course and deposited in the partnership account, is that correct?
A.

Yes.

It would be stamped but it wouldn't be

signed.
Q.

Okay.

It would be stamped.

A.

Of course, that's because we've discussed that,

you know, on prior occasions and said that's fine, that's
the way we want it done.
Q.

You said you have said that to —

you have dis-

cussed that with your secretary and this is how it's supposed to be done?
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
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A.

And Tom Higbee.

Q.

Okay.

Is it your testimony, then, that if you

had never had an express conversation with Tom Higbee saying
that he could endorse that check, that if a check came in,
let's say, payable to Tom Higbee, okay, for Chamberlain and
Higbee funds —

funds payable to Chamberlain and Higbee.

If

you went out and you endorsed the partnership stamp on the
back of it and put it in the partnership account
MR. BURNS:
at this point.

—

Well, Your Honor, I'm going to object

I think that we've gone far afield as to

relevance and materiality with respect

~

THE COURT:

I think not, Counsel.

Overruled.

MR. BURNS:

May I just make a brief record.

We're

talking now about stamp, I think, and —
THE COURT:

I understand that as well, but we're

still within the area of expertise that Mr. Chamberlain has
given us.
Q.

Go ahead, Mr. Pendleton, start it up again.
(By Mr. Pendleton)

If a check came into your

office, then, payable to Tom Higbee but it was actually for
services rendered by the partnership or by him as a partner,
you could take your partnership stamp and stick it on the
back of that check and put it in the partnership account
without it being forgery, isn't that correct?
A.

Yes.

Because we have —

Q.

And you could do that

—
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MR. BURNS:

Your Honor, if he could answer.

THE COURT:

Let Mr. Chamberlain finish his answer,

Mr. Pendleton.
MR. PENDLETON:
THE WITNESS:

Okay.

Yes, because we have an agreement

that thatfs how itfs to work.
Q.

(By Mr. Pendleton)

never sat down —

Now, suppose that you had

first of all, do you have a written part-

nership agreement?
A.

Of sorts, yes, uh-huh.

Q.

Does the written partnership agreement talk about

endorsing checks of the partnership?
A.

I don't know whether it does or not.

Q.

Suppose

A.

Itfs been a —

~
I mean, it's been twelve years so

I just don't have a specific recollection of whether it does
or not.
Q.

Okay.

together —

Suppose two partners —

two attorneys get

well, let's take two auto mechanics, get to-

gether and they never have —

they never sit down and say

you have the right to endorse checks or whatever and put
them into the Al's Mechanic Shop account or whatever, if a
check came in payable to one of those partners, therefs no
written agreement between them.
agreement between them.

There1s not even a verbal

Therefs only a partnership rela-
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tionship.

If one of those partners signed the other part-

ner's name on that check and put it in the partnership
account without intending to defraud the other partner,
would that be forgery?
A.

No, because I think it goes into the partnership

account.
Q.
account.

And suppose that it's not even in the partnership
Let's suppose that it goes into an account that

is used, which is the only account that is used by the
partnership, even though it is not designated as a partnership account, if there's no intent to defraud, is it
forgery?
A.

If it goes into the partnership account?

Q.

If it goes into the account that that partnership

has always used, in connection with this business, even
though that might not be designated down at the institution
as a partnership account?
A.

Do all of the partners know of the existence of

that check, I guess, would be my question.
Q.

Well, assume they don't.

Well, let's assume that

it's put in the partnership account and there is no intent
to defraud, is that forgery?
A.

I don't know.

I can't look into that person's

mind to determine whether or not there's intent to defraud.
MR. PENDLETON:

Okay.

That's my point.

BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN, JR.
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1

you.

No further questions.

2

THE COURT: Mr. Burns, anything else?

3

MR. BURNS:

4
5

£
7
B

Yes, Your Honor.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION,
| BY MR. BURNS:
Q.

Do you have an opinion as to whether or not if

they, let's assume, a partnership —

if a check were made

payable to one of the partners in the amount of, let's say,

9

$4,697.00, the other partner signs that person's name to

10

the check, doesn't ever tell the other partner about it.

11

There's never been authority given to sign her name, ever.

12

The partner then takes that check and deposits it into an

13

account, personal account, not a business account, that the

14

partner who the check was made out to is not a signatory on

15

that account, and the partner whose name was signed and the

16
17
IS
19
20
21
22
23

check was negotiated didn't even find out about it for one,
two, three, three and a half months.

Do you have an opinion

as to whether or not that would be with a purpose to defraud
or forgery?
MR. PENDLETON:

Objection.

This is far beyond his

field of expertise.
MR. BURNS: Well, Your Honor, Mr. Pendleton gave
him a hypothetical that I don't think was based closely in

24
reality and then asked him to give his opinion as to whether
25
or not it would be forgery and fraud, and I think I've given
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him a hypothetical and now, likewise, would ask him to give
the jury his opinion as to whether or not that would be
forgery or with purpose to defraud.
THE COURT: Members of the jury, I'm going to
allow Mr* Chamberlain to answer the question, but I'm going
to instruct you that the testimony of an expert witness
should be viewed by you as the testimony of any other witness when it comes time to make your determination in the
jury room as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant*
This testimony should be viewed by you in the same fashion
as you do all the other witnesses under the instructions
given by the Court.
overruled.

Your objection, Mr. Pendleton, is

Mr. Chamberlain, can you answer the question?
THE WITNESS:

I think I can.

THE COURT: What's your opinion, sir?
THE WITNESS:

In my opinion, that would be evi-

dence of intent to defraud.
MR. BURNS:

Thank you.

That's all I have, Your

Honor.
MR. PENDLETON:

Well, let me follow that up, then,

since I have to deal with this.
THE COURT: Mr. Pendleton.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION,
BY MR. PENDLETON:
Q.

Mr. Chamberlain, let's assume that three people
B Y R O N RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
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form a partnership or a joint venture.

Then those persons

enter into a real estate transaction which is part of the
objective of that partnership or perhaps the sole objective
of that partnership,

Let's assume that the check that comes

out of the title company by reason of the closing of that
real estate transaction is payable to but one of those
partners*

Let's assume that all of the partners, including

the one to whom it was payable, would concede that that
check represented partnership funds and was monies that was
available to all of the partners or belonged to all of the
partners and not just to the one partner just because that
personfs name was the only name on it.

Letfs assume that

this check, then, is endorsed by another one of the partners
and put into the only account that has ever been used for
partnership business.

Let's assume that other transactions

have come out of that account, other monies have been paid
out of that account, in connection with the advancement of
the partnership business.

Let's assume that even though one

of those partners is not a signator —

letfs assume that the

partner whose name is on the check is not a signatory on the
account but let's assume that she has been given express
authority by another one of the partners to write against
that account and has on at least 62 occasions drawn money
from that account.

Letfs assume that before this transac-

tion ever closed that these partners had had a conversation
B Y R O N RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
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2

and they had discussed different ways of dealing with this
I — of closing this transaction and they have discussed the

3

possibility of listing the property and other possibilities

4

and they had determined that one of the partners was going

5
6

to get the sum of ten thou — excuse me, one thousand dol-

7

the final figures are even known about what is going to be

B

earned through that transaction and before the costs are

9

even known, the costs of that transaction are even known.

ID

Now, let's assume that that partner who has agreed to take

11

one thousand dollars for her int — as compensation for her

12

services in that partnership venture, that person — the

13

check is issued in her name and that the check is endorsed,

14

placed in the partnership account by another one of the

15

partners, and then —

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

lars. And let's assume that they make this agreement before

A.

May I ask you a question?

Q.

Okay.

A.

At that point in time, when you say "endorsed,"

does the partner that signed the check sign his name to it
or the other partner's name to the check?
Q.

Signs his name to it and then puts a restricted

endorsement on that indicating which account it is going
into.
THE COURT: Mr. Pendleton, his or her name to it?
MR. PENDLETON: His or her name to it.
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
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THE WITNESS: My question is, does he sign his
J name to it or does he sign the name of the person to whom

3

the check is made payable?

4
5

Q.

He signs the partner1s name#

I the other partner1s name.

6

7

(By Mr. Pendleton)

A.

I

Whose name is on the check?

Q. Yes.

B

A.

Okay.

9

Q.

Okay.

ID

A.

I think Ifm with you so far. Quite a few assump-

11
12

tions, but I'll try to stay with you.
Q.

Quite a few facts in this case. And assume that

13

the partner whose name the check was issued in then was paid

14

the thousand dollars that she agreed to take as compensa-

15

tion, is paid right out of that same account.

16

that present the jury question as to whether or not the

17

person who signed that other partner's name acted with the

IS

intent to defraud?

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Now, does

A.

Does that present a jury question?

Q.

Yes. Does it present a jury question?

A.

As to whether or not —

Q.

As to whether or not the person —
MR. BURNS:

Ifm sorry.

Objection as to whether or not it

presents a jury question, Your Honor.

I think he can opine

as to whether or not there is an intent to defraud.
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
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1

THE COURT:

Ifm going to allow Mr. Pendleton to

2

I place it in that framework.

3

'

4
5

ID
n

THE COURT:

Whether or not it presents a jury

(By Mr. Pendleton)

Does it present a jury ques-

j tion as to whether or not that person who made the endorse-

B !
9

Okay

j question.
Q*

7

MR. BURNS:

ment on behalf of the partner intended to defraud that

j partner?
A.

Yes, a jury question.

Q.

And if the jury, then, must decide whether or not

12

they believe that the partner who made the endorsement acted

13

with that intent, is that correct?

14

A.

Well, yes, with this caveat, I guess, and that is,

15

you havenft told me whether or not — I don't think you told

16

me in your assumption as to whether or not the person whose

17

name was on the check said it was okay for the other person

IB
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

to sign her name to the check.
Q.

No, Ifm not talking about express consent, I'm

talking about apparent or implied authority by virtue of
their relationship as partners.
A*

I think the jury has to decide those relationships

and make a decision based on the evidence that they've
heard.
Q.

So, by telling this jury, that in your opinion
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN, J R .
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1

that was —

that under Mr. Burns' hypothetical that that may

2

J be evidence of fraud, you were not telling this jury that

3

' you have made any judgment about this case, is that correct?

4

5

A.

I don't think I'm —

I don't think I should be the

person that makes the ultimate jury decision.

6

Q.

Isn't that their —

7

A.

That's their decision, yes.

B

MR. PENDLETON:

9

THE COURT: Mr. Burns, anything else?

10

MR. BURNS:

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
ie
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Thank you.

Just briefly.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION,
BY MR. BURNS:
Q.

Taking all of those assumptions that you can

recall and add to that, now, Mr. Chamberlain, that the
partner whose name was signed did not give authority and
add the assumption that the partner whose name was signed
didn't even know about the check and add that to the assumption that these partners agreed to to a one-third split and
the partner whose name was signed had no idea of the amount
of that check, do you have an opinion as to whether or not
that that would show purpose to defraud?
MR. PENDLETON:

Objection.

This is —

we are

going so far afield here, Your Honor.
MR. BURNS: Well, Your Honor, Mr. Pendleton, lays
out a hypothetical

—
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THE COURT:
Overruled.

Counsel, your objection is noted.

Mr. Chamberlain, you may answer.
THE WITNESS: Ask me the question again.

Q.

(By Mr. Burns)

Do you have an opinion as to

whether or not that would, in your opinion, evidence a
purpose to defraud?
MR. PENDLETON:

Your Honor, the rules compel me

to note my objection and the grounds for it.

Irrelevant,

immaterial and in violation of Rule 403.
THE COURT: And I appreciate your specificity,
Counsel. Weighing this matter, coupled with the Courtfs
cautionary instruction, overruled.

Mr. Chamberlain, do you

have an opinion?
THE WITNESS:

I have an opinion.

Q.

(By Mr. Burns)

And that would be what, sir?

A*

My opinion, that that is strong evidence of intent

to defraud.
MR. BURNS:

Thank you, sir.

THE COURT: Mr. Pendleton, anything else?
MR. PENDLETON:

No further questions, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Thank you, Mr. Chamber-

lain, you may step down and you are excused from the subpoena.

Any further witnesses, Mr. Burns?
MR. BURNS:

No, sir.

THE COURT: All right.

The State rests, then, on

BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN, JR.
CEATirriD SMOHTMAND R l * 0 * T * H

I V M M
(801)

673*5100

4 6 3

ADDENDUM I
Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions Nos. 4 and 5
Trial Transcript, pp. 1155-56

INSTRUCTION NO

• 1

You are instructed that a joint venture is an association of persons organized
for the purpose of engaging in and carrying out a single business venture. A joint venture
may be created without any particular formality or writing and may be inferred by the
conduct of the parties.

46 Am JUT 2d, Joint Ventures

/ft r £>*% •
//

SQS-

INSTRUCTION NO.

r

Each member of a joint venture stands in relationship of agent as well as
principal to the other members of the venture in matters relating to the object for which the
joint venture was formed.

46 Am Jur 2d, Joint Ventures §42.

5^7

THE COURT:

With respect to your proposed instruc-

tions on the specific intent, we've covered that earlier.
The Court feels that the — well, we may not have covered
it on the record.

The Court specifically feels that the

charging instruction, Instruction 14A, defining knowingly
and intentionally, the definitional instruction, and Instruction 14B, and the Courtfs own stock instruction, Instruction No. 13, all set forth the specific intent needed
for this crime, which is knowing and intentional.

I differ

with the Federal Practice and I don't believe the State
courts follow that.

We may be bound by it eventually, but

I'm not aware of any State law to support that approach.
Instruction No. 4 and 5 on joint venture, I find
that while you may argue joint venture and have presented
sufficient evidence to argue joint venture, that it is
inappropriate for the Court to instruct on that matter
because I'm not sure that the facts and the evidence before
the Court at this juncture support instructions on joint
venture.
That's the Court's rulings. Mr. Bailiff, will you
ask the —
MR. BURNS:

Your Honor, before we do that, are

we going to put a time limit on closing argument, something
that

—
THE COURT: Mr. Burns, how long do you think
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1

intent being the purpose to defraud. And under the circum-

2

stances, I donft believe that the instruction relating to

3

general criminal intent, knowing and intentional or general

4

mens rea is adequate to instruct the jury as — on the law

5

J as it relates to that specific intent to defraud. And,
therefore, I take exception to the Courtfs refusal to give

7

J the following instruction, "The crime charged in this case

B

is a serious crime which requires proof of specific intent

9

before the defendant can be convicted.

Specific intent as

10 the term applies means more than the general intent to
11 commit the act. To establish specific intent, the prose12 cution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
13 knowingly did an act which the law forbids, purposely in14 tending to violate the law. Such intent may be determined
15 from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case."
16 And I would point out that that is a form instruction from
17 the Federal Bar Association here in the State of Utah.
IB Those are my exceptions.
19
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. With respect to
20
your exceptions to the proposed Instruction No. 14A, the
21
Court has previously ruled on this issue with respect to the
22
purpose to defraud anyone as is set forth in the statute.
23
The reasoning of the Court previously on the record follows
24
there.
25
Instruction 14B, the instruction as to defraud is
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPOATIA
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ADDENDUM J
Defendant's Proposed Jury Instruction No. 3

INSTRUCTION NO.

3

The crime charged in this case is a serious crime which requires proof of
specific intent before the defendant can be convicted. Specific intent, as the term implies,
means more than the general intent to commit the act To establish specific intent the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly did an act
which the law forbids purposely intending to violate the law. Such intent may be determined
from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.

ft/6T
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Federal Bar Association Criminal Instruction No. 12.
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ADDENDUM K
State's Objection to Defendants' Motion to Disqualify
Scott M. Burns

5thJiKfieialDist Court'iron County

FILE O

SCOTT M. BURNS (#4283)
Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite Ml
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694

MAY 2 7 1994
^

U

.CLERK
DEPUTY

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
)

STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff,
vs.

)

EMER KENT WINWARD and
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD,

)

STATES OBJECTION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY SCOTT M. BURNS

Criminal Nos. 941500056
941500057

)

Defendants.

Judge James L. Shumate

COMES NOW the State of Utah, by and through Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns,
and respectfully objects to the Defendants' Motion to Disqualify Scott M. Burns from further
prosecution of the above-entitled matter.
The State's objection is made on the grounds that the Defendants have failed to set forth
any statutory basis, ethical reason, or a legally sufficient basis upon which to disqualify the Iron
County Attorney. The State respectfully responds to the specific allegations set forth rh the
Defendants' Motion to Disqualify as follows, to wit:
ALLEGATIONS
ALLEGATION NO. 1. At the outset, Mr. Bums perjured himself in the statement of
probable cause which he signed in order to obtain arrest warrants for the Defendant and his wife
falsely stating that:

\3L3L

a.

The Defendants "were the real estate agent and attorney representing the

interests of George and Ann Bauer. . . " (Probable Cause Statement %5)
b.

"Defendant Kimberlee H. Winward became the selling agent and originally

advised the Bauers to list the property for sale in the amount of $45,000." (Probable Cause
Statement f 1)
c.

"Thereafter, Kimberlee H. Winward advised Mr. and Mrs. Bauer to accept

a cash offer in the amount of $40,000 from one Nicole Packer." (Probable Cause Statement f l )
d.

[DJuring an interview with Detective Orton on January 5,1994, Defendant

Emer Kent Winward acknowledged . . . that his wife had full knowledge of said action (the
alleged forgery) and consented, agreed, and assisted in that taking place." (Probable Cause
Statement ]3)
Each of these allegations is central to the State's theories of criminal liability. Each of
these statements is false and unsupported by any evidence.
Furthermore, and more disturbingly, the police report does not support any of these
allegations which indicates that Mr. Burns made them right out of whole cloth. Most telling is
the fact that Detective Orton's account of the January 5 interview with Kent Winward indicates
that Mr. Winward told the investigator that the subject check was deposited into Mrs. Winward's
account "to expedite the process in which Nicole would receive her percentage of the profit."
The investigator's account is completely devoid of any allegation made by Kent Winward
regarding his wife's knowledge of the process by which the subject check was endorsed or
deposited.
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RESPONSE NO. Ma). Detective Kelvin Orton of the Cedar City Police Department
submitted a report to the Iron County Attorney's Office (see Exhibit "A", attached hereto and
incorporated herein, and hereinafter referred to as "Detective Orton's report") that contained an
interview with Nicole Packer on December 10, 1993 (relating to the sale of the George and Ann
Marie Bauer home) which states, "Kim and Kent Winward needed Nicole Packer as a partner to
list as the original buyer for appearances." Moreover, Detective Orton's report contains an
interview with Mitch Schoppmann, Cedar Land and Title, on January 4, 1994, that quotes
Schoppmann as saying, "The property located at 171 North 800 West was bought and sold in
basically the same transaction." Mr. Schoppmann further stated that "according to Cedar Land
and Title personnel, Kent Winward handled the paperwork concerning this real estate transaction
including closing."
Clearly, the prosecutor preparing a probable cause statement would be led to believe that
Mr. and Mrs. Winward were acting on behalf of George and Ann Marie Bauer as related to the
sale of the subject property.
RESPONSE NO. Kb) and McY Detective Orton's report sets forth an interview with Mr.
Tom Goodman, ERA Realty, on January 10, 1994, wherein Mr. Goodman stated "he did not
handle the actual sale of the property and was just the listing agent. Kim Winward (also of ERA
Realty) was the 'selling agent' and handled all negotiations with the buyer." Goodman also stated
to Detective Orton that "all the information regarding the sale of the property would have come
through Kim Winward."
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In an interview with George Bauer on January 10, 1994, Mr. Bauer informed Detective
Orton that "they originally were advised to list the property for $45,000 . . . they received an
offer of $40,000 cash which they eventually agreed to."
In that Mr. Goodman and Defendant Kimberlee H. Winward both worked for ERA Realty,
and based upon Detective Orton's report that Mr. Goodman asserted "he was just the listing
agent" and "Kim Winward was the selling agent and all of the negotiations came through her,"
a prosecutor preparing the probable cause statement would be led to believe that Defendant
Kimberlee H. Winward (the selling agent) would have been the person to advise on the sale
amount ($45,000) and would have been the person to advise Mr. and Mrs. Bauer to sell for
$40,000."
RESPONSE NO. KdV Detective Orton informed the Iron County Attorney, verbally,
while the Iron County Attorney was preparing the probable cause statement, that Defendant Kent
Winward stated that Defendant Kim Winward knew Defendant Kent Winward was going to sign
Nicole Packer's name to the subject check (which is alleged to have been forged), and she further
knew that Defendant Kent Winward was going to deposit the check into her (Defendant Kim
Winward's checking account). The State alleges that this assertion was also based upon (and the
Court agreed in its findings as set forth in the preliminary hearing transcript, p. 262) the fact that
Defendant Kimberlee H. Winward made her checking account available to Defendant E. Kent
Winward and then wrote funds out of that account, specifically the $1,160 check to Ms. Packer.
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The State asserts, by the Defendants' failure to challenge or argue, that all other
allegations contained in the probable cause statement were true and based upon appropriate
evidence. Finally, the State asserts that a "probable cause statement" is made by prosecuting
attorneys in support of a information and arrest warrant and is just that, a statement that
"probable cause" exists to support the alleged offenses. Clearly, if the State were held to only
setting forth completely unrefutable assertions in the probable cause statement, there would be
no need for (a) a preliminary hearing or (b) a trial, and upon submission of the probable cause
statement, all parties could simply move to the sentencing phase.
ALLEGATION NO. 2. During the noon recess of the preliminary hearing, Mr. Bums
accosted defense counsel in the halls of the courthouse and invited defense counsel to set (sic)
outside, apparently for the purpose of some physical altercation.
RESPONSE NO. 2. The State of Utah asserts that Iron County Attorney Scott M. Bums
did not accost defense counsel in the halls of the courthouse and did not invite counsel outside
for the purpose of some physical altercation. If the Court is interested in the particulars of those
allegations, please refer to Exhibit "B", attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference.
ALLEGATION NO. 3. When challenged regarding the inaccuracy of the probable cause
statement and his behavior at the preliminary hearing, Mr. Bums responded with name-calling
and more false accusations.
RESPONSE NO. 3. Again, the State of Utah asserts that Iron County Attorney Scott M.
Bums did not engage in any engage in any "name-calling" or "false accusations" at the
preliminary hearing. The Court is again directed to review State's Exhibit "B" which is attached
hereto.
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ALLEGATION NO. 4. Mr. Burns' comments to the press have been unethical and
inappropriate.
RESPONSE NO 4. The State denies that Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns has made
any comments to the press that have been unethical and inappropriate. In fact, the Iron County
Attorney was misquoted by a Daily Spectrum newspaper reporter, and upon reading the article,
the Iron County Attorney responded in what would appear to be the appropriate and professional
manner (see Exhibit "CH, attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference).
ALLEGATION NO. 5. Mr. Burns' conduct of the prosecution of this matter evidences
an irrational and unjustifiable animus toward the Defendants.
RESPONSE NO. 5. The Iron County Attorney received information that certain citizens
had made complaints that Defendants Emer Kent Winward and Kimberlee H. Winward had
committed criminal offenses. Thereafter, Cedar City Police Detective Kelvin Orton investigated
the case, presented Mr. Burns with a police report, and the case was screened by Detective Orton
and the Iron County Attorney. Thereafter, a criminal information and probable cause statement
were prepared, and the Defendants were charged with felony counts, have received all of their
constitutional rights and protections to date, and were bound over after a preliminary hearing.
If the foregoing is "unjustifiable animus" toward the Defendants, I suppose one could argue that
anytime the State's prosecutor files charges against certain defendants and prosecutes the case
pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah, there is "unjustifiable animus." In any event, the State
of Utah denies any bias, prejudice, or ulterior motives related to the prosecution of this case.
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Based upon the foregoing, the State of Utah asserts that the Iron County Attorney should
not be removed from the prosecution of this case.
DATED this _2> 3r

day of May, 1994.

SCOTT M. BURNS
Iron County Attorney
CERTOTCATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true, and correct copy of the within and
foregoing STATES OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS1 MOTION TO DISQUALIFY SCOTT M.
BURNS, by first-class mail, postage fully prepaid, on this

day of May, 1994, to the

following, to wit:
Mr. Gary W Pendleton, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
150 North 200 East, Suite 202
St. George, UT 84770

klmtikIsMn

Secretary
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Cedar City Police Department
Incident File
Incident Number: 93-8267
Nature of Incident: Forgery
Offense Code: FCIR6 Incident Address: £6 N hain
(Time Spent: 30
State: UT
ZIP: 64 720
City: Cedar City
Complainant: Contact Person:
< Name Number: 29900
Last: Packer
First: Nicole
Midd le:
Phone «: <80i>865-0662
Address 640 S Main « 318
Cedar City
ST: UT
ZIP: 84720
City
DOB: 12/30/74
7
Received By
Location Code
K Orton
P
Responding Officer
How Received?
K Orton
Responsible Officer K Orton
^riency Code
CCPD
Time Occurred
Date Occurred
12/10/93
: 13:25
Time Reported
Date Reported
12/10/93
: 13:00
Time Arrived
13:00
;• 13:00
Time Dis pa tch eci
Disposition Code
: CAA
Time Completed
13:30
Miscellaneous Entry : Ko
01/21/94
Date Disp
Declared
1 The complainant alleges forgery to a check issued by Cedar Land & Title,
2 The check waii endorsed and depositee into the suspect(s) ac count at
3 Mountain America. The payee listed on tne check is Nicole PackerNo included Offenses for this incident.

Tyoe
NM
Nil
Mfl
NI1
NM
N!*i

Mm
N!*l

\m
NM
NM
NM

INVOLVING
Record
ti
Date

Description

Rel&tion&hi p

£9900
3B33&
£8414
97
3033?
7&B
30338
17468
16(093
38 33'3
16093
174&8

Packer, Nicole
Schoppmann, Mitchell
Goodsell, Garry
Orton, Kelvin .
Williams, Patricia
Eauer, George
Bauer, Ann
Winward. Kimberlee
Winward, E D I C T
Goodman, Thomas
Winward, Emer
Winward, Kimberlee

complainant
Involved P&r ty
Involves! Par ty
Invest! qato'i
Involved P A T ty
Victim
victim
Suspect
SusDect
In volv ed P <.\ v ty
Arrestee
Arrestee

12/1 0/93
12/1 0/93
1£/1 0/93
12/1 0/93
12/1 0/93
12/1 B/93
12/1 0/93
12/1 0/93
12/1 0/93
i.2/1 0/93
12/1 0/93
12/1 8/93

H4

nitial

Information:

On 12/18/93 at 1300 hrs I was contacted by Nicole Packer who
advised that she had been partners
in a real estate transaction
lith Kim and Kent Winward which involved buying a property and
>elling the same property to another buyer for a substantial
'rofit. Kim Winward explained that the property being purchased
las located at 171 N 800 W CDC and was presently owned by George
.nd Ann fiarie Bauer, the property would then be sold to another
iuyer Vicky and Dan Bassett the day the purchase from Bauer
losed.
Kim Winward told Packer that the transaction would not look
thical if Kirn Winward was represented as the buyer and then sold
;he property to another buyer for profit. Kim Winward is an
^gent for ERA Realty representing George Bauer, therefore, Kim
knd Kent Winward needed Nicole Packer as a partner to list as the
rriginal bu^er for appearances. Uinward advised Packer that the
rrofits would be split into thirds, each of them taking a equal
•hare.
nterview: Mitch

Schoppmann

On 1/4/94 this investigator met with Schoppmann who advised
;he property located at 171 N 806 W was bought and then sold in
basically the same transaction. According to Schoppmann the
locuments indicate that Nicole Packer purchased the property for
•40,000.00 and then sold the property the same day for $58,000.00
;o Dan SVVicky Bassett. The money for the transaction was beintj
supplied by Patricia Williams of Las Vegas Nevada. The buyer
licole Packer then turned her interest over to Patricia Williams
iaking Patricia Williams the principal holder of the property
;rust deed. Ban & Vicky Bassett would then make payments through
iedar Land & Title to Patricia Williams at a 13# interest fo*r the
purchase of the property.
According to Cedar Land & Title personnel 1, Kent Winward
candled the paperwork concerning this real estate transactJon
inc1ud ing c1osiny.
As a result of this meeting it was found that Kim Winward
vould have collected a commission check for the George Bauer &
•licole Parker -transaction as well as a share in the profit.
Interview: Emer Kent Winward
On ©1/05/94 this investigator met with Mr.Winward who
spontaneously told this investigator he had forged Nicole
'acker's name to the check $4637.50 issued by Cedar Land & Title
\nd deposited into his wife's account. Kent Winward states he
endorsed Nicole's name to the check and deposited the check into
<in,'s account to expedite the process in which Nicole would
receive her percentage of the profit.
Kent Winward states that the profit agreement between the
involved parties was that Nicole Packer would receive a total of
*>e,000.00. $1,000,00 when the deal closed and then an additional
£1,000.00 when the Winward' s collected The down, payment frrm
•ieky Bassett•
Mr.

Uiinu:.<fv!

, *! ..,;. «=t*te*. t . \ \

»;;^o*:^ Ticker- h*,. jinned .'.im

however, the Winward's concurred with the behavior at that timeMr. Winward has supplied this investigator with duplicate checks
which he believes to be forgeries. The documents Mr. Winward
supplied this investigator will accompany this report.
Interview: George Bauer / Ann Marie Bauer
On 1/10/94 this investigator contacted George Bauer and his
wife Ann Marie Bauer in Henderson Nevada, they state the property
located at 171 N 800 U was originally listed at $45,000.00
through ERA Realty, the asking price was lowered to $43,000.00
after the property had been on the market for approximately one
(1) yearm
The Bauer's state they received an offer of $40,000.00
cash which they considered and eventually agreed to. George Bauer
told this investigator that he did not feel comfortable with this
transaction from the start, stating "it was as though someone was
trying to buy low and then sell for a greater profit" this
statement was uttered prior to this investigator informing the
Bauer's of the investigation.
The Bauer'*, state that the proposal was for $40,000.00 cash
Ai'tu their information was that the money was being wired to
Nicole Packer from her parents for the purchase? of the property.
Mr. Bauer states there was no mention of the property being sold
to anyone else other then Nicole Packer or that the property was
being re-sold for an amount greater then 40,000.00
Ann Marie Bauer reiterates that the sell of the property
was suspicious, especially to George, however, they decided to go
forward ijith the sell due to circumstance in their personal life.
The Bauer's were not familiar with Kim Winward and advised
this investigator that Tom & Milba Goodman were the listing
agents, however, the Bauer's felt positive the Goodman's were
not involved in the deceit that took place.
Interview: Tom Goodman
On 01/10/94 I contacted Tom Goodman in refevened
to my
conversation with the Bauer's. Goodman states that he did not
handle the actual sell of the property and was just the listing
acjerit through ERA Realty. This investigator was informed that
Kim Winward was the selling agent and handled all the
negotiations with the buyer. Goodman told this investigator all
the information regarding the sell of the property would have
came through Kim Winward. Goodman was not aware the property had
been re-sold in the same transaction until after the fact and
even then was \/GC/ surprised.
Through my conversation with Goodman I found the commission
f:.r the sell was split into third's, one part going to the
franchise, one part to Goodman, and one part to Winward.
Goodman'* recollection of the transaction was vague but did
-.-,ay what information he relayed to the Bauer's would have came
fro**. Kim Winward.
T nterview: Garry Goodsel1
On (31/18/94 this investigator contacted Garry Goodsell in
.; •: ;:. r d*.> to how :<r>d why the money was. issued th.ouL;! •Southern

Goodsell researched the transaction end found that Patricia
lilliams had sold a property located iri Fiddlers
CAnyon,
Cdc,
Init *tl lot 2, Slock 5, to Berry & Teresa Gracely. When Gracely's
• btain financing for the property a check was issued to Patricia
lilliams in the amount of approximately $68,900.00 this check was
ent to Southern Utah Title who would forward the check to
lilliams. Patricia Williams endorsed the check back to Southern
Itah Title with the following instructions, $45,000.00 be sent to
edar Land & Title in the form of a Trust Deed in the name of
licole Packer with Patricia Williams as the principal interest
older. The remaining balance would be issued back to Patricia
lilliams in the form of a check which was $23,242.72.
To Garry
Goodsell 5 s knowledge this was the extent of
outhern Utah Title's involvement.
ountain America:
On 61/12/94 this investigator contacted Tonya, at Mountain
n-erica Credit Union. I was advised that deposit ships were kept
n microfiche in Salt Lake City and would be available by
ubpoena.
ollow-Up Investigation:
ate: 01/21/94
etective: Ko
Ovi Sl/21/94 This investigator contacted Sally Melling at
led&r Land & Title who discovered another possible fraud and
orgery pertaining to an earnest money sales agreement handled
;hrough C\-*dar Land & Title and involved Kim Winward. Mrs. Melling
recognized the writing on the legal document as Kim Winward's.
The document shows Dan and Vicky Bassett supplying $100.00
earnest money to ERA Realty and provides a buyer's signature,
signed by Dan Bassett. The Seller's signature represents Nicole
'acker, however, the signature is an obvious forgery based on the
actual signature cf Nicole Packer. The Dan Bassett signature
, ist's a signing date of 87/2S/93. The* Nicole Packer signature
[Forgery) list's: a signing date of 87/26/93. The date of document
eceipt with Da- Bassett's signature is 87/15/93.
Contact with ERA Realty:
Sally rielling contacted ERA Realty and talked with agent Ton.
ioodn<€.;r., Gcoomav. advised that the or.ly transaction ERA was
nvolved with was the Sell to Nicole Packer, the first
transaction. The second trav;saction between Packer avid Basse! fc
>as handled independently.
On 01/21/94 this investigator contacted ERA Realty and
;alked with Lori Goodsell who advised that ERA had no record of
receiving earnest money pertaining to Packer and Bassett.
Goodsell explains that usually the acer.t signs the earnest
ujviey agreement adjacent to the "Brokerage" line listed as
•Received by". In the ;.ase cf this document there is written i\\
;h« provided line "to be deposited upon closing".

aggar^

SEQ

OOpO

,*Q/100« -.

.*V £-*?$»?

S j£ w. * »

&l

ft ^rx^o/Vfj!'

ivy*
•-<ts

i&&&&***>*'-

* • * & #

m^*tk

1(0

,,#

\Y.

n u w u n 4 n - M A I N oao.-yye4
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STATE BANK OP SOUTHERN .UTAH
G*i*r Clxy Off**
P. O. Box 340
C»dar City, UUft ft472f-034Q

FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN DOLLARS AND 50/100*

97-177/1243

DATE

1

-r

_Aug. 9,1993>

AMOUNT

$ 4697.50

N i c o l e Packer
OER
kF

L

J
ii'CiUS^'

HHB

&&EE^

i l l 21*3017 7^1: O i 2S& iSn*

EE* DETACH THIS STATEMENT BEPORE OEPOSmNG CHECK

C E D A R LAND TTTLE, I N C .
CLOSING T R U S T

no9o
uyer: Vickie R. Bassett
-slier: Nicole Packer
2525.00 Sellers Proceeds
2172.50 Refund of overpayment in vire transfer

NON NEGOTIABLE
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IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY
97 North Main, Suite #1 • P.O. Box 428 • Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694
Telecopier: (801) 586-2737
SCOTT M. BURNS, COUNTY ATTORNEY

KYLE D. LATIMER, CHIEF DEPUTY

May 27, 1994

The Honorable Jan Graham
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
RE:

State v. WinwarcL Fifth District Court Criminal No. 941500056
Attorney Gary W. Pendleton

Dear General Graham:
Mr. Gary W. Pendleton previously requested that you remove me from this case (see
Exhibit "A") and I responded (see Exhibit MB"); he now makes a similar request (see Exhibit "C")
and has also filed a Motion for Change of Judge (see Exhibit "DM). Mr. Pendleton's accusations
were also forwarded to the Utah State Bar and have been dismissed as Mr. Pendleton refused to
submit the same in authorized form within the required time frame.
Mr. Pendleton is a fine lawyer and is aggressively defending his clients. I believe,
however, that Mr. Pendleton has used questionable tactics in this case (accusing me of perjury
in a probable cause statement and alleging I threatened him physically) and is currently seeking
my removal as another ploy to intimidate the prosecution and move the focus away from the
central issue, to wit: the guilt or innocence of his clients.
Please know that it is my desire to prosecute this case through jury trial (scheduled for
July 26 through July 29, 1994); if Mr. Pendleton's clients are acquitted, I am certain he will cease
in his various complaints to your office and other governmental entities.
Respectfully,

Scott M. Burns
Iron County Attorney
SMB.cm
Attachments
pc: Gary W. Pendleton, Esq.
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GARY W. PENDLETON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
150 North 200 East, Suite 202, St George, Utah 84770
Telephone (801)626-4411
Fax Number (801) 628-9260

February 22,1994

EXH/3/r "A"
Scott M Bums
Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite 1
P. O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Re: State v. Winward
Dear Mr. Burns:
I believe that your conduct in this case disqualifies you from its further prosecution. I refer
to two incidents, both of which I believe you are well aware: False statements set out in the
affidavit in support of the issuance of the arrest warrant and, more significantly, your
conduct in the lobby at the Cedar City Hall of Justice.
While I can overlook some of the inaccuracies in the affidavit which you authored and
signed, given the theory of the State's case, I cannot lightly dismiss the allegation regarding
Mr. Winward's alleged legal representation of Mr. and Mrs. Bauer. The inclusion of this
material in the affidavit is at least evidence of a conscious disregard for the truth.
However, more importantly, I refer to your conduct during the noon recess on Friday,
February 18,1994. As counsel for one who is accused of a criminal offense, I have not only
therightbut the duty to represent that client zealously within the bounds of the law and the
cannons of ethics. I am free to do so without the prospect of being accosted in the halls of
the courthouse by the state's attorney and invited outside, apparently for the purpose of
some physical altercation.
I could dismiss the incident if I were to regard you as nothing more than a bully with a law
degree. However, you are more than that. You represent the power and authority of the
State of Utah when you prosecute criminal cases. Accordingly, I cannot in good conscience,
as a member of this Bar, allow the State to make such an assault upon what I view as my
clients* constitutional right to due process of law and their right to be represented by
counsel.

RECEIVED FEB 2 4 199^

February 22, 1994
Page Two
I am therefore requesting that you immediately request the assistance of the Attorney
General's office in the prosecution of this case. Furthermore, I am sending them a copy of
this letter, given their supervisory authority over county attorneys pursuant to U.CA. 67-51(5).
Finally, I am sending a copy of this letter to Bar Counsel for his consideration and review.
Sincerely,

Gaiy W. Pendleton
GWP:cch
cc:
Kent and Kimberlee Winward
Jan Graham, Utah Attorney General
Stephen Trost
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IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY
97 North Main, Suite #1 • P.O. Box 428 • Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 Telecopier: (801) 586-2737
SCOTT M. BURNS, COUNTY ATTORNEY

KYLE D. LATIMER, CHIEF DEPUTY

March 1, 1994

EjCtftBrr " 5 "

Mr. Gary W. Pendleton, Esq.
Attorney at Law
150 North 200 East, Suite 202
St. George, UT 84770
RE:

State of Utah vs. Emer Kent Winward and Kimberlee H. Winward
Fifth Judicial District Court, Criminal Nos. 941500056 and 941500057

Dear Mr. Pendleton:
Given your highly emotional demeanor at the preliminary hearing in the above-referenced
case, I can understand your frustration in having to accept the fact that both of your clients were
bound over on two (2) second-degree felonies. I cannot understand your attempt to involve the
Utah Attorney General or Bar Counsel.
As you will recall, the Court ordered you on several occasions to "move back away" from
the Statefs witnesses. Moreover, I, during a late afternoon break prior to closing arguments, told
you that (a) I didn't appreciate your attempts to intimidate witnesses, (b) I couldn't believe that
you would engage in "snickering and laughing" loudly during the State's presentation of evidence,
and (c) your actions were embarrassing to me as a member of the Bar and that I had lost a great
deal of respect for you. As you will also recall, your clients and their family members gathered
around during our discussion, and I inquired as to whether or not you would like to step outside.
I find it almost humorous that you would interpret that request as a threat to harm you physically.
Mr. Pendleton, I believe in the judicial system and do my best to effectuate justice. As
a county attorney, I do not "win or lose cases" and I find no joy in prosecuting a case that alleges
a young lawyer and a young realtor committed serious felonies. That said, you must know that
I take great offense when a lawyer attempts to intimidate or ridicule witnesses who have been
subpoenaed to testify. Many of those witnesses (as well as other persons present during court
that day) called me or came to my office after the hearing and described you as a "rabid dog,"
a "jerk," a "bully," and an "actor trying to take over the courtroom."
In that I had never dealt with you in court before, I believed that you were a fine lawyer
and a gentleman. I have since learned that your reputation for in-court sarcastic antics and
intimidation of witnesses is well-known by prosecutors and other members of the Bar in southern
Utah. I would only hope that in future proceedings regarding the above-referenced case, and

\oH

Mr. Gary W. Pendleton, Esq.
March 1, 1994
Page 2

other dealings we may have together, we may treat each other with respect and act as
professionals while representing our respective interests.
If your letter was an attempt to open an investigation, I welcome any inquiries. If your
letter was an attempt to have me removed from prosecuting this case, I decline. If your letter
was an attempt to embarrass both of us by your whining, I am afraid you have succeeded.
Sincerely,

Scott M. Burns
Iron County Attorney
SMBxm
Attachment
pc:

Jan Graham, Utah Attorney General
Stephen Trost

P.S. While we are addressing each other's ethics and competency, I would suggest you
consider a letter from my good friend Loni F. DeLand that I have attached hereto. Judge Eves
and Judge Braithwaite have instructed lawyers in the Fifth District (private and appointed) to
consider Mr. DeLand's concerns. I hope you will take the appropriate steps to protect your
clients' interests.
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UTAH ASSOCIATION OF
CRIMINAL D E F E N S E LAWYERS
ftO. BOX eiO«44
SALT LAKE CfTr, UTAH ©4/81-6546

January 12, 1994

Honorable Robert T. Braithvaite
Fifth District court
40 Korth 100 East
Cedar'City, UT 84720
SUBJECT:

Conflicts of Interest Claims Regarding Multiple
Defendant Representation

Dear Judge Braithvaite,
It has coma to the attention of the officers of this
organisation that a number of appointed defense attorneys in courts
other than the Wasatch Front courts are being required to represent
multiple defendants in oriminal prosecutions.
Those defense
counsel that have raised concerns about this practice generally
cite the budgetary ooncerns of the various counties as being the
primary reason for multiple defendant appointments.
Ve are also aware that criminal defendants are becoming
increasingly litigious in the appeal and writ processes around the
country in raising issues of ineffective assistance of counsel
under a variety of claims. One of the areas in which convicted
defendants are increasingly bringing ineffective assistance claims
is in the case of conflicts of interest arising from multiple
representation.
Although multiple representation is not a EfiX 2£ violation of
Sixth Amei daent rights (Burger y. Kemp. 483 U.S. 776 (1987), the
U.S. supreme Court has noted that a possible conflict of interest
inheres in almost every instance, of .multiple representation,
Cuvler v. Sullivan. .446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980)'.' Of course, multiple
attorneys from the same law firm representing more than one
defendant presents the same problem as one attorney doing the same
thing.
Hollowav v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) first enunciated
the "automatic reversal" remedy in multiple representation/conflict
of interest cases where the "possibility11 of a confliot was brought
to the attention of the court.
cuyier also held that a defendant who makes a showing (of a
potential conflict) n'eed n,pt deipgnstrafe prejudice to establish a
Sixth Amendment claim. 446 U.S. at 349-350.

The courts vill presume prejudice In cases which meet the
Guvler standard.
The general standard regarding Ineffective
assistance of counsel, I.e., the two-prong test set forth In
Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984), is a greater
standard than is required in conflict claims. The Strickland court
addressed the different and less vigorous test applied in conflict
cases:
In Cuyler... [ve] held that prejudice is
presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual
conflict of interest. In those circumstances,
counsel breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps
the most basic of counsel's duties. Moreover,
it 1 B difficult to measure the precise effect
on the' defense of representation corrupted by
conflicting interests. Given the obligation
of counsel to avoid conflicts of interest and
the ability of trial courts to make an earlv
incruiry in certain situations likely to give
rise to conflicts.. .it is reasonable for the
criminal justice system to maintain a fairly
rigid rule of presumed prejudice for conflicts
of interest. At 692.
(Emphasis added.)
It is no secret that the Utah Supreme Court is dissatisfied with
the quality of appellate defense representation. Justice Hall's
present committee respecting creation of a statewide indigent
appellate defense association evidences the court's concern on the
appellate level. The court's concerns are no less significant at
the trial level.
one of the areas that is of growing concern to our courts is
some rural counties.' preference to letting contracts for indigent
defense to the lowest bidder, irrespective of the quality of the
representation. Another is this issue of multiple representation
and its potential for burdening the appeals courts with claims.
In the U.S. District Court there is an absolute prohibition
against appointment of counsel.for more .then one defendant. And,
in those rare cases where a' privately retained lawyer attempts to
represent more than one defendant, either personally or through a
law partner, the courts place the burden of demonstrating a lack of
conflict (and the entry of an express, informed waiver) squarely on
the defense counsel and the defendants. This problem is so closely
scrutinised that neither I, nor any of my colleagues, can even
recall an instance of multiple representation by a Utah lawyer or
law firm in the federal distriot court in Salt Lake.
Moreover, the appointment of counsel in the federal courts as
well as the appointment of investigators and approval for expenses
are all done g& parte pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act. Those
courts recognize, unlike many of our state courts, that anytime a
**„ i„ ••n„,.,«^ 4-A n»rf"(Mr>Ate in aooointntent decisions or
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decisions relating to appointment of investigators or other
reasonable and necessary defense expenses there is a clear Sixth
Amendment intrusion.
I would also invite your attention to Rule 1.7, Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct which states, intSX alia, that no lawyer
undertake any multiple representation without the consent of each
client after consultation (wherein the potential for conflict is
discussed).
Whore you, as judges, make appointments at first
appearances, for multiple defendants, there has obviously been no
opportunity for consultation with the prospective lawyer, ergo,
there is a per se violation of Rule 1.7.
After discussing this issue with the executive committee, I
would suggest that the only sure way to avoid a conflict is to
follow the example of the federal courts, i.e., judiciously avoid
Any. multiple appointments.
railing adoption of the above stated policy, the second most
prudent option would be to conduct an inquiry with each indigent
defendant in a multiple defendant case wherein the potential for
conflicts are discussed and each is then required to waive any such
conflicts before the appointment can be made.
The problem remains, however, that every possible conflict
cannot be addressed early on and will frequently arise at a stage
in the proceedings when plea offers (often disparate) are made
where decisions regarding whether defendant(s) ought to testify are
necessary or when the defense lawyer is faced with trial evidence
which is objectionable to one defendant, but not to another. I
would suggest therefore, that you continue to make inquiries, on
the record, StX ESTJfca, of defendants aj& counsel concerning
potential conflicts.
As stated above, although the federal policy is the safest
option, if defendants and counsel, in multiple representation
cases, are thoroughly examined regarding conflicts and potential
conflicts at the onset and throughout the proceedings, you stand a
greater chance of stemming the growing tide of post conviction
claims of ineffective asaistanoe of counsel based on conflict,
claims.
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GARY W. PENDLETON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
5opiSSK5^j£7t,:Suite 202, St. George, Utah 84770
S~^ /C^50[II^5d^St,
ff
—y\(
Telephone (801)628-4411
Fax Number (801) 628-9260

May 17,1994

Jan Graham
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re: State vs. Winward
Iron County Criminal No. 941500056
Dear Ms. Graham:
Enclosed is a copy of a motion which we have filed in the above-referenced matter seeking
the disqualification of the Iron County Attorney as prosecutor in this matter. We are
providing you with a copy of the motion because you have supervisory authority over the
various county attorneys pursuant U.C.A 67-5-1(5).
We are also providing you with a courtesy copy of our statement of points and authorities
in support of our pending motion to quash the bind over order. This pleading is provided
in order to provide you a factual backgroimd against which you may evaluate the motion to
disqualify Mr. Burns.

Uo^
Gary W. Pendleton
GWP:dap
Enclosures
pc: Scott M. Bums

RECEIVED MAY 1 8 1994
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GARY W. PENDLETON (2564)
Attorney for Defendants
150 North 200 East, Suite 202
St George, Utah 84770
Ph: 628-4411
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION FOR CHANGE
OF JUDGE

Plaintiff,
vs.
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD,

Case No. 941500057

Defendant.
Defendant, by and through her attorney, Gary W. Pendleton, hereby requests
that another judge be appointed for the purpose of considering Defendant's Motion to
Quash the Bind Over Order issued by the Honorable James L. Shumate. This motion is
made on the grounds and for the reasons that Judge Shumate was the committing magistrate
and it is unreasonable and unfair to the court and to the defendant to expect the court to
review the soundness of its own order.
DATED this

/ / day of May, 1994.

W^6^

Gary W. Pendleiton
Attorney for Defendants

^

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that on this II - day of May, 1994,1 did personally mail
a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Motion to Scott M. Burns, Iron County
Attorney, at 97 North Main, #1, Cedar City, Utah 84720.

Qim't PattiAMr)
Secretary
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IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY
97 North Main, Suite #1 • P.O. Box 428 • Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 Telecopier: (801) 586-2737
SCOTT M BURNS, COUNTY ATTORNEY

KYLE D. LATIMER, CHIEF DEPUTY

February 22, 1994

Mr. Steve Law
DAILY SPECTRUM
66 Harding Avenue
Cedar City, UT 84720
RE:

State of Utah vs. Emer Kent Winward and Kimberlee H. Winward

Dear Steve:
As you know, I have tried to be very accessible and helpful to you over the past several
months with respect to your duties as a journalist for the Daily Spectrum newspaper. I have
appreciated the fact that you have always contacted me prior to quoting me in the newspaper, and
I believe that you have always represented my statements in a fair and accurate manner.
However, after leaving town Friday evening and not returning until late Monday evening, I was
somewhat dismayed to read your article of February 19, 1994, entitled, "Attorney, realtor wife
plead not guilty to fraud."
Specifically, the article read:
"Kent Winward faces possible disbarment if found guilty," said
Iron County Attorney Scott Burns. "The Utah Bar Council is also
conducting their own investigation into Winward's actions," he said.
As you know, I did not make any comment (either in my argument to the Court or in any
discussions with you) about Mr. Winward facing possible disbarment. Moreover, the only
comment I made with respect to the Utah Bar conducting an investigation was by way of
disclosure to the Court that I had been contacted by the Bar Council and informed that I had a
duty to provide them with certain information regarding this prosecution.
Please know that this case is difficult enough for me, as it relates to a fellow member of
the Utah Bar, and I very much resent having statements attributed to me with respect to whether
or not Mr. Winward faces disbarment. Please know that I have absolutely no idea what sanctions
(if any) Mr. Winward faces, and I do not have the sufficient background or knowledge to even
comment on that issue. Had you asked me that question, I would have simply replied, "I have
no idea whether or not Mr. Winward will face any sanctions by the Utah Bar."

Mr Steve Law
February 22, 1994
Page 2

1 would request, after reviewing this letter, that you contact Mr. Winward's attorney, Gary
Pendleton, and ask him whether or not a retraction or statement setting aside the quote attributed
to me would be desirous. If he responds in the affirmative, I would request a retraction of the
quote attributed to me and replaced by what my response would have been, "I have no idea
whether or not Mr. Winward will face any sanctions by the Utah Bar." If Mr. Pendleton believes
that a retraction would simply draw more attention to the case and my purported quote, then I
would ask that you not print a retraction.
Should you have any questions, comments, or concerns regarding this communication,
please do not hesitate to contact my offices
Sincerely.

Scott M Burns
Iron County Attorney
SMBxm
Attachment
pc:

Gary W. Pendleton, Esq.
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Attorney, realtor wife plead not guilty to fraud
gating the case, Bums said other
By(ST»EmLAW
questionable acts allegedly perStaffWriter
formed by the couple involving
CEDAR CITY — Cedar City the same issue were discovered.
lawyer Emer Kent Winward and
On Aug. 9. 1993. Kim and
his wife Kimberlee, a realtor, Kent Winward used Packer as
pleaded not guilty to charges of an interim signer when they purforgery and unlawful dealing of chased property from George and
property by feduciary, each a Marie Bauer of Henderson, Nev.,
second degree felony, during Burns said. The Winwards
their preliminaiy hearing Friday allegedly told George Bauer they
at 5th District Court.
had a buyer who had $40,000
The Winwards will be bound cash. They had Packer sign the
over for Jury trial that will begin contract as the buyer with money
as soon as eight jurors are received from her father. Bums
selected and the involved parties said.
have had time to prepare eviPacker said she did not receive
dence.
money from her father. She said
Kent Winward faces possible the money caife from Pat
disbarment if found guilty, said Williams, a real estate broker
Iron County Attorney Scott from Las Vegas, who was told
Bums. ThQ Utah Bar Council is the house. was selling for
also conducting their own inves- $45,000. Packer said she was
tigation into Winward's actions, used as a go-between signer so
he said.
that the seller wouldn't know the
The'jcomplaint against the house was really being sold for
Winwards was first filed in $45,000 and the buyer wouldn't
December by Nicole Packer, a know it was actually sold for
former employee of Kim's, who $40,000.
In reward for her services.
alleges she discovered Kent
Winward had forged a check for Packer testified she was told she
$$.697.50 from the Cedar Land would receive one-third of the
aad Title Company that was profit made from the transaction.
n^de out to her. Upon investi- Packer said she was given a

check for $1,160. $160 of which
was for commission on previous
transactions. Since she received
only $1,000, she said she figured they must have made a
$3,000 profit on the Bauer to
Williams transaction.
According to Packer's testimony in Friday's preliminary
hearing, she signed documents
with no selling price listed.
Packer claimed she wasn't aware
she did anything wrong in following Kent Winward's instructions.
Packer said she found out several months later the property
was sold for $45,000 and not
$43,000. It was then. Packer
said, she realized Cedar Land
and Title Company issued her a
check for $4,697.50. Packer testified that Kim Winward
deposited the check into her own
account.
Packer said she contacted an
attorney to see if forgery charges
could be filed.
Bums said he learned the
property was sold for $58,000 at
13 percent interest to Vickl
Bassett with the Winwards serving as purchasing agent. The
Winwards allegedly told Williams

they had a buyer who would pay
$55,000 at 13 percent interest,
and Williams agreed to the sale,
not knowing Bassett would pay
$58,000.
Bassett testified that Kent
Winward falsely told her he paid
$3,000 as a down payment.
Bassett. a hair and nail stylist,
said Winward said she could
work off the $3,000 she believed
she owed by doing hair and nails
for the Winwards'. Packer and
another girl.
All the transactions took place
Aug. 9. 1993, and the Winwards
also made six percent commission off each sale. Bums said.
Only Kent and Kim Winward
knew of all the transactions.
Bums said.
When the case goes to trial.
Bums said he will attempt to
prove theft by fiduciary (theft
through violation of a trust) and
forgery against the Winwards.
Bums said he will attempt to
prove the? Winwards violated the
trust of their clients, George
Bauer and Vickl Bassett. and
that the Winwards forged
Packer's signature on a check
made out to her and deposited
it into their own account.

ADDENDUM L
Rules 1, 9, and 19, Rules of Lawyer Discipline
and Disability

cases in which a formal complaint has been filed. The Advisory Committee
considered the pros and cons at length, and in the final analysis, concluded
that the district court model was preferable to other models in terms of economy, efficiency, public access, fairness, and familiarity. Discipline ordered by
a district court would be appealable to the Supreme Court without prior review by the Bar Commission.
A majority of the members of the Advisory Committee favor the position
that disciplinary counsel and the Bar's corporate counsel should be separate.
However, there is no provision in the proposed rules that addresses the issue.
The proposed rules were published for public comment on July 20, 1992 in
Case No. 920334. Thereafter, the Advisory Committee met several times to
revise the proposed rules in light of the public comments received. The proposed rules were then submitted to the Supreme Court. Amendments proposed by the Court have been included herein. It is anticipated that the proposed rules will need further revision from time to time to refine the process
in the interest of fairness to the Bar and the public.

Rule 1. Purpose, authority, scope and structure of lawyer
disciplinary and disability proceedings.
(a) The purpose of lawyer disciplinary and disability proceedings is to ensure and maintain the high standard of professional conduct required of those
who undertake the discharge of professional responsibilities as lawyers and to
protect the public and the administration of justice from those who have
demonstrated by their conduct that they are unable or unlikely to properly
discharge their professional responsibilities.
(b) Under Art. VIII, § 4 of the Constitution of Utah, the Utah Supreme
Court has exclusive authority within the State of Utah to adopt and enforce
rules governing the practice of law, including admission to practice law and
the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law.
(c) All disciplinary proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the
rules and proceedings described herein. Formal disciplinary and disability
proceedings are civil in nature. These rules shall be construed so as to achieve
substantial justice and fairness in disciplinary matters with dispatch and at
the least expense to all concerned parties.
(d) The interests of the public, the courts, and the legal profession all require that disciplinary proceedings at all levels be undertaken and construed
to secure the just and speedy resolution of every complaint.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Utah Supreme
Court Extends Judicial Immunity to the State

Bar in Disciplinary Proceedings, 1994 Utah L
Rey. 422.

Rule 2. Definitions.
As used in these rules:
(a) "Bar" means the Utah State Bar;
(b) "Board of Commissioners" means the Board of Commissioners of
the Utah State Bar;
(c) "Committee" means the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the
Utah State Bar;
(d) "Complainant" means the person who files an informal complaint;
(e) "Disciplinary counsel" means counsel appointed by the Board of
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar, and Other counsel employed to
assist appointed counsel;
(f) "Formal complaint" means a complaint filed in the district court
alleging misconduct by a lawyer or seeking the transfer of a lawyer to
disability status;
(g) 'Informal complaint" means any written, notarized allegation of
misconduct by or incapacity of a lawyer;

(h) "Office" means the Office of Attorney Discipline;
(i) "Respondent" means a lawyer subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction
of the Utah Supreme Court against whom an informal or formal complaint has been filed;
(j) "Supreme Court" means the Utah Supreme Court.

Rule 3. Ethics and discipline committee.
(a) Composition. The Committee shall be appointed by the Supreme
Court. The Committee shall consist of four public members, and 18 members
of the Bar who have demonstrated a high standard of professional conduct. All
appointments following the initial appointments shall be for a term of three
years. For the initial appointments, six members of the Bar shall be appointed
for one year, six for two years and six for three years, and one public member
shall be appointed for one year, one for two years and two for three years. The
Supreme Court shall designate one lawyer member as chair and one lawyer
member as vice chair. The initial appointment of the chair shall be for one
year, and the initial appointment of the vice chair shall be for three years.
Committee members shall not serve more than two consecutive terms.
(b) Committee chair. The Committee chair shall supervise the Committee
and screening panels. The chair's responsibility shall be to maintain an adequate check on the work of the screening panels to ensure that matters move
forward expeditiously, to determine that screening panels have a uniform
base for the judgments rendered, and to provide the screening panels with
information concerning ethics and judicial decisions necessary to their activities. The chair shall make recommendations to the Supreme Court concerning
appointments to the screening panels and reports concerning the activities of
the screening panels and the overall work of the Committee.
(c) Vice chair. The vice chair shall act in the event of the chair's absence or
resignation. The chair may call upon the vice chair to assist in any of the
chair's duties.
(d) Screening panels, quorums. The Committee shall be divided into four
screening panels of four members of the Bar and one public member. The
Supreme Court shall name a chair from each screening panel, who shall
preside over that screening panel. In the absence of the screening panel chair,
a vice* chair designated by the screening panel chair shall preside. Each
screening panel is empowered to carry out any and all functions of the Committee under these rules. Three members of a screening panel shall constitute
a quorum. The concurrence of a majority of those members present and voting
at any proceeding shall be required for a screening panel determination. Each
screening panel shall meet as is necessary to effectively and promptly carry
out its duties. The entire Committee may be convened at such other times, on
the call of the chair, as necessary to effectively and promptly carry out its
duties.
'
(e) Responsibilities. The screening panels may, and as to all informal
complaints referred by disciplinary counsel, which shall be randomly assigned, shall, review, investigate, and hear all informal complaints charging
unethical and/or unprofessional conduct against members of the Bar. After
such review, investigation, hearing and analysis, the screening panels shall
determine the action to be taken on any informal complaint which, based
upon the facts of the particular case, is most consistent with the public interest and the standard of conduct required of a member of the legal profession.
(0 Subpoena. Any party or the screening panel may petition the district
court for an order allowing discovery prior to the filing of a formal complaint,
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(g) Committee and screening panel secretary. Disciplinary counsel
shall be the secretary to the Committee and is charged with the responsibility
of the administrative affairs of the Committee, the handling of the screening
panel calendars, giving notice to screening panel members and members of

Rule 6. Jurisdiction.
(a) Lawyers admitted to practice. The persons subject to the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the Court and the Office include any lawyer admitted to practice law in this state, any formerly admitted lawyer with respect to acts
committed while admitted to practice in this state or with respect to acts
subsequent thereto which amount to the practice of law or constitute a violation of any rule promulgated by the Supreme Court, any lawyer specially
admitted by a court of this state for a particular proceeding, and any lawyer
not admitted in this state who practices law or who renders or offers to render
any legal services in this state.
(b) Incumbent judges. Incumbent judges are subject to the jurisdiction of
the Office only for conduct that occurred prior to the taking of office.
(c) Former judges. A former judge who has resumed the status of a lawyer
is subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court not only for conduct as a
lawyer but also for misconduct that occurred while the lawyer was a judge and
would have been grounds for lawyer discipline, provided that the misconduct
was not the subject of a judicial disciplinary proceeding as to which there has
been a final determination by the Supreme Court. Misconduct by a judge that
is not finally adjudicated before the judge leaves office falls within the jurisdiction of the Office.

Rule 7. Roster of lawyers.
Disciplinary counsel shall maintain or have ready access to current information relating to members of the Bar including:
(a) full name;
(b) date of birth;
(c) current law office and home addresses and telephone numbers;
(d) date of admission in the state;
(e) date of any transfer to or from inactive status;
(f) all specialties in which certified;
(g) other jurisdictions in which the lawyer is admitted and date of
admission; and
(h) nature, date, and place of any discipline imposed and any reinstatements.

Rule 8. Periodic assessment of lawyers.
Every lawyer admitted to practice in this state shall pay to the Bar on or
before July 1 of each year an annual license fee for each fiscal year to be fixed
by the Board of Commissioners from time to time and approved by the Supreme Court. The fee shall be sufficient to pay the costs of disciplinary administration and enforcement under these rules.

Rule 9. Grounds for discipline.
It shall be a ground for discipline for a lawyer to:
(a) violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or any other rules of this
jurisdiction regarding professional conduct of lawyers;
(b) willfully violate a valid order of a court or a screening panel imposing discipline; or
(c) be publicly disciplined in another jurisdiction.
A.L.R. — Negligence, inattention,
or profesCOLLATERAL
sional incompetence of attorney in handling
client's affairs in personal injury or property
damage actions as ground for disciplinary action — modern cases, 68 A.L.R.4th 694.
Negligence, inattention, or professional incompetence of attorney in handling client's affairs in criminal matters as ground for disci-

plinary action — modern cases, 69 A.L.R4th
REFERENCES
410.
Negligence, inattention, or professional incompetence of attorney in handling client's affairs in bankruptcy matters as ground for disciplinary action — modern cases, 70 A.LJL4th
786.
Bringing offrivolouscivil claim or action as

ground for discipline of attorney, 86 A.L.R4th
544.
Soliciting client to commit illegal or immoral
act as ground for discipline of attorney, 86
A.L.R.4th 667.

Misconduct involving intoxication as ground
for disciplinary action against attorney, 1
A.L.R5th 874.

Rule 10. Prosecution and appeals.
(a) Informal complaint of unprofessional conduct.
(1) Filing. A disciplinary proceeding may be initiated against any
member of the Bar by any person, disciplinary counsel or the Committee,
by filing with the Bar, in writing, an informal complaint in ordinary,
plain and concise language setting forth the acts or omissions claimed to
constitute unprofessional conduct. Upon filing, an informal complaint
shall be processed in accordance with these rules.
(2) Form of informal complaint. The informal complaint need not be
in any particular form or style and may be by letter or other informal
writing, although a form may be provided by the Office to standardize the
informal complaint format. It is unnecessary that the informal complaint
recite disciplinary rules, ethical canons or a prayer requesting specific
disciplinary action. The informal complaint shall be signed by the complainant and shall set forth the complainant's address, and may list the
names and addresses of other witnesses. The informal complaint shall be
notarized. The substance of the informal complaint shall prevail over the
form.
(3) Initial investigation. Upon the filing of an informal complaint,
disciplinary counsel shall conduct a preliminary investigation to ascertain whether the informal complaint is sufficiently clear as to its allegations. If it is not, disciplinary counsel shall seek additional facts from the
complainant, which facts shall also be submitted in writing and signed by
the complainant.
(4) Disciplinary counsel. Upon completion of the preliminary investigation, disciplinary counsel shall determine whether the informal complaint can be resolved in the public interest, the respondent's interest and
the complainant's interest. Disciplinary counsel and/or the screening
panel may use their efforts to resolve the informal complaint. If the informal complaint cannot be so resolved or if it sets forth facts which, by their
very nature, should be brought before the screening panel, or if good
cause otherwise exists to bring the matter before the screening panel,
disciplinary counsel shall cause to be served a Notice of Informal Complaint by regular mail upon the respondent at the address reflected in the
records of the Bar. The notice shall have attached a true copy of the
signed informal complaint against the respondent and shall identify with
particularity the possible violation(s) of the Rules of Professional Conduct
raised by the informal complaint as preliminarily determined by disciplinary counsel.
(5) Answer to informal complaint Within 20 days after service of
the Notice of Informal Complaint on the respondent, the respondent shall
file with disciplinary counsel a written and signed answer setting forth in
full an explanation of the facts surrounding the informal complaint, together with all defenses and responses to the claims of possible misconduct. For good cause shown, disciplinary counsel may extend the time for
the filing of an answer by the respondent not to exceed an additional 30
days. Upon the answer having been filed or in the event that the respondent fails to respond, disciplinary counsel shall refer the case to a screening panel for investigation, consideration and determination. Disciplinary counsel shall forward a copy of the answer to the complainant.
(6) Non-meritorious informal complaint. An informal complaint
which, upon consideration of all factors, is determined by disciplinary

and in t h a t event the motion shall be heard and determined as expeditiously
as the ends of justice require.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AJJR.—Validity and construction of procednres to temporarily suspend attorney from
practice, or place attorney on inactive status,

pending investigation of, and action upoa, (tttciplinary charges, 80 A.L.R.4th 136.

Rule 19. Lawyers convicted of a crime.
(a) Transmittal of judgment of conviction. The court in which a lawyer
is convicted of a crime which reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall, within 30 days after
the conviction, transmit a certified copy of the judgment of conviction to disciplinary counsel.
(b) Motion for interim suspension. Upon being advised that a lawyer has
been convicted of a crime which reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, disciplinary counsel
shall determine whether the crime warrants interim suspension. Upon a determination that the crime warrants interim suspension, disciplinary counsel
shall file a formal complaint, accompanied by the certified copy of the judgment of conviction, and concurrently file a motion for immediate interim
suspension. The respondent may assert any jurisdictional deficiency which
establishes that the interim suspension may not properly be ordered, such as
that the crime does not reflect adversely on the respondent's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, or that the respondent is
not the individual convicted. If an order for interim suspension is not obtained, the formal complaint shall be dismissed and disciplinary counsel shall
process the matter like any other information coming to the attention of the
Office.
(c) Imposition. The district court shall place a respondent on interim suspension upon proof t h a t the respondent has been convicted of a crime which
reflects adversely on the respondent's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects, regardless of the pendency of any appeal.
(d) Dissolution of interim suspension. Interim suspension may be dissolved as provided in Rule 18(d).
(e) Conviction as conclusive evidence. Except as provided in paragraph
(b), a certified copy of a judgment of conviction constitutes conclusive evidence
that the respondent committed the crime.
(f) A u t o m a t i c reinstatement from interim suspension upon reversal
of conviction. If a respondent suspended solely under the provisions of paragraph (c) demonstrates that the underlying conviction has been reversed or
vacated, the order for interim suspension shall be vacated and the respondent
placed on active status. The vacating of the interim suspension shall not
automatically terminate any disciplinary proceeding then pending against
the respondent, the disposition of which shall be determined on the basis of
the available evidence other than conviction.
(g) Notice to clients and o t h e r s of interim suspension. An interim suspension under this rule shall constitute a suspension of the respondent for the
purpose of Rule 26.
Advisory Committee Note. — The phrase
"reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty*
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other

respects" refers to Rule of Professional Conduct
8.4(b).

Rule 20. Discipline by consent.
(a) Prior to riling of formal complaint A respondent against whom an
informal complaint has been filed may, prior to the filing of a formal complaint, tender a proposal for discipline by consent, including a conditional
admission to the informal complaint or portions thereof in exchange for a
disciplinary sanction in the form of an admonition, or supervised or unsupervised probation, and final disposition of the informal complaint. The proposal
shall be submitted to disciplinary counsel who shall forward the proposal to
the chair of the screening panel to which the case is assigned with a recommendation in favor of or opposed to the proposal, and a statement of the basis
for such recommendation. The screening panel chair shall either approve or
reject the proposal. If the proposal is approved, the screening panel chair shall
forward the proposal to the Committee chair for approval or rejection. If the
proposal is approved by the Committee chair, the sanction shall be imposed as
provided in this rule. If the proposal is rejected by the screening panel chair or
the Committee chair, the proposal and admission shall be withdrawn and
cannot be used against the respondent in subsequent proceedings.
(b) After tiling of formal complaint A respondent against whom a formal complaint has been filed may tender a conditional admission to the formal complaint or to a particular count thereof in exchange for a stated form of
discipline and final disposition of the formal complaint. The proposal shall be
submitted to disciplinary counsel, who shall then forward the proposal to the
district court with a recommendation in favor of or opposed to the proposal
and a statement of the basis for such recommendation. The district court shall
either approve or reject the proposal. If the district court approves the proposal and the stated form of discipline includes public discipline, it shall enter
the appropriate disciplinary order as provided in paragraph (e). If the district
court rejects the proposal, the proposal and admission shall be withdrawn and
cannot be used against the respondent in subsequent proceedings.
(c) Order of discipline by c o n s e n t The final order of discipline by consent shall be predicated upon:
(1) the informal complaint and any Notice of Informal Complaint if no
formal complaint has been filed;
(2) the formal complaint, if filed;
(3) the approved proposal for discipline by consent; and
(4) an affidavit of consent by the respondent to be disciplined.
(d) Affidavit of c o n s e n t A respondent whose proposal for discipline by
consent has been approved as provided in this rule, shall submit an affidavit
to the Committee chair or the district court as appropriate, consenting to the
imposition of the approved disciplinary sanction and affirming that:
(1) the consent is freely and voluntarily entered;
(2) the respondent is not acting under coercion or duress;
(3) the respondent is fully aware of the implications of submitting the
consent;
(4) the respondent is aware that there is presently pending an investigation into, or proceeding involving, allegations that there exist grounds
for discipline, the nature of which shall be specifically set forth;
(5) the respondent acknowledges that the material facts so alleged are
true; and
(6) the respondent submits consent because the respondent knows that
if an informal or formal complaint were predicated upon the matters
under investigation were filed, or the pending formal charges were prosecuted, the respondent could not successfully defend against the charges
upon which the discipline is based.
(e) Imposition of discipline. If the discipline by consent is an admonition
or unsupervised probation, the Committee chair shall enter the order and
impose the sanction as provided in these rules. In all other cases, the chair

